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Abstract
A design of an automatic network capacity markets, often referred to as
a bandwidth market, is presented. Three topics are investigated. First, a
network model is proposed. The proposed model is based upon a trisection
of the participant roles into network users, network owners, and market mid-
dlemen. The network capacity is defined in a way that allows it to be traded,
and to have a well defined price. The network devices are modeled as core
nodes, access nodes, and border nodes. Requirements on these are given. It
is shown how their functionalities can be implemented in a network. Second,
a simulated capacity market is presented, and a statistical method for esti-
mating the price dynamics in the market is proposed. A method for pricing
network services based on shared capacity is proposed, in which the price of
a service is equivalent to that of a financial derivative contract on a num-
ber of simple capacity shares.Third, protocols for the interaction between
the participants are proposed. The market participants need to commit to
contracts with an auditable protocol with a small overhead. The proposed
protocol is based on a public key infrastructure and on known protocols for
multi party contract signing. The proposed model allows network capacity
to be traded in a manner that utilizes the network efficiently. A new feature
of this market model, compared to other network capacity markets, is that
the prices are not controlled by the network owners. It is the end-users who,
by middlemen, trade capacity among each-other. Therefore, financial, rather
than control theoretic, methods are used for the pricing of capacity.
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Preface
This thesis proposes the use of a kind of rapid markets for controlling the
traffic in a computer network. The primary benefit from a networking per-
spective is that it allows new network services to be priced as contracts on
the fundamental capacity resources. A service price is computed from em-
pirically measured parameters of the network load. The network routers are
not involved in this computation, which reduces their load.
The communications network is assumed to be an internetwork, a collec-
tion of subnetworks each controlled only by their own organization’s manager,
such as a company, a university, etc. The subnetworks are interconnected,
and traffic typically passes through several subnetworks on its way from
source to destination. The subnetworks may admit foreign traffic at will,
and will typically do so only if there is no internal traffic congestion. Today,
congested networks simply drop traffic when they become congested.
We propose that there should be a market for subnetwork capacity. A
network user that needs a guarantee that the traffic will be admitted to a
certain subnet can buy access right, or capacity, on the market. Users will
typically leave the actual trading to a middleman that handles the compli-
cated deliberation of when and what to trade.
In order to obtain an efficient market, i.e. one in which the prices are
such that the total network capacity is used maximally, the derived goods
must be correctly priced. For the network to be usable, the trading must be
rapid, the price computations must not be too demanding for the traders,
and the communication overhead must not be large. To these ends, we
propose a network architecture, goods and markets, that have precisely these
properties.
In the proposed model, the prices of network services, such as reservations
along a path, can be computed as the price of a derivative contract on the
fundamental goods at sale on the market, the capacity shares. Many other
complex network services may also be priced in a similar manner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
To enhance the abilities of the Internet to support new services, and to
promote its further growth, it is necessary to improve the ability to buy
and sell network capacity. The vision here is that of a network where spare
capacity is traded on equal terms between the network owners, the network
users, and autonomous middlemen. In such a “democratic” market, anyone
can create new network services by buying and combining network capacities
in different parts of the network, and at different times.
Capacity trading creates incentive to develop new services, and to invest
in networks and maintenance in the areas where the available functionality
and service is less than the actual demand. True market prices will also indi-
rectly control and balance the network flow, as the “invisible hand” will move
traffic away from congested, and therefore expensive, areas of the network.
With the approach proposed in this work, almost arbitrary services can be
priced, and produced, as series of trades in simple basic resources. Consider
a network user that tomorrow evening wants to see a streaming 3D video-
stream from a repository in San Fransisco, mirrored in London. To achieve
acceptable quality in terms of latency, interactivity, etc., the user needs to
reserve some capacity. This reservation is a kind of network service - “see a
movie tomorrow”. However, it is not apparent how much it should cost the
user. The actual cost will depend on which repository that is used, at what
time the user watches the movie, and the actual network load at that time.
Computing the price of a service requires complicated decisions that the
user does not want to be bothered with. The user prefers to get a definite
price quote for the service beforehand, and make his decision on that quote
alone, or the user may prefer to just state a maximal price that the service
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is worth. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework
in which network services can be priced, and produced, so that complicated
user demands can be compressed into simple price quotes.
A number of requirements on the elements are necessary to achieve this
vision. First, the network must support new services, such as sending traf-
fic down the right path, which requires configuring the signaling and traffic
control in parts of today’s networks. Second, the markets must be fast and
efficient, so that the emerging trading does not choke the network. And
third, the network capacity must be represented in a way that allows service-
producing middlemen to trade capacity combinations, which is used to pro-
duce new services.
To these ends, this thesis identifies three models; a market model, a
network model, and contract signing model. They are three important com-
ponents in a future network in which capacity can be traded rapidly and
efficiently.
This text uses the term network capacity instead of the often used term
bandwidth, as it is more general and better conveys its close relation to the
ability to send information at a certain rate.
The pricing methods, here used to price bundles of network capacity, can
also be used for other services that are produced as combinations of simple
resources, such as access to shared resources, storage, etc., although such
applications are not discussed further here.
The remainder of this chapter contains two background sections, one
about computer networks, in which networking concepts are explained, and
one about the economic and financial concepts used in the papers, and about
doing resource allocation with software agents that trade resources. The
background sections are followed by a survey of related work in using market
prices to balance network load. The next section outlines the architecture
of the network capacity market, and the roles of the participating entities,
and after that, the interaction protocols used between the participants is ex-
plained. The interaction protocol guarantees that the network access tokens
are not forgeable. The last section of this introductory chapter contains a
summary of the papers, which explains their contributions, and what work
that builds upon results from what paper.
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1.1 Background to Computer Networks
This section provides an overview of the networking concepts that are rele-
vant for motivating this work. It requires some knowledge about computer
networks to follow the reasoning about why there is a problem with cur-
rent computer networks, and to see that it is indeed possible to address the
problems without very large changes of the networking infrastructure.
This introduction does not give a complete overview of the fascinating
area of computer communication. There are many good textbooks that pro-
vide more detailed descriptions of network architectures and protocols. For
details on the hardware signaling and networking concepts, a good refer-
ence is the volume by Stallings [1]. A book that covers broader networking
concepts is the book by Comer [2]. A hands on description of the Internet
protocols can be found in the book by Stevens [3].
1.1.1 Switches and routers
Computer networks are used to send information from one computer to an-
other. Computers on a local area network, LAN, are directly connected to
each other by some bus-like shared medium, such as an Ethernet. The data
is divided into chunks, or packets, which makes it possible to send many in-
terleaved data streams concurrently. Computers on different LANs can talk
to each other if the LANs are connected with switches. A switch is a device
that is connected to two or more LANs, and forwards packets between the
LANs. The switch knows the low level network addresses of all the computers
connected to all of its LANs, and it can therefore determine which packets
that are destined to which LAN.
To support larger network clusters, the computers are assigned logical
addresses in addition to their low level network addresses. The network
devices that forward packets based on the logical addresses are called routers.
A router is able to forward packets, even if the destination is not on any of
its LANs, by forwarding to another router that is closer to the destination.
To do so, the router has a routing table that maps every logical address to
another router, that is next in the path. For central routers, or core routers,
this table is very large, and this makes routing slower than switching.
The network routers and switches are simple forwarding devices. They
do not store the packet until it knows that the packet has arrived safely at
its destination, or at the next router. This make them cheap to produce,
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Figure 1.1: A computer network. Boxes are network devices such as host
computers, routers or switches. Thick lines are network media. H1 and H2
are logical host addresses. When H1 sends a data packet to H2, first of all,
since H2 is not on LAN1, H1 gets the low level address to its gateway router,
and sends the packet with LAN techniques to R1 by sending it to LAN1.
The switch S1 detects the packet on LAN1 and forwards it to LAN2, where
R1 gets the packet. R1 examines the packet, determines that the next router
is R2, gets R2’s low level address, and sends the packet to LAN3. The switch
S2 detects that the packet should go to LAN4. On LAN4 router R2 gets the
packet and sees that it should go to H2 on LAN5. H2 on LAN5 gets the
packet.
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and very fast. However, it is possible that a packet does not arrive at its
destination, due to transmission errors, or network congestion. Some part of
the network must be responsible for detecting this, and retransmit the packet.
In computer networks, it is the host computers, the sender and receiver, that
are responsible for detecting loss and ensuring that the packet is delivered.
In computer networks, the “intelligence”, i.e. the book-keeping, buffer-
ing, and retransmission logic, is placed in host computers, and not inside
the network forwarding devices. The idea to decouple from the core of the
network is called the end-to-end design principle. It is an important design
principle of the Internet [4, 5]. It states that the core functionality should be
kept simple and fast, and that more complex functionality should be built
by adding intelligence at the edge, and without modifying the core network.
An example of this kind of protocols is the TCP protocol, which is explained
below.
1.1.2 Best effort service
LANs use request-to-send, time slots, or similar signaling to prevent multiple
senders to transmit at the same channel at the same time [1]. Such signaling
cannot be extended beyond longer distances than the LAN, without causing a
big slowdown in the effective transmission speed. The effective transmission
time is decreased because each sender must wait for the signal to propagate to
all parts of the network, and back, before it can start to transmit. To keep
the LANs small and fast, network switches and routers do instead buffer
incoming packets from one LAN before it is sent to another LAN. This way,
a sender on one LAN must not get a clear to send signal from the computers
on the other LAN. The buffers cannot be too large, partly for cost reasons,
but also because large buffers will increase the maximal transition time in
the network, as packets may spend more time in buffer queues. This will
degrade the performance of protocols, such as TCP (see sec. 1.1.7.1), that
use the round trip time to discover packet loss.
Since the buffers are bounded, it may occur that a network device receives
more incoming traffic than it can fit in the buffers. It must then discard some
of the packets. The simplest approach is to simply handle packets in the order
they arrive, and throw away excess packets that do not fit in the buffer. This
strategy is called best effort service.
The public Internet was initially a number of separate networks that
were interconnected through gateway routers, and it got its name from the
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Internet Protocol [6], which provides logical addresses to the hosts, and does
the routing between LANs. The networks only provided best effort service to
each other, and that made it uncomplicated to configure the networks to talk
to each other. It also let the neighbor network connect to their neighbors,
and that rapidly resulted in high connectivity. Today, commercial companies
sell reduced best effort service to consumers, such as limited Variable Bit
Rate (see next subsection), where they throw away traffic above the traffic
rate limit. In other words, they throw away more packets than they might
have been able to handle. Between each other, operators may instead use
Available Bit Rate, and charge for traffic volume, peak size and duration, so
that they do not throw away packets unnecessarily. The end-to-end Internet
service is still fundamentally a best effort network. See [7, 8, 9] for more
information about how the Internet best effort access and Inter-connection
is priced today, and the problems associated with the pricing.
Best effort service works well in lightly loaded networks, and the sparsely
bursty nature of today’s network traffic is indeed low on average, with occa-
sional load peaks [10]. The backside of best effort service is that the network
is unable to guarantee a delivery deadline time, a so-called real-time guar-
antee. It is impossible to know the number of necessary retransmissions of
packets dropped due to congestion before the traffic gets through to the des-
tination. The fundamental reason for this is that traffic from any part of
the network may interact and cause congestion and packet loss in completely
unrelated traffic flows that traverse the same routers on some part of the
path.
1.1.3 Quality-of-Service provision
The best effort service cannot provide delivery guarantees, and may experi-
ence huge sporadic losses and transmission delays. The expected demand for
services that are more sensitive to the transmission quality will require that
some traffic gets better network service, by being prioritized in the network.
Quality-of-Service provision, or QoS [11], is a general term for a number of
different approaches with the aim to provide service guarantees in packet-
based computer communication networks.
The qualitative QoS level, or QoS type, is typically one of the following
(these are the ATM QoS types [2])
• Constant Bit Rate (CBR) specifies a fixed bit rate so that data is sent
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in a steady stream.
• Variable Bit Rate (VBR) provides a specified throughput capacity but
data is not sent evenly.
• Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR) does not guarantee any throughput levels.
• Available Bit Rate (ABR) provides a guaranteed minimum capacity
but allows data to be bursted at higher capacities when the network
load is low.
The quantitative QoS level sets the parameters in the QoS types above. As
an example, a network may provide the QoS of 1Mb/s CBR between two
edge nodes.
The fundamental idea behind QoS is that the network handles traffic
differently depending on the application and the kind of data being sent. An
application sending live video to a viewer has very different quality demands
on delay and loss, compared to an application doing remote system backup
and archiving. When a packet network becomes congested, data packets have
to be delayed, or dropped, and it is the QoS policy that determines which
packets to prioritize, and which to delay or drop. A live real-time media
stream should be forwarded with minimal delay and loss, as it will otherwise
experience skips, jitter, and long startup times, while a batch file transfer
may get sufficient service while only using the network when it is otherwise
unused.
Network devices apply different policies to stop a flow, or a flow aggregate,
from exceeding its allowed rate. When the data packets are temporarily
buffered, and sent out at a smoother rate, the device performs shaping of the
traffic. When excess packets simply are thrown away, the device performs
policing of the traffic.
There are many ways to measure the traffic rate and to determine if the
traffic is out-of-bounds [11]. A popular filter, which exists in many variants,
is the token bucket filter. A token bucket lets the send rate fluctuate, but it
limits the total amount of traffic that can be sent in an interval. A virtual
bucket of tokens is filled with a constant rate, up to the maximal capacity of
the bucket. A packet that is sent remove tokens from the bucket proportional
to the packet size. If there are no tokens left, the packet is buffered until
enough tokens have come in to the bucket (see fig. 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: The graph shows the result of applying a token bucket filter to
a Poisson stream. The x-axis displays time, and the y-axis displays number
of packets or tokens. Incoming packets arrive in bursts to the token bucket
filter. The filter smooths out the traffic by buffering excess traffic and sending
it later. Unused capacity can be saved and used for small bursts, e.g. the
burst around time 14 above. The finite bucket size disallows storing of large
amounts of unused capacity (not shown in this example). The graph is from
a simulation made in Octave/Matlab.
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Besides streaming video, other applications may also benefit from real-
time delivery guarantees. Distributed computation, such as GRID computing
[12], is today limited by the inter-computer communication delays [13]. Bet-
ter guarantees for the communication delays are needed to better partition
the large computational problems in sizes that keep the GRIDed computers
busy.
As some services benefit from QoS at the expense of others, the question
of pricing is central. Without any associated cost, everyone would simply de-
mand the highest possible service level at all times. It is therefore important
to associate a cost to the QoS-level, so that end-users choose service level
according to their preferences.
Today, the pricing of network access is mostly static, since it is based
on long-term agreements made outside of the network. An end-user has
a monthly subscription to an Internet provider’s access, or two Internet
providers have established Service Level Agreements, SLA, for peering traffic
between each other. Subscription schemes and interconnection agreements
which do not necessarily relate to usage dominate the currently practiced
allocation policies (see [14]).
The relevant time-scale for pricing of QoS is typically on the size of the
duration of a connection. With longer time-scales, the pricing will not provide
an incentive for the users to reduce their traffic in case of congestion.
Various disciplines have approached the QoS problem from different an-
gles. Game theoretic analysis of network QoS involves analyzing the incen-
tives to cheat the traffic level scheme by assigning a too high, or too low,
priority to one’s traffic [15, 16]. Queuing theory makes statistical models of
router load, in order to determine how parameters, such as arrival rate or
buffer size, control the asymptotic system behavior, whether the buffer size
will grow unboundedly or not, etc., cf. [17, 18].
1.1.4 Traffic engineering
A network owner, or operator, has a network consisting of gateway routers
connected to other networks, and a core network with switches and routers.
The network owner may want to sell the capacity in the network, or maximize
the throughput for its users. The existence of methods for measuring capacity
and rebalancing traffic within one network is therefore necessary for capacity
trading, while the details of these methods are outside of the scope for this
background.
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As we saw above, traffic from the gateways through the network may
cause congestion in the core. One approach to reduce the risk of congestion
and to improve the network throughput is to use traffic engineering methods.
Traffic engineering is concerned with performance optimization of traffic
handling in operational networks, with focus on minimizing over-utilization
of capacity when other capacity is available in the network. In other words,
its focus is to even out the load in the network links, by rebalancing traf-
fic in existing networks, rather than by dimensioning new networks. Traf-
fic engineering encompasses measuring or estimating the available capacity,
modeling, and control of the traffic.
Several load balancing algorithms use different variations of the multi-
commodity flow problem to model network load. A multi-commodity flow
problem is formally the problem of finding the maximum flow between any
two vertices in a graph, with edges with limited capacity, involving multiple
commodities, in which each commodity has an associated demand and source-
sink pair. Abrahamsson et al. [19] present an intra-domain routing algorithm
for load-sensitive forwarding over many paths. The gateways are sources and
sinks for different flows, or commodities, that must be fitted into the system
of pipes that model the network.
Traffic measurements are traditionally divided into active and passive
measurements. Active measurement is intrusive and consists of probing of
the network by sending test packets and monitor their arrival and inter-arrival
times [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Sending packets back-to-back and monitor how far
apart they arrive, will discover if routers on the path have full buffers not.
Active measurements are sometimes used before starting up a new connection
and during a session. The alternative method, passive measurements, collects
statistics from internal network nodes and tries to estimate available capacity
afterward. An approach to passively measuring one-way-delay is to generate
a time stamp and a unique packet ID for each packet of interest at the
involved measurement points [25, 26].
1.1.5 Routing
Routing is the task of deciding which way data traffic should be sent. Routing
is performed on different levels: inside a domain, and between domains. In
the former case, the traffic is forwarded in the core network of one operator.
The forwarding devices can be a mix of routers and switches, and the network
owner may use traffic engineering methods to preconfigure paths between
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the network gateways. For routing between domains, the routing consists of
finding a path that spans over several independent networks. The gateway
routers decide to which gateway the packet should be sent next. The routing-
decisions may or may not take into account parameters such as quality, cost,
prior obligations, and fault tolerance.
The network devices run two types of protocols, forwarding protocols,
and routing protocols. The former are used for sending the actual traffic,
while the latter is used for configuring the routers so that they know where
to send the traffic. There are four major types of forwarding protocols,
destination-based forwarding, source-based forwarding, circuit switching, and
label switching [1, 2].
Destination-based forwarding uses routing tables to decide where to send
the packets. A routing table is indexed by the destination address, and lists
to which of the neighboring routers that the traffic should be sent. The
destination address is written in the packet header, and the router looks up
in the table where to the packet should be sent next. The routing tables can
be configured manually, or through the use of protocols that automatically
discover paths and update the routing tables. The routing table may contain
multiple potential next hops, and select randomly among them, or by some
other strategy. This can be useful for load-balancing within the network.
Source-based forwarding does not use routing tables. Instead, the sender,
or source, writes the list of hops that the packets should be sent into the
packet header. It relieves the router of finding the next hop, and moves the
routing task to the traffic source. The source route may be just a coarse
description of the path, where only some hops are written into the packet
header. Between the hops, the network uses destination-based forwarding to
relay the traffic toward the next router on the path.
An alternative to destination-based and source-based forwarding is the
circuit-switched forwarding, or circuit switching. It is used in Telecom net-
works in forwarding protocols such as ATM, for delay-sensitive applications
such as telephony. It consists of a startup phase where the path is established
through the use of routing tables. The nodes on the path are configured to
take packets that arrive in a certain time slot on a certain input interface and
forward them to a specific output port. If the entire path, or circuit, can be
established, the packets can be forwarded without any routing information
at all in the header.
A mix between circuit switched routing and the packet-based routing is
the label switching. It can speed up the forwarding inside a domain by caching
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routers, and by using a simpler routing table. Inside the domain, a temporary
label in the packet header is used for routing, instead of the destination
address. When a packet enters a domain, the gateway adds the label to the
packet header, based on the destination address. All subsequent packets in
the same flow get the same label. Inside the network, the routing decisions
on the next hop are cached in a table indexed with the packet label. Since
subsequent packets do not have to be routed, the internal nodes will have to
do much less routing than with normal destination-based routing, and since
the label switching caches are simple indexed tables, they are much faster to
do lookup in. If the internal routing is turned off for some labels, the label
switching caches can be preconfigured to use certain paths for certain labels.
By doing that, the gateway can send some traffic along one by assigning one
label to it, and send other traffic down another by assigning another label to
it.
The routing tables are updated by the routing protocols, which are run
asynchronously in the background on the routers. Most popular are variants
of link-state, and distance-vector protocols. Examples of such protocols are
given below.
In a link-state protocol, each node probe the state of the links to its
neighbors. It then reports this states to its neighbors, which then propagate
this info to their neighbors, etc. Each node individually puts together the
local routing table from the link-state reports of the other nodes. In distance-
vector protocols, each node communicates the distance to all other nodes to
its neighbors. The neighbors may then update their distance tables from this
information. The routing tables are built to forward traffic to the neighbor
who is nearest to the destination. Distance-vector protocols converge more
slowly than link-state protocols.
More sophisticated QoS routing finds routes that obey more than one
given constraints on delay, throughput, jitter, latency, loss, etc., and it may
route traffic with different service demands along different paths. QoS routing
is a hard problem since it involves multiple criteria. Several approaches take
a global optimization approach to finding suitable paths. To find a multi-
constrained path is NP-hard [27]. Ergun et al. [28] cast the routing problem
as the NP-hard minimal spanning tree for multiple weights, and investigate
the effect on routing from approximative solutions. Ju¨ttner et al. [29] use
Lagrange relaxation to solve the same class of problem. Chen et al. [30, 31]
show an approximation to find multi-constrained paths in polynomial time
by discretizing some parameters and minimizing the other metrics based on
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constraints on the discretized metric.
1.1.6 Fault tolerance
Today, routing fault tolerance is managed by the network routing protocols.
If a link breaks, the routing tables will eventually be updated to use a new
path. The fact that fault tolerance is not handled at the edge makes it im-
possible to design different fault tolerance schemes for different applications,
and to use external knowledge to improve routing. If source routing was
available, an application could send traffic among more than one path to
the destination, and minimize the risk that the virtual connection is broken.
Today source routing is usually disabled for end-users in the Internet routers,
since it has been exploited by hackers in denial-of-service attacks, cf. [32].
The routing protocols is part of what made the Internet popular as the
“network that reconfigures itself after partial destruction.” It none the less
conflicts with the end-to-end principle to keep the intelligence at the edge.
That principle is what made the Internet useful for the host of services that
exist today, and most of which were unthought of at the time when the
Internet protocol was designed.
Without source-routing controlled by the edge, it is impossible to add
more fault-tolerance and new services without modifying the routers in the
network. Decoupling inter-domain routing decisions from the network, opens
up the network to completely new end-to-end services. Fault-tolerant virtual
links can be created by reserving capacity along several different physical
paths, and multiplexing the traffic over them, as the virtual path is less
sensitive to failure in one of the physical links. Unfortunately, source routing
creates an increase in the risk for denial-of-service attacks. However, that
risk is removed if there is a cost associated with using the network, and if it
is possible to reserve network capacity.
1.1.7 Internet network services and protocols
This section provides a qualitative description of the most common Internet
protocols for routing, resource allocation, and load balancing. Contrasting
these protocols to the market-based approach makes it clearer how a network
with capacity trading differs from the current best effort network.
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1.1.7.1 IPv4 and IPv6, and TCP
The original Internet Protocol, IPv4 [6, 3], and the new version IPv6 [33, 34],
delivers packets between network hosts. The protocol specifies how the packet
header should be interpreted, so that the routers will know where to send
the packet next. IP only provides unreliable delivery. It means that the
forwarding nodes do not verify that the packet reaches the destination, nor
does it inform the sender if the packet is lost on the way.
IPv4 uses the 32-bit destination address, and IPv6 the 128-bit destination
address, for the forwarding decision. This decision is based on a routing table
which has an entry for each destination address, that lists the next hop. The
IPv6 header also has a flowlabel field that can be used for label switching.
The routing tables are updated through asynchronous processes that run
in the background on the routers. They continuously compose new routing
tables, depending on the state of the network. Today, the Internet Protocol
routers most often use the OSPF and BGP4 (see sec. 1.1.7.2).
Both IPv6 and IPv6 has a byte in the header that determines how the
packets should be handled in case of congestion. It is called the Type-of-
service, or TOS, byte in IPv4, and the DS-field in IPv6, in DiffServ termi-
nology. This byte specifies the service class, and informs the router how the
packet should be handled in case of congestion. This functionality is imple-
mented, but is usually turned off in public routers, since there is no good or
fair way for a network owner to grant higher service to some public users.
The Transport Control Protocol, TCP, is a protocol that runs on top of
the IP layer. In TCP, the receiver acknowledges all received data with an
ACK message, and the sender buffers the sent data until an ACK is received.
If no ACK is received, the sender retransmits the data.
TCP uses two windows to control the send rate. One is the receiver-
controlled offered window (also called advertized window), written in the
ACK, that tells the sender how many more bytes he may send. It inhibits
the sender from flooding the receive buffer of a slow receiver. See fig. 1.3.
The other is the congestion window, which limits the number of packets that
may be sent without receiving acknowledgment.
Packet losses are detected by using a timer that triggers after two times
the network round-trip time. The designer of the TCP congestion avoidance
conjectured that losses are more likely due to congestion than to transmission
errors [35], and if the senders voluntarily reduce their send rate when they
detect a packet loss, the congestion will go away, and the entire network will
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Figure 1.3: Receiver controlled rate control in the TCP protocol. Above,
the receiver has received 50 bytes, and has ten more in the receive buffer.
The ACK is in transit and tells the sender that it can send 30 bytes more,
i.e. up to 80 bytes in the stream. An earlier ACK (not shown) told the
sender that it could send up to byte 70 in the stream, and now that packet
is in transit. Below, the sender has received the ACK and has sent the next
ten data bytes. Two ACKs are in transit, one for each received packet. The
application has handled all the packet in the receive buffer, and the last ACK
therefore signals that the offered window is 30. The congestion window is
not shown in the figure.
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eventually recover from the congestion. The senders decrease their send rate
in two ways. First of all, when a packet loss occurs, the congestion window
size is set to one, and increased more slowly than if there is no congestion.
Second, for every consecutive loss, the retransmission interval is doubled, in
order to prevent the network from being flooded by retransmissions.
Different actual TCP implementations have different ways to increase
the window size again. The implementations are often named after their
corresponding BSD Unix release, with names like as Tahoe, Reno, etc. The
different flavors work together, since the protocol does not require a particular
sender behavior to work.
There is also a number of service protocols that are used together with IP,
of which the most important are ARP, DNS, and ICMP, that bind hardware
addresses to logical addresses, bind logical addresses to names, and handle
signaling between neighbors. For more details, the IP protocol suite is given
a thorough explanation in [3].
1.1.7.2 BGP4 and OSPF
The Border Gateway Protocol, BGP4 [36], is a routing protocol that con-
struct paths between Internet domains, called autonomous systems, AS. An
AS is a subnetwork with its own management, for instance the network of a
large company, a university, or an Internet provider. The AS is connected to
the rest of the Internet through gateway routers that run BGP4. Each AS has
a unique identification number assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority, IANA, upon request. BGP4 builds a table with an entry for each
AS, containing the list of AS numbers on the path from the gateway to the
destination AS. The BGP4 nodes operate like a distance-vector protocol, and
send their routing tables to each other at regular intervals. Since BGP4 com-
municates the complete paths between the ASs, not just the node distance,
it can prune routing loops, and converges faster than a pure distance-vector
protocol.
The table determines which of the gateways that should handle traffic to
which other AS. The responsible gateway is the gateway that has the shortest
distance to the destination AS, measured as the number of AS on the list.
BGP4 does not take into account available capacity, delay, number of actual
router hops, etc., and therefore does not balance the network load.
Inside a network domain, or AS, the Open Shortest Path First protocol,
OSPF [37], constructs paths between the border gateways of the AS. It is
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a link-state protocol. Its predecessor was the distance-vector protocol RIP,
which is being phased out of the networks because of its slower convergence
towards consistent routing tables.
Since Internet uses coarse routing protocols such as BGP4, it is impossible
for a user to specify and use an alternative if the default is congested. In this
respect, BGP4 and OSPF are actually violating the end-to-end principle.
Today the “peering traffic”, i.e. the traffic flow between different net-
work owners’ domains, is regulated in Service Level Agreements, SLA. The
SLAs are bilateral contracts between network owners. They define how much
of the traffic coming from one network that the other network should for-
ward through its own network. Because SLAs only concern the two involved
subnetworks they do not provide service along the entire path through the
network. One can therefore not sell capacity on any other level than as net-
work access. This fact together with BGP, makes it impossible for users
to combine capacity in several networks to constitute a complete path with
coherent service level.
1.1.7.3 RSVP and IntServ
For the next version of the Internet Protocol, it was decided that it was
important to have capacity reservation. Therefore the Reservation Protocol,
RSVP [38], was developed. It is a protocol for reserving resources in many
nodes along a path. It is a two phase protocol, with a setup phase, and
a refresh phase. In the setup phase, the application initiates a request to
reserve capacity, that is sent sequentially to the routers, asking them to
temporarily reserve capacity. Each router forwards the request to the next
RSVP capable router. If all requests succeed, the initiator is informed of the
success, but if any of the routers is unable to reserve capacity, the reservation
is terminated. When the first phase succeeds, the second phase starts, in
which the transmission takes place. The initiator continuously has to confirm
that the reservation is still demanded, by sending a message to the concerned
routers, otherwise they will terminate the reservation.
This protocol has the disadvantage that it keeps capacity temporarily
reserved during the reservation phase. If there is a large number of allocation
requests being handled at the same time, much of the capacity will be in
temporary reserved state, even though no request will be able to succeed
along the entire path. It also maintains a soft state for each reservation,
which results in an enormous burden if the number of reservations is large,
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and it requires constant signaling to all routers to keep the reservation up.
Other reservation protocols exist, and while they are not in common use,
an alternative, often cited model, is the broker architecture for trading QoS
presented in Zhang et al. [39]. It uses a domain-wide access node called
a “bandwidth broker”, which performs a centralized version of the RSVP
reservation within one domain. It knows the current load in the nodes, and
can therefore grant or deny access immediately.
The IntServ protocol is used to reserve capacity in network nodes or
links. It specifies a number of service classes intended to cover the demand
of the current and future network services, such as Guaranteed QoS, and
Controlled-Load. The classes define how the routers should handle packets
in flows that have reserved capacity in a specific class. In theory, it could
use any reservation protocol, but it has only been suggested to use RSVP
to setup the reservation, and therefore suffers from the same problems that
RSVP experiences under high reservation demands. IntServ is not considered
to scale up to the traffic volumes that flow through the Internet core nodes.
1.1.7.4 DiffServ
The DiffServ protocol [40] addresses IntServ’s scalability issues by multi-
plexing all flows into a small number of predefined traffic classes, currently
Expedited Forwarding [41] and Assured Forwarding [42], that specify the
hop-by-hop behavior that the routers should implement. The former class is
a high priority class that is routed as quickly as possible, and the latter class
provides statistically better service than the best effort service. While the
IntServ core routers have to shape and handle packets on a per flow basis,
DiffServ routers queue, route, mark, and shape packets on a per-class basis.
Although DiffServ allows different flows for different routes, DiffServ is
not a routing protocol, but a control-protocol that tells how packets in a
class should be treated in case of congestion. All microflows in one class get
the same treatment. Since it works on an aggregated level, DiffServ can-
not provide any absolute quality guarantees for individual streams. If more
traffic is sent into a class than the router can handle, all streams experience
the same loss probability. Routers at the border of a DiffServ subnet, DS,
are responsible for traffic conditioning, according to a traffic conditioning
agreement.
As was pointed out by Van Jacobson [43], “A differentiated services mech-
anism must work at the scale of the Internet, (e.g., millions of networks) and
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at the full range of speeds of the Internet (e.g., Gbit/s links). The Internet is
growing at 20% per month. To get that kind of scaling the design must: push
all the state to the edges, and force all per-conversation work (e.g., shaping,
policing) to the edges.”
With DiffServ, packets are filtered and smoothed at the edges of the
network, and one relies on SLAs between network providers, outside the
scope of the protocol, to make sure that a traffic class is treated equally
across network domains. IntServ, on the other hand, requires a reservation
phase before it can start sending/receiving, and it also requires that streams
are policed in each reservation node.
DiffServ is intended to be used with access control. When a new request to
send traffic arrives, the access control determines if the network can support
the new stream without too large effects on the already available traffic. The
access is controlled only at the network edge, as it is considered to be too
costly to talk to all nodes along the path. The network owner can grant
access, since it is only responsible for guaranteeing the quality of service
within its own network. When traffic is sent to the next domain, Service
Level Agreements between the providers are used to establish how a traffic
class in one domain should be translated into a class in the other domain. The
packets may for instance be down-classed if the SLA states that the receiver
only accepts a certain amount of a certain class. Therefore, no mechanism for
determining guarantees along the entire path can be given in this framework.
1.1.8 The need for market-based network capacity al-
location
Today’s network are designed on the assumption that users behave coop-
eratively, that they reduce their send rate when they detect congestion. If
the users do not reduce their transmission rates fast enough, they cause a
congestion collapse of the Internet [44]. It happened several times during the
fall of 1986 [35]. Since then, TCP performs an exponential transmission rate
reduction when it experience packet loss [45]. However, since it is easy to
reprogram the computer to send traffic faster, the current network is sensi-
tive to malicious users. Its vulnerability is recently shown in the distributed
denial of service attacks [46]. It is therefore important to control the network
traffic by other means than relying on self-sacrificing users. One solution to
this problem is to charge the end-user for the network use. Sec. 1.3 discusses
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the pricing of Internet capacity and access.
1.1.9 Existing bandwidth markets
For companies, there are already markets for trading network capacity. The
markets are managed by network broker companies such as Band-X, Amerex
Bandwidth, Arbinet, RateXchange, and TFS Telecom [47]. The trading is
handled by human middlemen who accept offers on the telephone, or via the
web. The traded commodity is of different granularity, ranging from month-
long contracts of dark fiber, over arbitrary links with T1 transmission speed,
up to routed IP traffic. The process to define a standardized bandwidth
commodity is moving slowly, since most major Telecom providers prefer to
sell capacity discretely, one customer at a time [48].
To trade on these markets, one must be physically connected to one of
the exchange locations run by the network brokers. The physical or logical
recoupling of the network paths is managed at the exchange locations by
network managers. It is then up to the customer to reconfigure his routing
tables to use the acquired capacity, without support from the Internet routing
protocols.
The markets are directed towards large network capacity consumers, such
as service providers or large companies. The traded goods is specified in large
capacity chunks, and for long duration. Although they certainly appear to
move toward more rapid trading of short term capacity, too much is missing
in the market and in the network to make automated trading on the network
capacity consumer level possible.
There is not yet any specific market for trading bundles of network ca-
pacity. Such services are, if requested, managed by the human brokers at
the broker companies. Nor are network capacity derivatives traded on these
markets yet. One reason for this is certainly the large price fluctuations that
appear on these markets. One potential cause for this is that the trading oc-
curs on a timescale that is fairly long compared to the technical innovations
that drive the network capacity increase. It seems likely that it is easier to
model the price fluctuations better on short time scales, since they are not as
severely affected by dramatic changes in the available capacity and demand
that occurs on longer time scales.
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1.2 Background to Economic Theory
This section introduces some of the fundamental concepts in economics, such
as utility, optimum, and equilibrium. These concepts are useful when dis-
cussing how a group of individuals should go about to divide a set of resources
among themselves.
1.2.1 Utility functions
Consider a resource with bounded amount C, and n persons that want to
have the resource. The resource could be anything from plant fertilizer to
network capacity, and the persons can be farmers that grow corn, or couch-
potatoes that want to watch streaming video. Here we are interested in how
the resource should be split between the persons, if someone should get more
or less than the others.
The final allocation is represented with an allocation vector x = (x1, ..., xn)
′,
where xi is the quantity of the resource that is given to person i, and xi ≥ 0.
In general there may be many kinds of goods involved, and xi could be a
multi-commodity allocation vector where xij specify the amount of goods
j that is allocated to user i, but to keep things simple, we only consider
one resource here. The amount of allocated resource must be less than the
available amount,
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ C
The persons, which are typically called agents in economics, have a dif-
ferent preference for different amounts of the resource. One allocation may
be very good, while another may be useless. These preferences are encoded
into utility functions. The utility function maps an allocation vector to a real
number in such a way that higher numbers are better, or u(x) ≥ u(x′) iff the
agent prefers x to x′.
If the resource is used in production, the agent’s utility is a concave
function if the resource utilization shows diminishing returns. For instance,
the amount of crop the farmer can get on a given area is a concave function
of the amount of fertilizer placed on the field. Similarly, the couch-potato’s
video experience is only improved by more capacity up to a certain level,
after which it makes no difference to have more capacity.
22 Network capacity sharing with QoS
If all agents have the same utility function u(·), then one can compute
the global utility G(x) = nu(x). The global utility is relevant for agents that
work together toward a common goal, such as departments in a company,
where the total earnings of the company is dependent on the earnings of the
individual departments.
The agents may also have different utility functions, ui(·). If ui only
depends on how much resource that is allocated to agent i, then the agent is
termed self-centered. Self-centered is an important class of agents, since they
are able to make rapid local decisions. Agents whose preference also depend
on how the utility is allocated to the other agents are called social.
The agents may disagree on which allocations that are better than others.
It can be due to different individual knowledge, goals, or abilities. They may
also disagree on the relative “goodness” of the different allocations, in which
case the allocation must be left to an external allocator. If all the utility
functions are publicly known, a centralized allocator can compute an optimal
allocation by maximizing the global utility function
G(x) =
n∑
i=1
ui(x)
It will not maximize the individual utilities, but rather the total system
performance. Other ways to combine utilities into a global utility are also
possible. For instance
G∗(x) =
(
n∑
i=1
(ui(x)−G(x)/n)2
)−1
minimizes the variance, or “spread”, in utility between the agents.
Above, we have assumed that the utilities are publicly known. This is
typically not the case, as agents may benefit individually from keeping the
preferences to themselves, even if the global utility gets lower. If the utility
functions are not publicly known, a central allocator must collect them from
the agents before computing the optimal allocation. If this is the case, the
agents may profit from overstating their utility functions. Consider the case
with two agents, with utilities and constraints according to
ui(x) = ki log(xi + 1)
x1 + x2 = 1
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The allocation
x1 =
2k1 − k2
k1 + k2
, x2 = 1− x1
obtains maximal global utility. Now, suppose k1 = k2 = 2. Then each agent
gets xi = 1/2 of the resource, and utility ui = 2 log(3/2). The global utility
is G = u1 + u2 = 2 log(9/4). On the other hand, if agent 1 “lies” to the
allocator and claims that k1 = 3, then the allocator will allocate x1 = 4/5 to
agent 1, which gives agent 1 a higher utility, but the true global utility will
be lower, G = 2 log(54/25).
1.2.2 Money as utility
The above shows that the concept of utility has difficulties when it comes to
handling the relative demands of agents. Since the utility only is a numerical
preference ordering of alternatives, it does not allow one to compare utilities
with each other. One cannot compare the numerical utility values between
individuals [49]. The utilities must be normalized so that they become com-
parable.
One possible normalization is to use currency as the unit of the utility
function. The demand for a resource is expressed as the price at which one
is willing to buy the resource. Expressing demand in terms of prices on
individual goods is to make a very strong assumption on how the utility
function can be normalized. An apparent problem is that to humans, money
does not have a linear demand curve, which is what the assumption above
implies. When one has little money, e100 is food for a few weeks, but for a
millionaire, it is the price of a dinner.
A fair universal welfare function in technical terms respects unanimity,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and is non-dictatorial. If it exists,
it can be used to define the socially optimal resource allocation. However,
no such function exists for three or more users, which is stated in Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem [50]. Since no fair allocation exists, it cannot be fair
(in Arrow’s sense) to use money to express utility. However, money is often
used as a stand-in for the utility function, and produces reasonable results.
Equating utility and money is more suitable when modeling the inter-
actions between companies, and similar entities, where one decides which
production methods to use to achieve a given goal. It is also useful for in-
vestors that invest capital for the sole purpose of increasing the capital, as it
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simplifies the comparison between different investment objects into compar-
ing the probability distribution and expected value of the yield.
Economic models for resource allocation have the advantage that they
can solve certain problems related to resource sharing, such as the problem
called the tragedy of the commons [51]. When n shepherds let their m sheep
graze on the public common grass, the commons were destroyed because
the shepherds had too many sheep on the common. Although everybody
lost from destroying the common, each individual shepherd benefited from
adding more sheep to his flock. The reason was that the cost for the sheep
was payed by all the shepherds who got thinner sheep, while the profit of the
extra sheep went to a single shepherd. The solution suggested in [51] is that
the access to common resources is sold off in an auction. The market price
for the resource access will be that at which the demand equals the (finite)
supply.
Economic mechanisms can be used to make interaction incentive com-
patible, meaning that the participants benefit the most from declaring their
preferences. It facilitates and improves the resource allocation if no-one has
an advantage of lying. One example of such a mechanism is the Clarke tax
[52]. With this mechanisms, each agent pays an extra fee determined by the
impact of the agent’s bid on the allocation to the others. If the allocation
is the same with or without the agent’s bid, the tax is zero. If the agent’s
bid reduces the utility for the others, he is taxed with the difference in util-
ity experienced by the others. With this tax in place, the highest utility is
received if one is honest. There are however problems with the Clarke tax,
as it accumulates tax money, and it does not work if the agents collude.
1.2.3 Markets and pricing
A market is the, not necessarily physical, place, where the trading is carried
out. The trading is regulated by trading rules that define how traders talk
to each other, in terms of bids, specification of goods, and default clauses.
The trading gives rise to prices that can be observed. There exist a number
of different theories, with different levels of sophistication, for how the prices
behave, and how they can be computed [53, 54]. First we will discuss some
properties of markets, and then touch upon pricing theories.
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Market places
In auctions, a number of bidders that can be either buyers or sellers place
bids until the auction clearing rules determines that the bidding period is
over. Then the prices are computed, and the goods exchanged according to
the market rules. See [55, 56] for an introduction to auctions.
There is a long list of different options regarding the auction rules, so
we will only mention a few. The bidders may be allowed to update their
bids zero or more times before the auction clears. Auctions may clear when
the price has reached a certain limit, or at a certain time. An auction uses
sealed bids if the bids are kept secret from the other bidders, at least until
the bidding is over, otherwise the bids are open. In an nth price auction, the
buyers pay the bid price of the nth highest bidder. Sealed nth bid auctions,
where n ≥ 2, are often used to promote honest bidding.
One popular auction type is the open outcry auction, with one seller and
many buyers. Here, the bids are public to all bidders, and they overbid each
other with non-revocable bids, only updatable upwardly, until no-one has
bid for a certain time. The advantages for the buyers is that they get a
picture of the goods’ worth by the outcries of the others, and that they do
not have to make their limit price public. The advantage to the seller is that
buyers unsure of the true value can participate in the bidding, even though
the bidders do not necessarily bid their maximum.
Another popular market type, is the continuous double auction [57, 58].
Bidders and seller place bids concurrently, and the logs of active orders are
made publicly available. The market is cleared immediately when two bids
match. The stock market is an example of a continuous double auction.
The market typically accepts two kinds of orders, limit orders, and market
orders. The former is a bid that specifies a volume and a maximum or
minimum price for trading, while a market order only specifies a volume,
and the price becomes whatever is necessary for the specified volume to be
traded. Obviously, market orders can be cleared immediately, while limit
orders may never clear.
It may happen that a deal is struck between two or more parties, but that
one of the parties for some reason does not deliver, either money or goods.
This can be very costly to the other party. To reduce this risk, some markets
have an elaborate system with institutions that are designed to guarantee
that the trading parties will not default from (i.e. break) their deals. In
modern stock markets, the trading is handled by brokers who trade on behalf
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of their customers. They follow strict rules, set by the market place, about
how much risk they may be exposed to from their customers. The customer
has a margin account with the broker that must contain assets of a certain
value before the customer may place orders on the market. For instance, a
broker may not sell stocks for a customer, without verifying that the customer
owns the stock, or has enough money to buy the stock if they need to be
delivered. The brokers trade with each other, and have the responsibility to
deliver the assets, even if their customers default.
Market liquidity denotes how much the market price changes if someone
buys or sells a large amount of an asset [59, 60]. In a liquid market, the
price is hardly changed at all, but in an illiquid market, the price may move
considerably. In the stock market, the stock shares of small companies are
often illiquid. That means that the advertized price is not a good prediction
of the actual value of a given quantity of shares.
Another source of illiquidity is when assets are traded very seldom. It
may be difficult to find a buyer that is willing to buy when a trader wants
to trade, and vice versa. It may make the traders unsure of the correct
price, which causes the buy and sell price spread to increase. With a large
spread, it becomes more difficult to trade. Markets typically are interested in
large trading volumes, and to improve the situation, the market owner may
authorize one or more brokers, or other entities, to become market makers,
and trade with lower or no transaction costs. A market maker must guarantee
to always provide prices at which they are willing to buy and sell, and where
the prices must be sufficiently close to each other.
Pricing theories
Pricing theories attempt to explain why prices are as they are, and to predict
how they will be in the future. Different theories makes different assumptions
about the market participants.
A fundamental theory is the equilibrium pricing theory, cf. [61, 62, 63, 64].
It assumes that the market is large enough that the bids of a single agent
will not affect the price in any significant way, and that agents act as price
takers. The agents express their preferences in terms of demand and supply
functions, that are functions of one parameter; the price. The curves map
a market price to a desired traded quantity. Demand and supply curves
are monotonically decreasing and increasing, respectively. The equilibrium
pricing theory postulates that the market price is the price that makes the
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Figure 1.4: In equilibrium pricing, the market price is the price p where the
supply curve and demand curve intersect. At this price, sellers are willing
to produce the quantity q, and the buyers are willing to buy that quantity.
The curves show the aggregated demands of many individuals.
demand equal the supply (see fig. 1.4), because when the market prices are
out of equilibrium, they tend toward the equilibrium. If prices are lower,
producers do not produce, supply is small, and demand prices rise. A similar
argument can be made for prices higher than the equilibrium price.
In markets where the prices are out of their theoretically justified prices,
arbitrageurs can make profits. They are traders that make risk-less profits by
buying an asset and selling it more expensively. Arbitrage can be done be-
tween markets, for instance by someone buying a car in Germany and selling
it in Sweden, or it can be done in time, by someone buying an under-priced
asset and selling it later. The arbitrage argument in asset pricing postulates
that arbitrageurs will always operate so that no arbitrage opportunities exist.
This can be used to price assets.
One important property of a pricing theory is that it produces a unique
market price. However, if the agents have different assumptions about the
market price behavior, they will compute different prices. Therefore, a com-
mon assumption is that the agents have homogeneous expectations about the
expected return and the variance of the asset price. Even if the agents have
the same expectations, they may have different attitudes toward the risk in
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an investment.
A common risk-measure is the variance of the asset price, and it is used
in the capital asset pricing model, CAPM [65]. CAPM postulates that the
demand depends on the expected value and variance of the future value of an
asset. It is therefore a two-factor model. CAPM assumes that everyone can
invest and borrow money at the same risk-free rate, and that they can invest
in a market portfolio with the same yield as the entire market. Under the
assumptions if CAPM, the expected asset market price is a linear function
of the ratio of the standard deviations of the asset price and the market
portfolio.
In CAPM the investor uses several correlated assets to reduce the variance
of the portfolio. This technique is called hedging. The investor makes himself
less vulnerable to price fluctuation by investing in a diversity of assets.
1.2.4 Derivative pricing
This section introduces briefly the Black-Scholes option pricing. For more
details about option pricing, see the text books by Øksendahl [66] and Hull
[59].
Theories such as CAPM are not complete, in the sense that the prices
contain some undetermined parameter. Typically this parameter can be
interpreted as the investors attitude towards risk. Different investors may
want different risk premiums for different levels of risk. An investor that is
indifferent to the risk-level is called risk neutral.
Black and Scholes [67] showed in 1973 that, under certain assumptions, it
is possible to construct a portfolio consisting of options and the underlying
asset that should have the same return as a risk-free asset. The price of
such a portfolio is independent of the investor’s attitude towards risk, and a
risk-neutral and a risk-sensitive investor can agree on the price of the option.
More importantly, it means that the investor does not even have to know the
parameters for his/her risk attitude to be able to trade.
Black-Scholes model
A derivative is an asset the price of which is a function of fundamental assets
prices, current or future. The function can be arbitrarily complex. An option
contract (in this example an “european call option”) is a derivative asset that
gives the buyer the right to acquire a fundamental asset, typically a stock, at
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a future expiration time T , for a predetermined strike price B. It is a right,
but not an obligation. Although the acquisition takes place in the future,
the right to do the trade has a value today. At the time of expiration, the
value of the option is a function of the asset price S = S(T ) is
g(S) = max(S −B, 0)
since the call option is valuable only of the market-price is higher than the
strike price. Although the price at T is trivial, the current value of the option
is not. In order to compute the price, one must have a complete market.
Black and Scholes made the following assumptions about the market [67]:
a) The short-term interest rate is known and constant.
b) The fundamental asset prices move stochastically, and behave as Itoˆ
processes with variance proportional to the square of the price.
c) The asset pays no dividends.
d) The option can only be exercised at a determined date.
e) There are no transaction costs.
f) It is possible to borrow any amount to the short-term rate.
g) “short selling” is allowed, i.e. to sell an asset that one does not have,
and compensate by buying it back later.
If f(t, S) is the price of the option, S = S(0) is the current price of the
asset, and t the time until the option expires, the number of options that
must be sold short against one unit of asset long in the portfolio is
1/
∂
∂S
f(t, S)
(See below for a derivation of this result). This constructs a momentarily
perfectly hedged portfolio. The amount of capital held in assets and in option
contracts is in the literature called β and γ. One can construct a self-financing
strategy, which means that one does not have to add or remove any capital
to construct the hedge. A self-financing strategy changes the proportions of
the holdings so that the buying cost equals the selling income.
On a short time scale, the portfolio value movement caused by a move-
ment in the asset price is perfectly offset by an inverse movement in the option
price (see fig. 1.5 ). However, the prices change as a function of time and the
random movements of the asset price. The portfolio must be continuously
rebalanced in order to remain risk-free.
Assuming that there are no arbitrage opportunities, the return from the
portfolio must be the risk-free interest rate. Otherwise, an arbitrageur could
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Figure 1.5: The horizontal axis shows the time, and the vertical axis shows
the value in currency units of different assets. The first graph to the left
shows the price of an asset, and beneath is the price of a call option on the
asset, strike price 8 and expiration at t = 1. The short term rate is 0. The
graph in the middle shows how the weights of a risk-free portfolio varies over
time. Beta is the amount of the portfolio value invested in the asset, and
gamma is the amount invested in the option. The graph to the right shows
the values of the current holdings in assets and options. The line in the
middle shows the total portfolio value. Although the asset prices fluctuate,
the rebalancing keeps the portfolio value constant over time.
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borrow money and buy under-priced portfolios, and sell them for the correct
price at the expiration date, and vice versa, until the no arbitrage assumption
was satisfied.
Since risk-free portfolios can be created, brokers can make money by
selling (buying) option contracts at a price just above (below) the theoretical
price. They create a portfolio that balances out the risk, and then, except for
the rebalancing, sit back, waiting for the option to expire. The self-financing
hedge assures that they do not have to add capital to the portfolio.
Stochastic calculus in mathematical finance
Mathematical finance is, among other things, concerned with computing a
theoretical price of derivative contracts, under certain assumptions about the
asset price dynamics, and the market. Stochastic processes are treated in [66]
and mathematical finance is treated in [68]. We will hence here only list the
most important definitions and results.
The Wiener process W (t), a.k.a. Brownian motion is an example of a
stochastic process. It is a continuous function with probability 1, such that
W (0) = 0, and for any time points
0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN
the increments
W (tN)−W (tN−1), ..., W (t1)−W (t0)
are independent, and the increments are normal distributed with mean 0 and
variance ti+1 − ti, i.e.
Prob[W (ti+1) = y|W (ti) = x] = 1√
2pi(ti+1 − ti)
exp−1
2
(y − x)2
(ti+1 − ti)
TheWiener process is aMartingale, i.e. E[W (T )|Ft] =W (t), andE[|W (T )|] <
∞ for all T > t. Ft denotes the filtration up to t, or “all information gen-
erated by all observed events up to time t” [68]. For Markov type processes
like the Wiener process, all information in Ft is available inW (t). With Itoˆ’s
interpretation of the integral
∫ T
0
f(t,W (t)dW (t), it is the limit of the forward
Euler approximation dt = ti+1 − ti, and dW (t) = W (t + dt) −W (t). It has
the property
E[
∫ T
0
f(t,W (t))dW (t)|W (0) = 0] = 0
32 Network capacity sharing with QoS
since all terms in the forward Euler sum are i.i.d. with mean zero. Note
that the limit of the backward Euler approximation, or other mid-point ap-
proximations, give different results, since then f(t,W (t)) is not independent
of dW (t). Itoˆ’s interpretation is reasonable for financial applications, since
price fluctuations do not have an impact backwards in time.
Asset prices are routinely modeled as Itoˆ processes (see [59] and below),
which are processes with a drift term and a diffusion term. One standard
model for stock prices is dS(t) = µS(t)dt+σS(t)dW (t). Here the rate of the
price increase is µ, but the price in a short time span is also affected by a
the Brownian motion dW (t).
Itoˆ processes have the remarkable property that any function f(t, S(t)) of
an Itoˆ process S(t) is also an Itoˆ process. So, if the asset prices are modeled
with Itoˆ processes, and the assumptions about the market hold, then also
the derivative prices are Itoˆ processes.
Since it is the same Wiener process W (t) that generates the random
motion in both S(t) and f(t), it is possible to construct a balanced portfolio,
composed of assets and options, in which the diffusion terms cancel out. This
was shown by Black and Scholes [67]. Since the balanced portfolio is riskless,
the price of the portfolio can be computed exactly, and hence the price of
the option.
A derivation of the Black-Scholes equation
This derivation is based on the derivation in [69]. To improve readability,
we do not write out the arguments t and S(t) for the functions a, b, g, h, A,
B, dS, df, f, ∂f
∂S
, ∂
2f
∂S2
, and the argument t for S, W, dW, β, γ, and Π. All
functions are bounded.
Definition: An Itoˆ process S has the dynamics dS = a dt+ b dW , where
W is a Wiener process.
Itoˆ’s Formula (sec. 3.3 in [70]): A function f of an Itoˆ process S is an
Itoˆ process df = g dt + h dW driven by the same Wiener process W as S,
with
g =
∂f
∂t
+ a
∂f
∂S
+
b2
2
∂2f
∂S2
, and h = b
∂f
∂S
To construct the B-S portfolio, assume that the price S of an asset is an
Itoˆ process dS = a dt+ b dW as above, and that the price of an option on the
asset is f . The price of a portfolio with β assets and γ option contracts is
Π = βS + γf
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By Itoˆ’s formula,
df = g dt+ h dW , and dΠ = Adt+B dW
are Itoˆ processes.
Since both S and f are driven by the same Wiener process W , with an
appropriate choice of β and γ, they will combine into a riskless portfolio in
which the dW terms in dΠ cancel each other.
The portfolio is self-financing, i.e., ∂β
∂t
= ∂γ
∂t
= 0. Therefore
dΠ = (βa+ γg)dt+ (βb+ γh)dW
The portfolio is riskless if B = (βb+ γh) = 0, which implies
γ = −βb
h
= −β/∂f
∂S
By arbitrage arguments, the value of a risk-free investment grows with the
risk-free rate r, i.e.
dΠ = rΠdt
Equating the two expressions for dΠ gives(
βa− (β/∂f
∂S
)g
)
dt+ 0dW = r
(
βS − β/∂f
∂S
f
)
dt
which, after using g, simplifies to the Black-Scholes equation
∂f
∂t
+
b2
2
∂2f
∂S2
= −rS ∂f
∂S
+ rf
This deterministic PDE, together with sufficient boundary conditions, deter-
mines the relationship of the option price and the asset price.
Call option
The Black-Scholes equation is an instance of the Kolmogorov backward equa-
tion. Its general solution is called the Feynman-Kac formula (eq. 8.14 in [70]).
It states that the solution to the Black-Scholes equation is
f(t, S(t)) = EQ
[
e−r(T−t)g(S(T ))|S(t)]
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where g(·) is the initial condition that determines the value at time T , and
that Q is a risk neutral measure under which S(t) has the drift a(t, S(t)) = r.
Remarkably, the derivative price is therefore independent of the natural drift
function a(·).
The option price is not the expected value under the natural probability
measure, but under another measure. The reason for this is that the option is
priced with a portfolio that is constantly rebalanced so that its value follows
that of a risk-free investment. This trading can be captured in the change
of probability measure of x, and since it arises from the construction of a
risk-free port folio, it is called the risk-free measure.
It is not always possible to construct a risk-free portfolio, in which case the
market is called incomplete. Some commodity markets, in particular those
with unstorable goods, are incomplete. To be able to use risk-free portfolios
for pricing, care must be taken to model the goods so that they constitute a
complete market.
1.2.5 Relationship to the network capacity markets
In this thesis, the market price of the capacity shares is assumed to be an
Itoˆ process, and the network services are priced as derivative contracts. The
above result shows that the derivative price can be computed as an expected
value. That provides a connection between derivative pricing and Monte-
Carlo methods, which will be used to price network services in paper E.
The taken approach requires that the price process dynamics is identified,
that the parameters µ, σ, etc. are estimated from observations, as in paper
C, that the contract prices are computed, and that risk-free portfolios are
constructed.
1.2.6 Market-based resource allocation
The idea to use prices for computer resource allocation dates back to the late
sixties [71, 72]. Twenty years later, the Spawn system [73] was implemented
at Xerox PARC. It was a system for trading CPU time of idle work stations.
In Spawn, the resources of one workstation was auctioned out in time-slices.
Interested buyers placed bids in an auction, with one auction for each work-
station. The auction cleared at regular time intervals, and the winner was
awarded temporary access to the workstation. This renewed the interest in
market-based resource allocation.
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Market-based control [74] uses markets to control computer systems. A
market-based view of the system, facilitates modular modeling the system,
where components act as either buyers or sellers, and work independently of
each other. Market-based resource allocation allocates resource to those who
are willing to pay the most for the resource. Market rules and legislation
determine which deals are possible, by determining if goods may or may not
be resold in a secondary market, if the bids are cleared immediately, or when
certain criteria on bidding time, amount, price, etc., are fulfilled, and what
actions to take if somebody defaults from a closed deal.
With market-based allocation, the allocation decisions are delegated to
the participants, and not to a centralized control. Although centralized plan-
ning in theory can find optimal allocations, in practice it often cannot. Cen-
tralized planning is infeasible for control of large systems that need frequent
replanning. The communication cost to collect and disseminate information
from all parts increases rapidly, making the planner a communication bot-
tleneck. Further more, the components in open systems are self-centered
(see sec. 1.2.1), and may give the planner biased information in order to im-
prove their own utility. Market-based control, is therefore useful for problems
where no global planner can deliver a solution within reasonable time, where
the components try to maximize their own profit, and/or where sub-optimal
solutions are acceptable.
Compared to other research on negotiating software agents, where agents
can negotiate bilaterally and commit to complex contracts [75], a market-
based allocation has simpler and faster interactions. It only allows committed
bids on well defined goods, and it can therefore be faster.
Markets are robust in two senses. First, they are robust against the failure
of a centralized planner. The participants can continue to trade even if some
participants breaks down. Since there is no central planner, the system
is not vulnerable to a “single source of failure”. Second, they are robust
against misuse, such as a user overstating its demand to circumvent fairness
goals. The protocol does not rely on self-sacrificing behavior of the selfish
participants. Since the market incurs a cost on the resource users, they will
not ask for more resources than they are willing to pay for, and they have
an incentive to limit their resource demand when almost all resources are
reserved.
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1.3 Related work
A number of different suggestions on how to charge efficiently for network
traffic exist. They are typically analyzed from an economic, game-theoretic,
statistical, and/or load-balancing point of view. See [76] for a review of pro-
posed architectures and mechanisms for charging and pricing IP and ATM
networks, or [7] for a discussion on the problems with simple pricing mech-
anisms. The author of [7] note that usage-based pricing [77], which often
is used in telephony, is not good in computer networks since it charges the
user equally much when the network load is low as when the load is high. It
provides no incentive for the user not to use the network during peak load.
This and other similar characteristics of “information resources”, resources
with a production marginal cost very near or equal to zero, have been studied
by the economists Hal Varian and MacKie-Mason [78].
1.3.1 QoS levels
The idea to use only two QoS service classes is inspired by the Paris Metro
Pricing scheme [79], and the TwoBit DiffServ architecture [80]. In PMP, two
identical classes get different prices. The cheaper one will be more populated,
and therefore experience more loss, while the other is less populated and
experience less loss. Since this may leave the network under-utilized, we
instead propose to use a best effort class that may borrow from the unused
first class space, and a prioritized first class, to compose the mix. In TwoBit,
best effort traffic is mixed with premium service traffic, where the latter
provides constant bit rate to a flow. TwoBit uses a buffering leaf node that
evens out the senders traffic bursts so that they do not exceed the allowed
rate. TwoBit demands that the traffic between networks is shaped at the
network border.
1.3.2 Network admission control models
There are different schemes for incurring costs on the users, in order to make
them reduce their transmission rate. Common suggestions are to make the
user pay for network access, and/or to pay for peak transmission rates [81, 7].
Only charging for access to the first subnetwork in the from the source to
the destination has the advantage that the user only has to consider one
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resource. However, the price does not take into account the disturbance the
traffic may cause in subsequent networks.
Instead of modifying the network to guarantee traffic, one can us an
admission policy that blocks out traffic with higher demands that can be
statistically guaranteed. An approach, taken by Kelly [82] at the Statistical
Laboratory at Cambridge, and and Key et al. [83] at Microsoft, is to model
the amount of capacity along a given path that is allocated to a user with
a system of differential equations. Kelly gives Lyapunov functions for the
system, which means that he can find asymptotically stationary states, which
in turn tell the end user how much weight, i.e. money, he should mark the
packets with. The approach is easy to relate to current TCP implementations
and the proposed extensions with Explicit Congestion Notification. However,
end-users typically prefer to know in advance how much a service will cost,
and it is therefore desirable that the cost could be computed before the user
decides to use the system. This is not possible in these models, as the amount
of money necessary to send traffic varies during the session. It also does not
address the problem of how to handle the case when there are alternate paths,
as it relies on the IP for routing.
The EU funded M3I project use a Markov chain approach to compute the
network access prices [84] in an access system with different service classes.
A. R. Gibbens and Frank Kelly have published a model for access con-
trol [85], where QoS is defined as the probability of call blocking, and also
[86] which describes a packet-marking scheme and the corresponding prices.
Packet marking is one way for the end-user to signal to the routers that a
packet belongs to a particular service class. Gibbens’ work on alternative
routing paths [87], concerns how an over-congested shortest route can be re-
placed by an alternative, longer route. They use a fix-point model to analyze
the behavior such as stability and performance of this congestion avoidance
scheme.
Schele´n et al. [88, 89] at Lule˚a University have implemented an agent-
based infrastructure for more fine-grained admission control than network
admission.
Not all market-based network capacity reservation markets can avoid con-
gestion by re-routing. Since a congestion further away in the network does
not affect the price of network access, none of the above schemes give the
users the ability to avoid congested paths. Network capacity reservation pro-
tocols such as IntServ reserve the available capacity along the entire path,
but it does not give the user the ability to choose another path.
38 Network capacity sharing with QoS
1.3.3 Agent-based markets
Smart Market by MacKie-Mason and Varian [90], is an agent-based market
for QoS with self-interested agents. In Smart Market, each user attaches
a price to each packet. When the packet traverses an uncongested router,
it is forwarded as usual, but when it traverses a congested router, only the
highest bidders are forwarded. The winners only pay the amount in the
lowest winning bid, and the auction in the router is therefore an nth price
auction. It also contains game-theoretic arguments for why their model is
incentive compatible, but it has problem scaling since the routers must handle
the auctions while the packets are in transit. Other game-theoretic analysis
include Marbach [91] from U. of Toronto, Chen et al. [31] from Purdue U.,
Ben-Shahar et al. [92], and Korilis et al. [93] from Technion, Israel.
Gupta et al. [94, 95, 96], use a general equilibrium model of the market
to compute prices for access to information resources. To reduce the com-
putational complexity, they define a “stochastic equilibrium” for which they
can compute near-optimal prices, in the sense that it optimizes the total wel-
fare, and where the stochasticity is due to the limited knowledge among the
agents. Similar market-based models are also used for bandwidth allocation
by Miller et al. [97], Sairamesh et al. [98], and Fulp et al. [99]. A common
problem for most of the agent-based markets that use auctions with iterative
bidding, is that they rely on a centralized broker that computes the optimal
prices. It is unlikely that iterative bidding can become efficient enough for
very fast trading, as it requires that bids are collected, intermediary prices
are computed and distributed, and the bids are updated, until the biding
is settled. Fast markets will require that trading is done in one shot. To
this end, Chuah [100] proposes a hierarchy of brokers that estimate the ca-
pacity demand with a Gaussian estimator. Local brokers have a capacity
buffer, which they occasionally replenish from a superior broker, based on
the estimation, which enables the local brokers to rapidly respond to resource
requests.
1.3.4 Network derivatives
Most work on network pricing has focused on pricing network access, but
some efforts to use methods traditionally associated with financial or com-
modities markets have been made. The references in this section show that
derivatives have been used to price network access to end-users, observed
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forward prices have been used to infer the network spot price, the price dy-
namics of single links has been modeled as stochastic processes, and small
geographical arbitrage models have been applied to derivative pricing.
Courcoubetis et al. [101] use a standard queuing model, in which a router
supports C calls, QoS level are defined as a loss probability f , and packets are
weighted. They develop asymptotic (C →∞) continuous approximations of
the system load, and use an admission policy that only accepts new calls when
the expected loss will be less than the required f . They derive the price of
an option contract that lets end users hedge the risk of over-spending. Their
approach is not based on risk-neutral evaluation (see sec 1.2.4), but the price
is the expected value under the natural process, since their model is based on
perishable goods. Lukose and Huberman [102] also use the natural measure
to price the risk of network latency, but not in the sense of a tradeable
derivative asset.
Semret and Lazar [81] at Columbia University also use an admission con-
trol model, where network access is traded on a progressive second price auc-
tion path. A standard game-theoretic analysis is carried out. Their model
is shown to have desirable characteristics, such as users being incentive com-
patible, etc. The define QoS as a reservation over an arbitrary time as an
option that is the integral over the price, and the price process is a diffusion
approximation of the occupancy process, i.e. an approximation similar to
the one made by Courcoubetis, et al.
Kenyon and Cheliotis [103, 104] model the bandwidth spot price devel-
opment as a combination of the factors liquidity, geographical arbitrage, and
link price changes. The price process used is a mean-reverting Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process with an additional jump process. They simulate the price
process at discrete intervals, and between the price updates, they remove all
geographical arbitrage. They found geographical arbitrage to be a common
feature in computer network forward rates.
Keppo [105] computes the price of network forward contracts under the
arbitrage condition that the price of a network path is always the equal to
the cheapest path. Bandwidth prices are modeled as geometric Brownian
motion. In their model, bandwidth commodities are non-storable. Hence
they cannot price option contracts using Black-Scholes, since that approach
requires that the contract can be hedged with the underlying instruments.
An analytical approximation of the forward price for a network with two
paths is computed. The forward price is then used for hedging options on
the network path. A similar model is used by Upton [106] who computes the
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instantaneous bandwidth price from the forward prices in a single resource.
Upton questions the usefulness of network arbitrage on the grounds of being
too computationally complex.
1.3.5 Trading bundles
In [107] it is described a model in which TwoBit [80] capacity in DiffServ
networks is traded by a Bandwidth Broker. The clients send periodical re-
quests to buy and send capacity on specific paths. The bandwidth broker
collects all the offers, and centrally clears the market. Its objective is to
minimize the unused capacity, while honoring the users’ price limits. The
market is cleared repeatedly. The market is a combinatorial market, and the
solution of the problem is an integer programming problem, which is known
to be NP-complete [108]. Instead of solving the optimal problem, the au-
thors use a heuristic to clear the market, in which they make the allocations
in descending order of surplus per unit capacity per node. This bandwidth
market is neither extendable into a market with alternative routes, nor can
it be used to trade future capacity.
In [109], the approach is taken to compute a price hint, rather than find-
ing the optimal multi-constrained network path. The hint is computed by
simplifying the problem into a shortest-path problem [108], by creating a
mixed one-dimensional metric from the price and hop-count.
1.4 Architecture
This section covers the architecture of the market-controlled network used in
this work. It is outlined in papers A, C, D, and F. The details are put together
here, in order to provide a more complete picture of the market-controlled
network. The suggestion to use a market maker to provide liquidity in ca-
pacity markets was first put forth in paper A. The design of the market was
refined in paper C. Paper D introduced bundle derivatives to price network
services. Paper F introduced the network access points that shape traffic at
the network edge, and capacity tokens to represent the traded commodity.
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1.4.1 Exchange locations
The total network is composed of interconnected subnetworks, or domains.
Each subnetwork is owned and controlled by a network owner (see sec. 1.4.2).
The subnetworks are interconnected at exchange locations.
An exchange location is a neutral place where operators may connect their
networks. It is managed by a neutral manager. The exchange managers have
no networks of their own. They only provide the neutral location where the
traffic is switched, monitored, and measured. A company that wants to buy
or sell capacity connects its network to exchange locations in two or more
cities. To be able to sell capacity, the company must have a network of its
own that links the two cities.
Managers and exchange locations of this kind already exist today. They
are run by network broker companies (see sec. 1.1.9). As an example, Band-X
has exchange locations in several cities in Europe, North and South America,
and Asia, where customers exchange IP transit traffic, or virtual leased line
capacity to other exchanges.
In the proposed market architecture, the exchange points are nodes in the
graph that describe the network layout. The buyers and sellers are anony-
mous, so that the sellers cannot discriminate against some buyers. Anyone
can buy the capacity offered at the exchange locations.
1.4.2 Network owners
Network owners, or operators, are companies, universities, etc., that own and
run computer networks. In the near future, networks will be able to route
traffic with a throughput on the order of terabits per second. A network
owner wants to sell transit traffic capacity, or parts of it, to users or service
providers.
The network may be built of different kinds of network equipment, with
varying routing or switching characteristics, but the network owner can con-
figure the network routing so that different transit traffic classes can be routed
along different paths. See fig. 1.6.
The subnetwork edge node-to-edge node capacity and delay is estimated
by its manager, and reserved for sale. The manager must configure the
network to guarantee that the reserved traffic will be delivered. The capacity
is then announced for sale in shares at a market-place. The buyers cannot
reserve more than the available capacity, because there are not more capacity
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Figure 1.6: The network in one domain has preconfigured paths for the
reservable capacity. The paths start and end in gateway nodes. The capacity
is configured or measured by the network owner. The spare capacity on a
path is sold on a network capacity market.
shares announced than the available capacity. The network owner can use
probing techniques, so called active measurements, or theoretical queuing
models to maintain updated estimates of how much traffic that can be sent
between two edge nodes in his network. He can also use load balancing
techniques, and traffic engineering to re-route traffic inside his network to
make more traffic available.
When the network owners announce that they have available capacity,
they make a commitment to deliver the capacity to the customers. If the
network owner has over-estimated the available capacity, or simply lied about
the available capacity, it is a contract breach, which should be handled as a
legal matter. The issue is resolved outside of the network, not in the network
protocols.
1.4.3 Network services
A network service is a commitment from the network to deliver data traffic in
some way. It is an abstract function of the network that can be mapped down,
in different ways, to concrete network element behaviors. The service can be
to deliver traffic from one source to a destination within some maximal delay
and loss probability. Examples of more exotic services, envisioned in this
work, include controlled traffic quality, point-to-point connection, multicast,
congestion induced dynamic re-routing, postponing of transmissions during
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congestion, delivery from any of a number of sources to a specific destination,
as in the case of mirrored data repositories.
In Telecom networks, services are implemented in the network core. The
internal network nodes communicate to setup and maintain the state for the
service. The user uses terminal devices at the network edge that are dumb,
in the sense that they are passively receiving the provided services.
In data communication network it is the opposite. Services are imple-
mented with intelligent terminals and a dumb network. The advantage is
that the network is not affected when a new service is added. It puts how-
ever design demands on the network: it should be as simple as possible, yet
controllable enough by the terminals that interesting services can be imple-
mented.
Services are implemented as bundles of network resources. A guaran-
teed point-to-point transmission connection is a bundle of capacity shares in
different networks. The connection can be rerouted if the user has sold an
option to a broker that permits the broker to exchange the user’s tokens in
the access point node (the terms are explained below). The load is balanced
when the broker notices that some substitutable resources can be sold for a
higher price than that of the substitute, and acts to make a profit. If the
prices go up, the broker will exercise the option, and the traffic will be sent
along a cheaper route. Although load balancing is not built into the network
as a service beforehand, it comes as a side-effect of the continuous trading
on the capacity markets.
1.4.4 Network users
A network user is connected to one or more subnetworks through a network
access point that moderates the user’s access to the rest of the network. Users
are persons, companies, or automatic agents acting on behalf of persons,
companies, or other agents. The users have an interest to send and receive
information to each other. They want access to different network services,
that require that capacity is temporarily allocated to the user. A typical
QoS network service such as streaming video requires capacity on the order
of Mb/s for a duration on the order of hours. Two users are not typically
connected to the same subnetwork. Therefore, a user requesting the service
of a virtual connection to another user needs capacity in several operators’
networks at the same time.
The users can specify a maximal price they are willing to pay for a service.
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The users are self-interested, meaning that they prefer better performance
for themselves to better performance for someone else. They will therefore
always demand more capacity, as long as the price is low enough.
1.4.5 Traffic classes
A subnetwork owner that wants to sell excess capacity in the proposed net-
work market, should be able handle two traffic classes, namely best effort traf-
fic, and first class traffic. The traffic class denotes the priority with which
a congested network should handle incoming packets. First class traffic is
guaranteed to be handled by the network, while best effort has no guarantee
at all. If the network becomes congested, the best effort packets may be
thrown away, in order to guarantee the handling of the first class packets.
How the class-based routing is implemented in the subnetwork is up to
the network owner to solve. Different network may use different techniques,
as long as they live up to the service level of the capacity market where the
capacity is sold. Depending on the protocol used in the network, there are
many available ways to achieve the functionality, see e.g. [80, 40, 39, 11],
although this is still an area of active research. Paper F and [110] use an
experimental setup with Linux computers, that use the hierarchical token
bucket filter in iproute [111] to achieve a first class and a best effort class.
Another way to create the two traffic classes in an IPv6 network is to use
Expedited Forwarding for the first class traffic [41], and ordinary IP best
effort for other traffic. In order to guarantee delivery, Expedited Forwarding
requires that the incoming traffic does not exceed the maximal allowed rate.
Such guarantees will be provided by the access points (see sec. 1.4.8). The
access point shapes the traffic so that the users cannot inject more than the
allowed amount of first class traffic.
There is no access control or shaping inside the network. This means that
the access points can control the amount of first class traffic on a certain
path only if the network gateways do not make any independent routing of
first class traffic themselves. This is because if the gateways make routing
decisions, they may send more than the maximal allowed rate of traffic on a
first class path, with will result in packet loss.
Since the subnetworks must trust the access points to shape the traffic,
the QoS provision is vulnerable to abusive access points that admit more than
the allowed capacity rate. This seems unavoidable, since the alternative is
to police traffic in the network core, and this is does not scale up to the
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high throughput speeds that are expected. Instead of active policing, one
can use a passive system that logs abusive traffic without interfering with
the routing. The logs can then be used to find the abuser after-the-fact.
1.4.6 QoS levels
In the proposed network model, a Quality-of-service level is implemented as
a specific mix of first class and best effort traffic. Higher QoS is achieved by
sending a larger proportion of the traffic as first class traffic. The choice of
how much of the traffic that is sent as first class and as best effort enables one
to compute the loss and delay moments (mean and variance), of the number
of lost packets in a time interval and of the packet transit time. The network
is configured to be guaranteed to deliver the first class packets. Statistical
multiplexing and overbooking is only used for best effort traffic.
The traffic mix, i.e. the QoS level, is decided and controlled by the end-
point. It is not the result of a number of uncoordinated local decisions made
by routers in the different network, as is the case for the DiffServ QoS model.
1.4.7 Capacity shares
Since first class traffic is guaranteed to be delivered, a network owner must not
sell more capacity than can be guaranteed. The guaranteed transit capacity
in a network is estimated by its owner, and is sold in slices called shares.
The share specifies the capacity and the entry and exit gateway addresses,
and the exchange locations between which the share provides capacity. In
addition to the market price of a share, the share owner pays a per-second
fee to the network operator for the access right, as described in paper D. The
subnetwork guarantees a user that has reserved capacity in a subnetwork
that the traffic will be delivered within some time between the edge nodes of
the subnetwork.
The shares are traded on spot-markets with special trading rules. In
principle a user could buy the necessary shares itself, but normally the actual
buying and selling of shares is left to a broker. How the trading is realized
is however of no concern to the policing system or network operator.
The core network does not know about the capacity shares. Even though
the capacity is given to individual users, the entry gateways multiplex the
individual traffic streams into a compound flow that is handled in a uniform
manner. The core nodes do not have to distinguish between individual traffic
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flows, and are therefore relieved of the book-keeping costs that for instance
prevents IntServ from scaling.
A share owner is allowed, and guaranteed, to send packets, at a specified
rate, indefinitely on the channel. The shares therefore have a value and can
be traded at market places. Users that terminate connections sell their shares
on the market to other users that establish new connections, or to actors that
trade capacity shares for other reason, such as speculation, or arbitrage. Note
that it is not the network owner that sells the capacity shares, but that shares
are traded between autonomous middlemen on open markets. When many
users need the resources, the market prices will go up, etc., and therefore the
bandwidth market will be load balancing.
Also note that the capacity is not traded in time-slices, i.e. the capacity
right does not expire at a certain time, but the right is indefinite. Time-slicing
the right to a resource is bad for several reasons. The time-sliced commodities
lose their value after a certain time and are complicated or impossible to price
efficiently. Further, time-slicing produces very many different commodities
each of which has its own market price, which decreases market liquidity and
increases the combinatorial allocation problem enormously.
1.4.8 Network access points
In the proposed network model, network users are connected to access points
which are attached to the network of an access provider. The access point
is a policing device that shapes the traffic from the user so that it does not
exceed the allowed amount. It is responsible for policing the traffic of a few
hundred to a few thousand users. See fig. 1.7.
The access point is a trusted node. It has an agreement with the network
owners to only admit its users’ reserved share of first class traffic. The access
point shapes each user’s first class traffic to the maximally allowed rate,
which is the minimal allowed rate in the links from source to destination.
Traffic that exceeds the allowed rate is marked as best effort traffic. The
access point manages the access for the entire path, so the access right does
not have to be verified at each exchange location, but only at the edge.
First class traffic from the user is sent through the access point, who
either classes the data packet as first class and writes the in the network
headers, or classes the packet as best effort, and modifies the packet header
accordingly. It enters a coarse source route, with the entry and exit nodes of
the subnetworks. The coarse route header can be implemented with MPLS
Introduction 47
Autonomous network
The Internet
Access node
End user
Figure 1.7: The access to the network is controlled by network access points,
a.k.a. access nodes. They shape the user traffic flows that enter the network.
No shaping is done inside the network. The access points are trusted, by all
network owners, to shape the traffic correctly.
explicit route header, or IPv6 routing header.
The packets sent by a user constitute a network microflow. To achieve
good network performance, it is important that the internal nodes of the
network do not have to deal with microflows explicitly, but that they can work
with aggregated flows, so called macroflows. When a packet in a microflow
reaches a subnetwork entry node, the node finds out to which exit node
the packet should be sent. All microflows with the same exit node can be
aggregated into a macroflow when they reach a subnetwork entry node. They
can be encapsulated and rushed through the network on preconfigured paths,
to the exit node. Only there do the packets have to be routed again. However,
since the information for routing decision is in the packet header, this decision
is very fast.
Since the traffic is only coarsely source-routed, it does not matter if the
flows change inside a subnetwork, as long as the traffic is delivered. Therefore,
the network owner can use standard protocols like OSPF, or other traffic
engineering methods to optimize the local throughput.
Access control for several domains at once means that the access point has
to be trusted by the other network owners. A network owner that discovers
that an access point is admitting too much traffic can add a temporary filter
and take measures outside of the network to get compensation for the broken
agreement. In contrasted to this is the the traditional idea of only buying
the initial access, and rely on the network to provide the service. With that
access model, it is impossible for the access control to base the admission on
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the availability of capacity in other networks. It will either have to probe the
network, preallocate capacity, or give a statistical guarantee, none of which
is what we want here.
With the proposed access control, the access point device does not have
to contact the different network owners to verify the access right of its users.
This is instead handled through the use of cryptographically signed capacity
tokens.
1.4.9 Capacity tokens
In the proposed model, the access point nodes are responsible for not admit-
ting more than the reserved amount of capacity from a user. To make the
access point admit traffic, a user must to prove to the access point that he
owns sufficient capacity shares. The user sends a capacity token to the ac-
cess point. The capacity token is a bit-string with a cryptographically signed
contract. The capacity tokens are exchanged between the user, the access
point and the market middlemen with the interaction protocol, described in
sec. 1.5. The protocol relies on a public key infrastructure, PKI, to establish
the identities of the parties involved in a transaction. One good choice of
PKI is for instance the IETF’s X.509 standard [112].
The user obtains the capacity tokens from a market, or a trading middle-
man. The capacity token is signed by a market authority, such as the market
maker. It states the kind of capacity (the entry and exit gateway addresses,
and parameters describing the allowed traffic fluctuations), the amount of
capacity, the identity of the owner (the user), the address to an access point,
and a date stamp.
The access point verifies that the token is valid, and uses the information
in the token when it configures a traffic shaper (see sec. 1.4.8) for traffic that
traverses the subnetwork path of the token. Since the token only represents
capacity for a part of the path, tokens for many subnetworks are required to
build a complete path from the source to the destination.
Since the token is signed, the user cannot send a forged contract to the
access point. Since the token contains the name of the access point, the token
can only be sent to one access point. The date stamp prevents the user from
re-sending old tokens to the access points. The token can be bought and
resold many times, and the interaction protocol ensures that it is only the
most recent owner that can send traffic corresponding to the reserved capacity
share.
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The access point keeps a list of its users, and their capacity tokens. When
a user wishes to sell some capacity, the access point removes the capacity
token from the user’s list, and signs a contract that includes the token, and
states that it has been freed. That way, a market authority can be certain
that the capacity is really available for sale. Only the user, the access point,
and the market are involved. None of the entry or exit nodes need to be
informed.
1.4.10 The market-place
Each network produces its own kind of capacity, and there is one market for
each kind of capacity. The kind is defined by the entry and exit gateways and
the associated exchange locations. The market-place where a particular kind
of capacity is sold is not located in the subnetwork, but at an independent
market-place server which manages the market, handling the bids, etc. The
market should be of a special kind, described in paper C, that only accepts
market bids, and is guaranteed to always accept bids. The reason for this is
that it makes makes the bid-handling very rapid, because the market manager
does not have to maintain a database of unfilled orders.
Near the market-place server, middlemen run programs that buy and
sell the shares, in order to make profit. The middlemen also trade complex
contracts with the network users, but they are handled through bilateral
deals with the users.
There needs to be geographically distributed market servers, to reduce
the communication overhead of sending trading messages in the network. If
the network owner partitions the capacity, it can be announced on markets
at different locations, and the owner can transfer capacity between the two
partitions by buying back capacity somewhere and announce it somewhere
else.
Although different market mechanisms are possible, the paper C advo-
cates the use of a Farmer market. The Farmer market is very rapid and
stateless, and therefore a single server can host markets for many kinds of
capacity. It does not maintain an order-book of unresolved bids, but the
bids are cleared immediately against the market maker who runs the mar-
ket. The prices are adjusted deterministically, as a function of the traded
volume. The market only accepts market orders. If other ways of buying
the assets is required, such as limit orders, they must be implemented as
derivative contracts. A model of the price dynamics of the Farmer market is
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Figure 1.8: The sending user solicits price quotes for a service from the
middlemen, and decides to buy one of them. The middleman constructs
the service by buying the required capacity. When it is time to deliver the
capacity tokens, the middleman contacts the user, who accepts and signs a
receipt. The user shows the capacity tokens to an access point node. The
node then lets through shaped first class traffic from the user, until the user
revokes the tokens and sells them back to the market, via the middleman.
described in paper C.
1.4.11 Trading middlemen
The applications run by the users at the edges of the networks must obtain
bundles of capacity shares, but since the actual trading involves both a lot of
communication and also a risk/price uncertainty for the user, the trading of
shares is left to middlemen, or brokers. The user’s network software realizes
a given service by closing a deal with a middleman, who in turn buys the
capacity tokens on the market, and delivers them to the user. See fig. 1.8.
The deal typically involves getting capacity in several subnetworks. In the
deal, the user commissions the broker to immediately sell a contract that
forces the broker to deliver the required shares at a specified future time-
point. Since the user pays a fixed price for the contract, all trading risk and
trading is eliminated for the user.
The middleman programs are owned by brokering companies, such as
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banks, insurance companies, or investors, that want to make a profit by
trading network derivatives. This is analogous with how financial derivatives
are traded today. Standardized contracts are sold on exchanges, while non-
standard derivatives and insurances are sold by profit seeking institutions.
To maximize the profit and minimizing the risk, the middleman must be
able to compute the price of the derivative. Paper D explains how this is
done for a class of derivatives that consist of alternative linear combinations
of the capacity in the network links.
1.5 The interaction protocol
This section describes an abstract interaction protocol for the network users,
the market middlemen, the market places, and the network access points.
The protocol is used for exchanging capacity tokens and currency between
the participants. It binds together the contributions in the papers in the
thesis by showing that the network participants actually can communicate
to close deals, and configure network access points.
The communication framework is based on an existing PKI. It can be
established with standard cryptographic tools. In the framework, the partic-
ipants communication is authenticated and secure. The protocol uses multi-
party contract signing [113] for atomic exchange of digital information. The
purpose is to guarantee that a cheating or defecting participant can be proven
to be accountable. The digital information that is exchanged is contracts and
capacity tokens. They are cryptographically signed bit-strings that cannot
be forged or double-spent by the user. The protocol lists the messages needed
to close contracts and to transfer tokens between market participants with
different roles.
The protocol is built of known cryptographic functions, and no claim
on originality is made on that part. The protocol is abstract in the sense
that it does not specify explicitly which cryptographic functions, formats,
and standards that should be used. The protocol can be implemented for
a number of different choices of PKI infrastructure and cryptos. Detailed
references and explanations about several suitable cryptographic algorithms
can be found in the book [114], which can be downloaded free from the
Internet.
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1.5.1 Contracts
In electronic trade, as in traditional trade, the trade transactions need be
auditable. If someone breaches a contract, it must be possible to determine
who is responsible. In this protocol, a contract is a statement that states the
obligations of the parties, signed by the parties. After the transaction, each
participant needs a proof, i.e. receipt, that it can show to anyone claiming
that the participant did not fulfill his obligations. Failure to provide such a
proof is evidence that the obligation was in fact not fulfilled. One may only
dispute if obligations was fulfilled or not, but one may not dispute that one
has signed a contract or a receipt, since the cryptographic signatures are, as
far as is known, unforgeable.
A receipt is a contract that frees someone from (some of) the obligations
imposed in a contract. A contract also specifies the authority that resolves
arguments. Disagreements about whether an obligation has been fulfilled or
not are settled by the authority by verifying if the signatures on the receipt
are valid or not.
When two or more parties trade information goods, for example when
someone buys a capacity token, or an digital audio file, the parties need to
exchange bit-strings. One string is the payment cheque, and the other is the
goods. The bit-string exchange is not as simple as one party sending the
string to the other party, and then waiting for the other party to send its
string. One receiver may falsely claim that it did not receive the string, and
refuse to send its cheque. If the string is a password, e-cash, or a music file,
this is obviously not good, since one party gained the information for free.
The exchange must occur atomically, it must be fair in the sense that in the
end of the exchange both parties have valid bit-strings, or neither one does.
A simple solution to the problem of exchanging electronic goods is to
involve a trusted third party, TTP. All trading parties send their strings to
the TTP, who receives all strings, verifies them, and then distributes them
to the participants. If anyone fails to produce a correct string, the TTP will
cancel the deal, and no information from the strings will be exposed. The
TTP is a potential bottleneck, since all trades must pass through the TTP.
To reduce this effect, one may use optimistic protocols [115], i.e. protocols
which only involve the TTP in case of a dispute. In order to discuss these,
we need to introduce a notation for cryptographic functions.
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1.5.2 Public key cryptography
A public key is a bit-string that is used as input argument in cryptographic
functions. Symmetric public key algorithms, such as the RSA algorithm[116],
uses a pair of keys, one secret K¯, and one public K. It also has a “one way
function” b = f(a,K), a, b ∈ Ω for which the inverse a = f−1(b,K) is
assumed to be of computational complexity O(|Ω|), i.e. exponential in the
number of bits of the arguments, or impossible to compute for large |Ω|.1
Knowing the secret key allows for a faster computation of the inverse.
For symmetric key systems, the inverse can be computed
f−1(b,K) = f(b, K¯) = a
Only by knowing K¯ can the crypto b be deciphered in less than exponential
time. Symmetric keys also have the property that
f−1(b, K¯) = f(b,K) = a
Thus, by knowing the public key K, anyone can verify that the crypto b was
encrypted with the secret key K¯.
We let {a}b denote the message a signed with the key b, i.e.
{a}b ≡ (a, f(h(a), b))
where h(·) is a public hash function that reduces the size of the signature.
Only someone knowing the private key K¯ can compute the signature b =
f(h(a), K¯) of a message a. However, everyone that knows K can verify that
the message-signature tuple (a, b) is correct by verifying that a = f(b,K).
Let 〈a〉b denote the message a encrypted with the key b,i.e.
〈a〉b ≡ f(a, b)
Knowing someone’s public key allows anyone to send encrypted messages
b = f(a,K) that can only be decrypted a = f(b, K¯) by someone knowing the
associated private key.
In the communication between the network participants, all messages
are signed by the sender and encrypted with the public key of the receiver
before they are sent. This means that the receiver knows the identity of the
1RSA uses f(x, {k,N}) = xk (modN) for k ∈ {K, K¯}, where N = q1 · q2, qi is prime,
and K · K¯ ≡ 1 (mod (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)).
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sender, and that no one can eavesdrop or modify the messages in transit in a
predictable way. Messages sent by u are signed with the key K¯u. A message
m with authenticated receiver v and sender u is encapsulated in
authMsg = 〈{Cu,m}K¯u〉Kv
1.5.3 Auditable exchange of electronic goods
The following is an optimistic contract signing protocol which fairly produces
signatures from all participants on a contract. The users ui all want to sign
a contract D = {o1, ...} where oi is the obligations of ui. The protocol has
two phases. First everybody broadcasts
{〈{D}K¯i〉KT , D}K¯i
which is a “promise to sign” the contract. KT is the public key of a TTP.
In the second phase everyone broadcasts the signature {D}K¯i and if anyone
defaults, the others can ask the TTP for the signature, or the TTP can
determine that the signature was false and free the others of the obligation.
However it would be preferable if the users could verify that the promises
did indeed contain a correct signature, without revealing the signature, and
without involving a TTP. This would allow the protocol to be terminated
after phase one if someone cheats. The private contract signatures, PCS, of
Garay, et al. [115] have this property. A PCS allows the users to determine
beforehand whether or not the TTP can extract valid signatures from the
PCS, and it does not require interaction with anyone. It is based on cryp-
tographic techniques for designated-verifier signatures and non-interactive
proofs of knowledge.
In abuse-free protocols, it can not happen that some participants are
bound by the protocol, while others can still choose whether to proceed or
not, and they can prove this fact to an outside observer. Only recently
have optimistic and abuse-free contract signing protocols been published.
Such multi-party protocols that are efficient in communication will produce
n signatures while only requiring O(n) protocol rounds [113, 117].
Building on the existence of efficient multi-party contract signing proto-
cols, we return to the problem of exchanging bit-strings. Multi-party contract
signing protocols can be used to optimistically exchange bit-strings. The ex-
change is done in two phases. First everyone signs a promise
{〈{si, D}K¯i〉KT , D}K¯i
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to deliver certain bit-strings si, and sends to the other parties. The bit-string
is included in the promise, but it can only be extracted by the designated
TTP. Some bit-strings, such as signatures on cheques or capacity tokens, can
be verified without involving the TTP, and without revealing the bit-string.
Other strings, such as mp3-files, cannot be verified in advance. If any promise
was found to be invalid, the exchange is terminated. Otherwise, when all
promises have been disseminated, the protocol enters the second phase. Each
user signs the bit-string and the received promises and sends them to the
other participants. This gives the users receipts that they have sent promises,
and that the promises have in fact been received by the recipients. From the
information in the contract, the promises and the disseminated bit-string
messages, all charges of cheating can then be settled by the TTP.
1.5.3.1 An example transaction
Consider the following example: u1 buys X from u2 for e100. They establish
a contract
D =

o1 : u1 should sign the cheque s1
o2 : u2 should deliver a string ”s2” satisfying X to u1
s1 : the string ”pay EUR100 to u2”
Then
• u1 sends the promise α = {〈{s1, D}K¯1〉T , D}K¯1 to u2
• u1 receives the promise β = {〈{s2, D}K¯2〉T , D}K¯2 from u2
• when all promises have been received, u1 sends the receipt γ = {s1, α, β}K¯1
to u2
• u1 receives the receipt δ = {s2, α, β}K¯2 from u2
Now u2 cannot claim that it did not get s1, since u1 can use the receipt δ
to show that u2 had enough information to get s1 with the help of the TTP.
Suppose that u2 did not send δ, for instance because it did not have s2. Then
TTP can see that the promise β did not contain s2. In general, a cheating
u2 cannot prove its innocence to the TTP, because that requires showing a
δ that matches the promise.
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1.5.4 Certificates
In an public key infrastructure, PKI, there are trusted certification authori-
ties, CA. A CA can issue one or more identity certificates. A user u proves
its identity to the CA by some legally binding method, such as showing a
physical identity card in a bank. The CA issues an electronic certificate Cu
containing the applicants name and public key, and information for revoca-
tion procedures, such as issue time, and expiration date. The certification
authority’s own (self signed) certificate CCA and public key KCA is known to
everyone.
The CA assigns roles to the network actors by issuing certificates. Cer-
tificates have revocation procedures based on time stamps, expiration dates
and revocation lists. These details depend on the choice of PKI.
A user gets an identity certificate when he registers his public key KI
with the CA.
CI = {’identity’,KI}K¯CA
A market maker M that trades goods X receives a market maker certifi-
cate
CX = {’market maker′, key=KM , goods=X}K¯CA
The certificate states that the CA has verified that KM is the public key of
the market maker for goods X.
A network access point A has an access point certificate
CA = {’access point’, key=KA, address=addr}K¯CA
1.5.5 Messages
This section lists the messages accepted by the participants, and how they
react to the messages. All messages are authenticated. The message m from
u to v will be sent as
〈{Cu, m}K¯u〉Kv
Also, when the communication involves returning a reply, such as tokens,
money, receipts, etc., the parties use the auditable bit-string exchange method
described in the previous section. To improve readability, this secure trans-
port will be assumed, and below only the messages m are listed below.
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1.5.5.1 Market maker
Market maker M accepts authenticated market orders to buy and sell ca-
pacity in X. Since the market maker is a trusted entity, it does not use the
multi-party contract signing, and thus can handle trade orders immediately
when it receives a request, without the additional communication rounds
necessary for bit-string exchange between untrusted parties.
Markets trade network tokens. A network token is a tuple T , signed by
the market maker,
T = {CX , capacity=y bits/s, access point=CA, issue time=t}K¯M
The token identifies the access point and an issue time to prevent double
spending (see sec. 1.5.5.2).
A buy message is of the form
buy = {’buy’, goods=X, capacity=y, access point=CA, blank cheque=cheque}
to which the market maker is obliged to return
invoice={’invoice’,T, cost=c, buyRequest=buy}
where T is a token, as defined above. The blank cheque entitles the market
maker to withdraw ec from the buyer’s account. The invoice guarantees that
the market maker can withdraw the amount only once.
The market maker also accepts bids to sell capacity. A sell bid is of the
form
sell={’sell’,{’unused’, T, time=t}K¯A , account=acc}
to which the market maker is obliged to return
cheque={’cheque’, amount=c, toaccount=acc}
A is the access point listed in the token T .
The token once assigned to access point A is wrapped in an receipt mes-
sage signed by A, to prove that A is no longer uses the capacity (see sec.
1.5.5.2).
Since the market only accepts market orders (see sec. 1.4.10), the market
maker does not need to keep an order-book of unfilled orders. On receiving
a message, it verifies the authenticity, and the market price, and sends an
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invoice, or cheque back in the returning message. To stop a user from selling
the capacity twice, the market maker keeps a backlog of old sell requests. Sell
requests must have a sufficiently recent time stamp in the unused message.
Older messages get a slower treatment after the unused message has been
checked up by in the backoffice database.
1.5.5.2 Access point
The access point A accepts addToken messages from user u of the form
addToken={’add’, T, revoker=Kr, user=Ku}K¯r
where T is a token addressed to A, Kr is the key needed for revoking the
token, Ku is the key needed for using the capacity in T , and KA is the public
key of the access point.
Revocation messages are of the form
revokeToken={’revoke’, T}K¯r
where K¯r is the private key associated with Kr. To this the access point
returns a receipt
receipt={’unused’,T, time=t}K¯A
where t is the revocation time.
Since the identity of the access point is listed in the network token, the
access points can prevent users from double spending the capacity in different
access nodes. Further, the access point requires that the issue time t is not
earlier than a certain time tmin. The access point keeps a list of revoked
tokens with a time stamp more recent than tmin. It will also only accept
to add tokens with time stamps more recent that tmin that are not in the
revoked tokens list. An access point that accepts old tokens needs to have a
large key revocation list. Thus, tmin should be set so the revocations fit in
the revocation list.
To use capacity, the user tells the access point to configure path headers,
and to set up an access filter that shapes the traffic sent on the path. The
access point verifies that the user has capacity for the path by looking at
the tokens in the token list and at the list of already configured paths. To
configure a path, the user sends the path message
path={’path’,T1, T2, . . . , capacity=y, src=srcIP, dst=dstIP, pathid=t}K¯u
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where u is the user designated in the addToken messages for T1, T2, . . . . The
user may configure many paths between the same source and destination.
When traffic is sent on the path, the packet header is marked with the path
id to use, for instance by writing the id number into the IP TOS field. The
access point makes sure that only packets with the specified srcIP , dstIP
and path id value not exceeding the allowed rate, will be sent along the
specified path. Because of the capacity tokens, the access point can verify
locally that the user has the right to configure a particular path. The access
node does not have to talk to any of the core routers or network border
routers.
1.5.5.3 Middlemen
Users request service offers from the middlemen. On receiving a request, the
middleman calculates a price quote and returns a binding offer. A request is
of the form
request={’request’, specification=spec}
where spec contains an expression that determines which goods the middle-
man must deliver in order to honor the request. One example is a contract
where the middleman provides capacity tokens for one of any of the paths
between two specified border nodes, i.e. a point-to-point contract. The spec
also specifies to which access nodes the capacity should be assigned.
In reply, the middleman produces a multi-party contract
offer={’offer’, specification=spec, price=p, valid until=t}
which is valid if both parties sign the contract, and sends it to the user
using a multi-party contract signing protocol, i.e. using the atomic bit-string
exchange protocol.
When the deal is closed, the middleman starts trading with the market
makers, using the protocol in sec. 1.5.5.1. When the middleman delivers
tokens to the user, it addresses the token to the access point, using the pro-
tocol in sec. 1.5.5.2. If the service specification spec entitles the middleman
to dynamically alter the during the service lifetime, the middleman enters its
own public key in the revoker field of the addToken message. This enables
the market-maker to have control over the token. The messages are sent via
the user and forwarded to the access point. This way, the user can then ver-
ify that it receives the capacity it has paid for. Since the middleman needs
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a receipt that it has delivered the service, it uses the bit-string exchange
protocol in sec. 1.5.3 to send the tokens to the user.
1.5.5.4 End-users
The end-users communicate with the middlemen by requesting services, as
described above. The end-user’s public key is entered into the user field of
the addToken message. This way, the user can configure paths as it wishes
from the capacity it has received from the middleman. It can set up different
capacity for different source and destination pairs, or alternating the route,
by using the path message in sec. 1.5.5.2.
The end-user application sends the packets to the access point using the
ordinary IP protocol. It uses the packet TOS field, or DS field, to signal
to the access point whether it should send the packet along a preconfigured
path, or if the packet should be sent by best effort.
1.6 Summary of the papers and contributions
This section introduces the papers included in this thesis. It gives a summary
of the contents of each paper, and explains their relations in the thesis.
1.6.1 Paper A
Lars Rasmusson. Evaluating resource bundle derivatives for multi-agent ne-
gotiation of resource allocation. In E-Commerce Agents: Marketplace So-
lutions, Security Issues, and Supply and Demand, volume 2033 of Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI). Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1999.
This paper deals with negotiation between software agents. In this work,
software agents are programs that help a user to automate negotiation with
other users, such as booking meetings, finding the cheapest price for some
goods, etc. This paper formulates the problem for service-producing end-
user software agents as the problem of acquiring bundles of goods. Many
services can be seen as bundles. For example, an agent may produce the
service “a vacation trip”, where the entire trip is a bundle of flight tickets,
hotel room reservation, etc., that must be acquired all-or-none, and with
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alternative bundles listed in a preference list.2
The amount of available goods is typically restricted, and in demand by
other agents at the same time. This paper presents for the first time the idea
that agents that need to acquire bundles of goods can do so through trading of
derivative contracts based on the basic resources. It lists the necessary roles
that must be fulfilled by actors on the resource market, such as arbitrage
agents, exchanges, and brokers.
Earlier papers on negotiation between agents in resource allocation would
either model negotiation as a dialog between the agents, or as trading inde-
pendent goods on fundamental markets. In the former case, an agent acquir-
ing a bundle, has to solicit commitments from other agents to deliver the
goods, before eventually all goods can be retrieved. This line of work ended
up in complicated game-theoretic arguments about when to defect from the
commitments [75, 119, 120]. It has been applied to complex goods produc-
tion by using a hierarchical system where agents act as subcontratctors, and
where comples goods is created as bundles of simpler goods. Goods on all lev-
els, from semi-manufactured to finished, were traded through a negotiation
with temporary binding offers. However, the negotiation-based approach to
reserving complex resource bundles is wasteful in resources, as the resources
for a large part of the time are locked up in temporary offers in pending
negotiations.
The proposed market-based idea removed the need for explicit offers and
quotes for the semi-manufactured goods, and suggested a market in which
the bundles could be priced explicitly, without intermediary markets. An
advantage of the model is that it even allowed services that can be produced
from different bundles to be priced, as it integrates the alternative production
methods into the pricing. One weakness is that the model has to work
on fairly liquid markets with a fair amount of trading in the fundamental
resources.
The paper outlines a way to price the options which was later to be
abandoned for computationally more efficient methods from mathematical
finance. The market model is also refined in subsequent papers, especially
by the introduction of the Farmer market.
2This scenario was later used in the Trading Agent Competition, TAC [118], in which
software agents try to compose bundles to their clients by bidding in different auctions for
each good.
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1.6.2 Paper B
Lars Rasmusson and Sverker Janson. Agents, self-interest and electronic
markets. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 14(2), pages 143-150, 1999.
This paper argues that resource allocation systems should be built by
active planning components, so called agents, that should be assumed to act
self-interestedly. The paper points out that most work in electronic mar-
kets has been based on agents that follow well-behaved, easily analyzable
strategies, and that these strategies often did not behave self-interestedly,
competitively and speculatively, and that they were often implicitly pro-
grammed to work toward a common goal, such as the good of the entire
system. This matter of affairs was not strange, considering that some of the
roots of agent-based programming stem from the community of distributed
algorithms, which study of cooperative algorithms that achieve some common
task, and how the work should be coordinated most efficiently.
Since agents are programs with the task to maximize the benefit for their
user, cooperative coordination algorithms are not relevant. If two users want
the same resource, their agents will not agree on to whom the resource should
be given. Since both agents will be designed to give the resource to their own
user, budget constraints are needed to settle the affair.
The paper also discusses the claims from the game theory community
about using sealed bids in mechanism design [121], which is the name under
which game-theoretic results are presented in the agent-based programming
community. The often suggested Vickrey auction, cf. [122], often claimed
to be incentive compatible for bidding agents, is found to be inappropriate,
since software agents in an open network can collude in order to manipulate
the price.
The paper suggests that future agent markets should incorporate agents
that do more speculative trading to produce goods. This need was addressed
in paper A, written about the same time, with the introduction of the idea
to use derivatives to price bundles before they were put together.
The paper argues that for scalability reasons it is impossible to coordinate
resources centrally, as was suggested in the Walrasian markets [120, 123].
Those markets require that all individual preferences are collected before
the price can be computed, they cannot handle complementary goods, and
they are not suitable for self-interested agents. The paper instead proposes
that secondary markets should be used, and notices that this will result in
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time-based speculation.
While later papers focus more on the particular application of network
capacity markets, this paper outlines general requirements on agent-based
markets. It directed the modeling of the network capacity markets toward
decentralized rapid markets, and placed the focus on the need for allocating
resource bundles, and speculative trading.
1.6.3 Paper C
Lars Rasmusson and Erik Aurell. A price dynamics in bandwidth markets
for point-to-point connections. Technical Report SICS-T2001-21-SE, SICS,
Stockholm, Sweden, 2001.
The paper is concerned with finding a dynamics to govern the price pro-
cesses in network capacity markets, also known as bandwidth markets. It
is done by simulating a simple bandwidth market, observing the price pro-
cesses, and trying to fit two different stochastic differential equations to the
observed prices, and qualitatively comparing the obtained fit.
The network capacity markets that we have in mind here are markets
where users buy and sell capacity on a short time scale. Since there are no
available price quotes for the network capacity markets that are considered in
this thesis, a simulated bandwidth market was developed for this purpose. As
this simulation was intended to characterize the nature of the price process,
their governing SDEs and their correlations, the simulation did not include
any capacity derivatives. The users had to try to buy bundles on a market
in the hope that they would receive the resources to a reasonable price.
This paper introduced for the first time the Farmer market. It is based
upon J. D. Farmer’s qualitative observations of the behavior of large mar-
kets, and his reasoning about the soundness of the price movements [60]. In
this paper, Farmer’s observations were used as a prescription on how prices
should move, as a function of the traded volume. Among the advantages
of this new market are that it has almost no overhead, and that bids are
cleared instantaneously. This is because instead of letting prices drive the
traded volume, our Farmer market lets the traded volume drive the price.
The market only accept “bids-at-market” and updates the price with an ex-
ponential factor, the liquidity parameter, of the traded volume. It does not
keep an order-book and does not require that two bids are matched, as all
bids are accepted by the market maker.
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A disadvantage with the market is that the traders cannot be certain
of the price at which they will trade. However, in ordinary limit-bid mar-
kets, traders instead cannot know if the deal will take place at all. In later
paper, this seeming disadvantage is mitigated by the bundles-as-derivatives
approach. The users delegate all the trading risk to risk-neutral middlemen
who sell derivatives at a guaranteed price.
The paper gives statistical estimates of the variation, mean, and mean re-
version coefficient for two mean-reverting processes, one with additive noise,
and one with multiplicative noise. The correlation coefficients are also es-
timated from the multi-dimensional price process, and it is discovered that
the price of neighboring nodes have a correlation coefficient of about 0.4,
while the rest of the prices are uncorrelated, and no prices are negatively
correlated.
Different values of the liquidity parameter show that low liquidity re-
sults in high price movements which result in many unsuccessful connections.
Since a market that is almost saturated becomes illiquid, it is important that
the capacity markets are dimensioned so that there is sufficient supply.
1.6.4 Paper D
Lars Rasmusson. Pricing virtual paths with quality-of-service guarantees as
bundle derivatives. Technical Report SICS-T2001-21-SE, SICS, Stockholm,
Sweden, 2001.
Based upon the results of paper C, this paper introduces derivatives for
pricing derivatives on bundles of simple resources. In the previous paper,
formulas for estimating parameters describing the price process of capacity
were given. This paper uses the values of the parameters to compute the
price of linear combinations of capacity.
The paper begins with explaining how the prices and routes of seemingly
independent traffic flows in different parts of the network may affect each
other, in order to show how complicated the trading of capacity may be, if
one wishes to achieve a good resource utilization.
It then goes on to explain the option pricing methods that are used, and
how the price of a portfolio is affected when it is not hedged continuously.
The latter is done through simulations rather than theoretically, while it is
pointed out that such a derivation, made by Bouchaud [124] at the time the
paper was being written, is only appropriate for short time scales.
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The market model is explained. This paper first suggests mixing traffic
classes in two levels, which was inspired by Odlyzko’s Metro Pricing Scheme
[79].
One mathematical result of the paper is a corollary that the price of a fu-
ture to buy and later sell a set of shares on the resources on the cheapest path
between two network nodes is zero, and therefore this future is unsuitable
for load balancing. However, this can be remedied by adding to the contract
the condition that the resource holder must pay a fee rate for holding the
resource.
The main result is a theorem to price general functions of linear combi-
nations of assets, by using a Girsanov transform. The resulting theorem is
used for two corollaries. One is about the price of an option to buy the assets
on the path that is cheapest at a future time t. The other one about the
partial derivatives of the option price. The latter is needed for the market
middlemen who need to compute the partial derivatives of the option in order
to correctly balance a portfolio that replicates the option.
The paper shows that the option price can be expressed as a weighted
sum of terms cosisting of the CDF for a weighted sum of correlated lognormal
random variables. This CDF has no closed form solution. It is suggested that
Monte-Carlo methods could be used to evaluated the value of the option.
1.6.5 Paper E
Lars Rasmusson. Evaluating the CDF for m weighted sums of n correlated
lognormal random variables. In Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Computing
in Economics and Finance, Aix-en-Provence, France, June 2002. Soc. for
Computational Economics.
This paper is devoted to evaluating the CDF studied in paper D. The
paper proposes a Monte-Carlo method.
The paper shows how the CDF can be evaluated by deriving its joint
probability density function for the correlated random variables. The PDF
is then used in an adaptive Monte-Carlo method, which iteratively estimates
the number of trials it has to perform to meet a given error bound. The use
of an adaptive method is especially useful for the evaluation of the network
capacity option, since it requires that many terms are evaluated, and to
different precision.
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Other numerical methods to estimate the CDF are discussed. Quadra-
ture methods are rejected on the grounds of their failure to cope with high
dimensionality problems. This is crucial, since a network capacity option
may easily include thirty or more different assets.
1.6.6 Paper F
Lars Rasmusson, Gabriel Paues. Network components for market-based net-
work admission and routing. Technical Report SICS-T2002-22-SE, SICS,
Stockholm, Sweden, 2002.
In this paper we go through the components in the network; the access
points, the core nodes, and the exchange locations where network owners in-
terconnect their networks. The paper explains the functioning of the network
admission node, and how it modifies packets so that the core can route the
packets rapidly. It explains the signalling by the network user to preconfigure
and choose network paths.
The access control policy must be able to verify the network access for
the entire path at the network edge. It calls for an access point to shape
traffic, and to modify the packet header to contain a coarse source route,
and it calls for the network core components to route the first class traffic
packets according to the coarse route instead of the best effort route.
As proof-of-concept, we show how it is possible to configure a normal
workstation running Linux to do the required classifying and shaping of the
traffic, based on the functionality in the Linux kernel, the routing packages
iproute2 and the firewall utility iptables. This paper contains the architec-
tural overview of the network components, and details of the configuration
commands used. The access point’s shaping functionality was implemented
and tested experimentally in the Master’s Thesis of G. Paues [110].
1.6.7 Paper G
Lars Rasmusson, Erik Aurell. Simulation of a network capacity market and
three middle-man strategies to price and sell dynamically routed point-to-
point connections. Technical Report SICS-T2002-23-SE, SICS, Stockholm,
Sweden, 2002.
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In this paper, the performance of the network derivative approach is com-
pared to two simpler approaches to trading capacity bundles. The hypothesis
is that network deriviatives are useful because they (1) allow trading of future
demand, and (2) reduce the risk for the broker and for the end-user. If these
properties are useful, they will increase the number of successful connection
requests.
In a simulation, the performance of a broker using network derivatives is
compared to the performance of (1) the trading strategy of only buying on
the spot market, and (2) a null broker that does not hedge its portfolio, but
only aggregates a lot of demand.
It is shown empirically that using the derivative broker results in a lower
fraction of rejected point-to-point requests than using simple spot market
trading or simple demand aggregation with a null broker. A larger fraction
of derivative brokers on the market also improves the performance for the
other trading strategies, which is conjectured to be due to the observed effect
of derivative brokers’ trading to reduce price volatility.
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Abstract. Consider continuous negotiations where the goal is to obtain
exactly one complete bundle of resources and there exists alternative
bundles that solve the task. This paper presents a market-based model
of this negotiation that does not require commitment and decommit-
ment during the negotiation phase. A negotation goal is represented by
a graph, called a resource network. Goals are achieved by obtaining re-
sources along one path in the graph. The resource network model can
be applied to electronic commerce with agents trading bandwidth in all-
or-nothing deals, and for agents that want to combine simple goods into
more complex goods.
1 Introduction
The agent design problem is the problem of how to write programs that act as
helpers for a specic user. The help provided may consist of individualized search
for information in large data sets such as the web, automation of repetitive tasks
such as negotiating meeting times, coordination of the use of common resources
with other people, doing the bidding for the user in computer-mediated auctions,
etc.
An agent is of course always "just a program", but by calling it "agent" one
emphasizes the wish to design a flexible open-system component that the user
interacts with on a high level. The user supplies goals rather than a task list, and
leaves specic details (such as locating relevant information servers and deciding
with whom to interact) up to the agent.
The need for and benet of agent programs increases when programs can
communicate with information sources and other agents on remote computers.
A number of execution platforms, agent communication languages, class libraries
for common tasks, such as maintaining user models, exchanging data or meta
data (plans, protocol descriptions, etc.) have already been developed to simplify
the task of programming flexible, ecient and inter-operable agents.
Computer algorithms using market-based resource allocation started with de-
centralized algorithms by [2,3,6,10]. Perspectives on the limits of market-based
? This work was supported by a grant from NUTEK, the Swedish National Board for
Industrial and Technical Development.
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systems are discussed in [5,11]. Bandwidth markets are a hot topic, see for in-
stance [1,7]. A recent proposal for a combinatorial auction is described in [9].
This paper outlines a way to design parallel negotiation over bundles in a
way that does not require the agent to reserve or lock some resources during the
negotiation phase. The idea is to trade the components in the bundle in a contin-
uous market, and also support a liquid and functioning derivatives market. By
casting the agent decision problem into a market based problem, it is possible to
evaluate the value of an action numerically, something that is dicult or impos-
sible in traditional negotiation where one uses commitment and decommitment.
This paper does not address how to decide which bundles that are required, nor
do we focus on implementation on a particular execution platform.
We begin by dening the task structure that species the goals of an agent
and enumerate a set of agent types that need to be implemented for an e-
cient market. Next we dene the problem of negotiating over multiple resources
in parallel in multiple markets. We go on to formulate the agent’s task as the
problem of insuring itself against risk during the trading period. We arrive at an
expression for the value of a network option, the option needed for agents using
the resource network structure. This could be used for instance for agents that
trade bandwidth capacity, and who need to use the capacity to set up routes.
Finally, we show that the value of the option can be expressed in a recursive
formulation, assuming that prices are normally distributed (not necessarily in-
dependent) and discuss some dierent techniques available for evaluating the
expression, numerically and analytically.
2 Agents
In the context of this paper, an agent is a program that acts to maximize the
payo for its client through negotiations with other agents or clients. Typically a
client is a human user, and the payo is measured in net cash income or increase
in utility. In many negotiation cases, clients are indierent to each others’ payos,
meaning that the payo of one client is not a function of the payos of another
client.1 We can then express the task of the agent to obtain as much prot as
possible.
An agent system consists of
{ agents representing clients,
{ resources, each one owned by one agent,
{ oers to exchange resources,
{ goals for the agents to achieve,
{ payo/valuation functions to order the goals.
Depending on the properties of these entities, we may have market-based sys-
tems, cooperative/non-cooperative behavior, self-interested behavior, etc.
1 This is not the case for games, situations where the performance is measured relative
to the performance of others, i.e. when one agent’s prot is another agent’s loss.
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Resources can be modeled in many dierent ways. For instance, they can
have a number of attributes that have to be negotiated over. Here, we assume
that all the details of the resources have been standardized, so that to \normal"
resources with dierent attributes are here represented as two dierent kinds
of resources. So the resources are the \atoms" of the negotiation. The prefer-
ences over dierent attributes are instead represented in the payo function (see
below).
Messages with commitments to exchange resources are what changes the
state of the agent system. Much agent work have consisted in describing the
communication that is used to discover which resources one is willing to place
oers for. In this paper, we assume we already have sucient knowledge about
the resources and the alternatives to be able to create the resource network.
A negotiation is an interaction where two or more parties exchange oers to
exchange resources until a mutually satisfying oer is found.
Most generally, goals are \desirable states of the world", and they usually
require the agent to nd which actions to perform and then which resources it
requires to be able to achieve those actions. In this scenario, we assume that the
agent has gured out which resources it needs to fulll it’s task, so a task can
be completely specied by a set of resources. However, there may be alternative
ways of performing a task, each of which requires a dierent set of resources.
Therefore, we represent a task with a set of sets of resources, each of which is
one particular solution to the task.
Some \states of the world" may be more preferable than others, so some sets
of resources will be less valuable than others to the agent. If the agent is to be
able to make a rational choice of which tasks to perform it needs a function that
assigns a value to each solution of the task. For instance, the task t2 = \buy a
car" may give the payo function for agent 5 the values
u5(t2; fFerrarig) = 10000
u5(t2; fVolvog) = 5000
u5(t2; fskate-boardg) = 0
The goal for the agent a is to get the resources
R =
⋃
i
si; i 6= j ) si
⋂
sj = ;
that maximize
∑
i
ua(ti; si)
where the solution sets si to the tasks ti have to be disjunct since no resource
may be used to solve more than one goal. If the agent does not already have the
resources needed, it must negotiate with other agents to exchange resources. If
one wants the agent to economize with the resources given to it by the user, one
of its tasks should be to get the currency resource.
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We suggest that this negotiation can be performed in a market based in-
frastructure. The resources are exchanged for some specic resource class used
as currency. Resource oers are represented as options on bundles of resources,
and since they can be priced, the agent can get the value on the price of a com-
mitment. The agent framework we suggest will require the following agent roles
(each agent can take on one or more of these at the same time):
{ exchange agents which establish a secondary spot market for a particular
resource class by relaying oers between traders,
{ trading agents which represent clients with goals in terms of resource net-
works,
{ arbitrage agents which exploit arbitrage opportunities, and thereby estab-
lish the arbitragelessness of markets,
{ institution agents which provide network options, and
{ market-maker agentswhich provide liquidity to derivative markets.
3 Resource Networks
A resource class is a set of resources the client considers completely interchange-
able, and thereby may be negotiated over as a set, i.e. traded at an exchange.
The resource network denition: For the agent, solving the task is equal to
obtaining one resource in each node on a path from the start node to the end
node. Each node contains the relevant parameters for specifying the resource
class (temporal, quantitative, or other, constraints). The resource network struc-
ture is implied by solutions to u(t; s) > 0. (The resources in those tasks that have
a payo greater than zero build up a path.)
A
B
F
H
D E
G
C
Fig. 1. The path A-B-F-H may represent the solution "Airport cab", "Broadway
ticket", "Flight to N.Y.", "Home from airport cab". The path A-C-D-G-H may rep-
resent "Airport cab", "Canberra flight", "Diving trip", "Go sightseeing", "Home from
airport cab". The second path has the alternative solution where D is replaced for E,
an "Excursion in the desert". For all other combinations, the payo u(t, s) is zero.
A resource network can be used to express the task for the ubiquitous travel
agent. To arrange a holiday trip, the agent has to book a flight, reserve a hotel,
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arrange sightseeing tours and dinners, all according to the client’s interests and
needs. Finally it will call a cab to get the client to the airport in time.
For each of the dierent subtasks there exists a variety of solutions. The
solutions may partially overlap, and the set of solutions may be represented in
a resource network where each node represents a resource class.
Another scenario is where the client wants to watch a lm over a computer
network. To guarantee good transmission quality, it is necessary to reserve some
of the capacity in each of the routers on the path from the video server to the
client.
Two kinds of diculties arise when trading for resources in a resource net-
work: disjunctions and conjunctions. In disjunctions, need one resource or an-
other, but do not benet from getting both. In conjunctions, you need to get a
set of resources, but you do not benet from getting a subset.
To understand the risk with disjunctions, lets consider the problem where
an agent wants to acquire one of two resources, while having a specied time to
negotiate. In a spot market, traded resources are exchanged immediately (\on
the spot"). An agent that needs a resource at a future time t faces in a spot
market continuously the problem of estimating whether the price will go down
between now and t. In the case where there are alternatives and the agent has
managed to obtain one resource the agent also has to estimate whether the the
price of the alternative will decrease below the price of the obtained resource. In
other words, the agent’s marginal payo is insecure.
A B
Fig. 2. The agent wants to buy either A or B and have it at a future time t.
Risk related to conjunctions occurs if an agent requires resources of several
resource classes at once, and it must trade on several markets in parallel. When
the agent holds a set of resources, it faces two risks, that prices go up for the
remaining resources, or that prices go down for the possessed resources. Of these
two, the former is more problematic, since then the total cost of getting all the
resources may be higher than the limit set by the client (via the payo function).
The task of a trading agent with a resource network is in a market reduced
to nding the shortest, i.e. lowest cost path from source to destination, bid for
the resources while reducing the risk of obtaining a bad end result.
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A B C
Fig. 3. The agent wants to buy all of A, B and C and have them at a future time t,
but not just some of them.
4 Risk Reduction via Hedging
As we saw, an agent trading resources in a resource network takes a risk during
the trading phase. A common approach used in non agent-based trading is to
buy an insurance against the risk of price movements. The theory in this area
is well developed and could be used in agent systems [4]. The two suggestions
by the theory of market risk are diversication and hedging, of which hedging
seems to be the most appropriate for our needs. To hedge a set of resources,
one acquires another set of resources such that their price fluctuations cancel
out. An agent may simply watch the movements and measure the correlation
between prices of dierent resources to nd suitable hedging candidates.
To hedge a portfolio with other resources is expensive and may be inecient
since the correlation may be low. More ecient is to hedge the risk during the
negotiation with some derivate resources. A derivative is an intangible resource
which value can be derived from the values of other resources, hence its name.
Since its price is a function of the underlying resources, the correlation with the
underlying resource is very high. Also, since contracts can be specied on large
volumes of resources, the covariance of the prices can be arbitrarily large.
The mathematical theory of derivative pricing is well developed. It is usually
based on assumptions such as arbitragelessness of markets and requirements such
as the possibility of short selling. Arbitragelessness means that it is not possible
to buy a set of resources for less than for what it can be sold. Short selling
means that it is allowed to sell a resource that one does not have, provided that
one eventually will deliver the resource, so it is a kind of future. To guaran-
tee arbitragelessness, "arbitrage agents" should constantly watch for arbitrage
opportunities and exploit them.
The simplest form of hedging consists of obtaining resources such that all
rst order partial derivatives of the resources equal to zero. For instance, to
momentarily hedge one unit of resource r with an option o on the same resource,
one should get −1=(@o@r ) units of o. (If the amount is negative, one should sell
the option.) To hedge a complex portfolio w with the options oi on resources ri
one should (if one ignores price correlations) obtain (@w=@ri)=(@oi=@ri)) units
of oi for all i.
The cost of solving the task equals the cost of the resources plus the cost of
setting up the hedge. The latter may be both positive or negative, since some
hedges allow that the agent itself sells derivatives. An ecient agent should use
techniques making this "insurance cost" as small as possible.
It may be quite computationally and communicationally expensive for each
agent to hedge its resources. Instead of hedging itself, an agent could oer an
institution agent to sell it a specialized option that captures the intention of
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its resource network. The role of the institution agent would be similar to that
of a nancial institution, such as a bank or an insurance company, which sells
specialized, or "exotic", options for their customers on demand. In the resource
network structure that agents have to deal with, the exotic option would consist
of an option to buy one of any of the paths form source to destination for a xed
price.
One benecial property of this design is that the market gets the ability to
replan in real time. In the design where agents hedge their resources individually,
they buy a set of resources and hold on to them, only compensating for their
personal risk of loss. If the hedging strategies of the institutional agents are
ecient, they will possess the resources for the least expensive path when it
is time for the trading agent to exercise the option. Therefore, the resource
allocation is able to adapt to resource demands that arrive after the start of a
particular allocation task.
5 Market Liquidity
An exchange agent proting on the traded volume wants there to be interested
traders on both sides, i.e. liquidity. Liquidity is vaguely dened as how much
prices are aected by trading. Causes of low liquidity are lack of immediacy and
thickness, i.e. when it is dicult to nd someone to trade with, and when only
small volumes are oered at each price. In both cases, traders must bid far o
from the current price to be able to nish a deal. A commonly used indirect
measure of liquidity is the standard deviation of the price, where a low value
signies high liquidity. The issue of liquidity also arises in the design of an agent
system, when we decide which resources that should be traded.
A na¨ve approach to a market for a demand network is to create one market
for each pair of nodes, see [12]. In the case of R = fA; B; C; Dg we would
create the markets fA; B; C; D; AB; AC; AD; BC; BD; CDg. Speculating agents
buy two resources and oer the combination at a third market. This is clearly
infeasible for larger networks, as each market would be very thin (cause 2 of
illiquidity above), and a lot of resources would be held in buers, causing a
virtual demand that will generate prices away from "rational" prices.
By limiting trade to the resources in R plus a derivative market on carefully
selected derivatives we have a better chance of getting liquidity. The cost com-
pared to only using a spot market is the added complexity that the agents have
to deal with when trading derivatives too.
To provide immediacy, exchanges may allow "market-maker" agents to trade
for a lower transaction fee in return for being required to at all times give simul-
taneous buy and sell oers which price dierence is less than a certain amount.
This (together with some of the mathematical properties of options) implies
that when someone wants to trade, the exchange is always guaranteed to nd a
matching oer that is not too far away from the theoretical option price. Since
market-makers have low transaction costs, they may easily exploit arbitrage op-
portunities, and thereby help establishing arbitragelessness.
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6 The Network Option for Bandwidth Markets
To create agents for a specic domain, we must design suitable options that
capture the structure of the payo function u(: : :) of the agents. Agents trading
telecom bandwidth have the task of buying capacity in a number of nodes or
routers so that they can establish a connection between two sites. They are
indierent to the actual path they receive (assuming that latency is not a major
factor). To implement an institution agent for this domain, we must develop an
expression for the value of an option to buy one of any path in a network. Note
that for the institution it is obviously best to always deliver the least cost path
since it is only paid a xed price anyhow.
The value of the option on the time it may be exercised is
w0 = max(0; min(P1; : : : ; Pn) − X)
where Pi is the cost of buying all the resources on path i and X is the price for
which the path may be bought. Obviously, if it is cheaper to buy the resources
on the spot market, that is preferable to the agent, and the option is worthless
to the agent, and the option is worthless.
The costs of the paths may be correlated, and this correlation depends on
the specic network structure and trac model.2 This correlation must be es-
timated by the agents, and it may be represented in a correlation matrix, .
The estimated expected prices M must also be computed. M will typically be
a function of the current prices, and  an estimation based on the historical
distribution of the prices.
We denote the probability for a specic outcome of prices f(p1; p2; p3; : : : ; pn).
Assuming that the resource prices are linear drift and diusion Ito-processes
(dS = Sdt + SdW ), one can show that this distribution should be a mul-
tivariate distribution of sums of log-normal variables. If we approximate this
distribution with a log-normal distribution lognorm(M; ), we can express the
expected value of the option under the risk neutral measure
E[w0] =
∫ 1
−1
: : :
∫ 1
−1
max(0; min(p1; : : : ; pn) − X)f(p1; : : : ; pn) dp1 : : : dpn
Since we use a risk neutral measure for the resource prices, the value of an
option with a time t to the exercise time is
wt = e−rtE[w0]
where r denotes the continuous risk free interest rate, the return rate one can
get with probability 1, like the bank account interest rate.
Since the max(: : :) expression always will be zero when any pi is less than X,
we can move up the lower integration limit to X. We can further assume that
the p’s are ordered, for instance by i < j ) pi < pj if we write E[w0] as the sum
over all permutations Γ , since they are disjunct.
E[w0] =
∑
γ2Γ
E[w0]γ
2 The trac model species who wants network capacity, when and where to.
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Since the second argument of max(0; :::) is always greater than zero, and
min(pγ(1); :::; pγ(n)) = pγ(1) we can rewrite the equation (dropping the cumber-
some γ(i) notation.)
E[w0]γ =
∫ 1
X
∫ pn
X
: : :
∫ p2
X
(p1 − X)f(p1; : : : ; pn)dp1 : : : dpn−1dpn
By recursively using Bayes’ rule P (A; B) = P (AjB)P (B) we can split f(: : :) into
a product
f(p1; p2; : : : ; pn) = f(p1jp2; : : : ; pn)f(p2jp3; : : : ; pn) : : : f(pn−1jp)f(pn)
and expand
E[w0]γ =
∫ 1
X
f(pn)
∫ pn
X
f(pn−1jpn): : :
∫ p2
X
f(p1jp2;: : :; pn)(p1 − X)dp1: : :dpn−1dpn
since f(pn) does not contain p1; : : : ; pn−1 and we can move it and the other
terms of the integral. One benet of this formulation is that if f(p1; :::; pn) is the
density function for a normal distribution, then so is f(p1jp2; : : : ; pn).
7 Evaluation of the Network Option
7.1 Numerical Evaluation
This integral unfortunately has no simple analytical solution for n > 2. Mil-
ton [8] discusses a method for evaluating the integral using multidimensional
quadrature.
Another way to evaluate complex integrals that has become increasingly
popular during the last decade is to use numerical methods like Monte-Carlo
integration.
Monte-Carlo integration of a function f(x) uses sampling of the function to
estimate the integral from the observation that
∫ b
a
f(x)dx = limn!1
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(si); si 2 U [a; b]
where si are drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution U [a; b]. If f(x) = g(x)h(x)
in the interval [a; b], where
∫ b
a
h(x)dx = 1
then we can improve the convergence speed of the integration by sampling g(s)
with s drawn from a distribution H with density function h(x).
∫ b
a
f(x)dx = limn!1
1
n
n∑
i=1
g(si); si 2 H
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This is exactly what we can do in the formula for E[w0]γ above, since the func-
tions f(pij : : :) all satisfy the requirement for h(x).
The Monte-Carlo technique may be extended for multivariate distributions,
but even with the above improvement the convergence is slow, making it costly
to compute the value of the option.
Another approach is to use a multinomial tree evaluation of the option. This
method also suers severely of large growth for problems of high dimensionally
since the branching factor increases exponentially with the number of resource
classes.
7.2 Analytical Approximation
An analytical solution of the integral seems to be impossible since it involves
integrating over Erf(x). However, if we can show that the value of the option can
be expressed in simpler terms for which we can nd a good approximation, that
implies that if we would be able to evaluate the price of the option very fast.
There might exist a converging series expansion of the terms in the integral
such that an approximation of the integral is possible to express in a closed form.
If so, it would be possible to evaluate the price of a network option very rapidly.
We note that we can write the integral recursively
I0(p) = p − X
Ii(p) =
∫ p
X
Ii−1(pi)f(pijpi+1; : : : ; pn)dpi
and thus we can write the value of the network option as
E[w0]γ = In(1)
If the price changes follow a normal distribution3, f(pij : : :) is of the form
keh(p1;:::;pn), where h(: : :) is a polynomial in p1; : : : ; pn.4 The Taylor series of
an exponential of that form (not shown here) is
f(: : :) = g(pi; : : : ; pn)eh2(pi+1;:::;pn)
so the integral Ii of a function on the form above is
Ii =
∫
g(pi; : : : ; pn)eh(pi;:::;pn)dpi
= eh2(pi+1;:::;pn)
∫
g2(pi; : : : ; pn)dpi
= g3(pi+1; : : : ; pn)eh2(pi+1;:::;pn)
which is of the same form as the integrated function, but without pi. Recursion
shows that we could iterate this step, for instance doing the Taylor expansion
3 this is approximately true when t or r are small
4 This can be worked out from the denition of the multivariate distribution.
164 L. Rasmusson
around the center of the integration interval, until we have an analytic approx-
imation of the integral. Since it would be a polynomial in p1; : : : ; pn, it would
be very fast to evaluate on a computer. By keeping track of the error terms we
may even get a bound on the error.
The weakness with this approach is that the error of the Taylor series in-
creases rapidly as we leave the region around point where we developed the
series. If the error term does not even tend towards zero if we leave it too much,
we cannot get a better approximation even by expanding the series further. One
way to circumvent this problem could be to partition the integration interval
into N pieces and doing N expansions around the center of each small interval.
An open issue is to nd a better series development for the integral.
8 Summary
We describe a way to model agents as self-interested actors on a market, and give
a framework for reasoning about their actions. The agents are equipped with a
set of resources which they exchange to another set of resources according to the
client user’s specication. Our idea is to declare the client’s requests as a network
of resources that must be acquired along one path by the agent. This model can
express both traditional agent programming examples such as the travel agent, as
well as market-based bandwidth reservation negotiation for a computer network.
In the latter case, the resource network is equal to the topology of the computer
network.
Although suitable for many scenarios, resource networks are yet not so suited
for domains where utility functions depend on the obtained volume, or where
the resources have too many parameters and constraints for them to be seen as
members of a class. The alternatives to resource nets are generally search, and
one-to-one negotiating, which can be very inecient for complex tasks.
We propose the use of derivatives to create hedged portfolios to coordinate
parallel bidding and reduce trading risk, and institutional agents which pro-
vide "network options", options on the min value of a set of sums of correlated
lognorm-distributed price processes. The formula for the option value is given,
and shown to be of a nice recursive structure which implies that if we can ap-
proximate this substructure eciently, we can evaluate the price of the option
very fast. The derivation assumes that resources are liquid enough for assum-
ing that the market is enough like the nancial market to allow for risk-neutral
evaluation.
We have so far not a good approximation function for the option price, and
the current way to evaluate the option seems to be by using Monte-Carlo tech-
niques.
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Abstract 
How free are our software agents to take the best possible care of our interests? 
How free can we make them? In what sense and to what extent do currently pro-
posed mechanisms and agent behaviors consider self-interest? What current re-
search addresses these issues? What needs to be done? 
We address these issues in the context of electronic markets, such as consumer 
goods markets and (future, more fine-grained) markets for electric power or com-
munication bandwidth. 
 
Electronic markets and self-interested agents 
The notion of a self-interested software agent is well established in the agent community. Al-
though this notion of agenthood is widely applicable, it is perhaps most obviously useful in the 
context of electronic markets, where it coincides with the rational, utility maximizing, agent of 
microeconomic theory (see, e.g., [1]). 
Through automated trading by software agents, we expect improvements in the quality of exist-
ing markets, such as consumer goods markets, and to reap the benefits of markets as effective 
instruments of resource allocation also in non-traditional domains, such as fine-grained markets 
for electric power and communication bandwidth. Agents have the capacity to consider more 
information, e.g., evaluate thousands of offers for a new car, and may also act in domains where 
we are disqualified due to speed requirements, e.g., buying the bandwidth we need packet by 
packet. 
Activity in this field has surged the last few years, riding on the Internet bandwagon, but the 
idea of viewing parts of a distributed computing systems as economic agents has been around at 
least since the late 70s (see, e.g., [2]). At the time, computational economies were mainly re-
garded as mechanisms to achieve system global goals, i.e., a class of decentralized algorithms 
for resource allocation built into a system by top-down design. 
In systems designed with the market based resource allocation paradigm, resources are allocated 
based on the current supply and demand for a set of resources. If the consumers have several 
alternative ways to satisfy their resource demand, the only important factor for them to consider 
is the price, provided that individual resource differences have been normalized away. It is con-
ceptually easy to understand that if the agents choose to sell/buy resources where the prices are 
highest/lowest, resources will generally be allocated to where they are expected to be of most 
use. The paradigm has been proven applicable and efficient for a range of domains. 
Work presented at conferences in 1998 includes  
• Selling excess CPU time or other resources [3,  4,  5,  6] 
• Constraining peak usage of networked resources [7, 8] 
• Improving network utilization and economic efficiency [7, 9, 10] 
• Differentiated network service levels [11,12] 
• Work flow and task allocation [13, 14] 
• Data replication and mirroring [15, 16, 17] 
• Information searching/selling [18, 19] 
• Technical infrastructure for trading agents [20, 21, 22, 23] 
The most recent areas where the economic behavior of software agents is being studied are in-
formation economics and network economics. Information economics is concerned with pricing 
information goods and with the problems that arise when the production marginal cost is zero, 
i.e. when copying is essentially for free (see, e.g., [18, 19]). Information can be expected to be a 
commonly traded goods in software agent mediated commerce, since both trading and distribu-
tion can be handled by agents. 
Network economics deals with pricing the access to a shared resource in which the marginal 
cost most of the time is zero, but where occasional usage peaks result in congestion and heavy 
degradation of the service (see, e.g., [24, 7]). As the congestion incurs more cost for the other 
agents than for the congesting agent, different kinds of economic control is expected to reduce 
peak usage. 
Current research on agents in electronic markets is still to a large extent focused on idealized 
computational economies, or on the implementation of agents and market infrastructure without 
an accompanying analysis of their real-life properties. The agents of such systems have no true 
self-interest, are not competitive, do not speculate, but play the market game using a given strat-
egy, working towards a common goal. We would like to encourage a shift of interest from well-
behaved, easy-to-analyze computational economies, to open full-fledged electronic markets in 
which the participants are free to act in their own best interest. 
In the following sections, we will discuss some recent results on the topic of self-interested 
agents in electronic markets, suggest issues that need further research, and finally offer some 
conclusions. 
Emphasizing self-interest 
Agents that are not self-interested are often made to negotiate to achieve a high global (or so-
cial) welfare.  Such unselfish agents will give up their goals if someone else has a more impor-
tant goal which is blocked by the unselfish agent.  The idea that agents should behave in order 
to optimize the global welfare of the system has been popular in the distributed AI community, 
where a distributed system of agents solve a common task for which the system was specifically 
designed.  All agents share the same goal, hence the high global welfare coincides with the 
agents' own return. 
However, in open systems it is not possible for the participants to agree on which goal is more 
important than another as a unique global utility function does not generally exist. One therefore 
often uses budget constraints rather than the relative importance of goals to settle conflicts.  In 
other words, the highest paying agent gets the goods. This appears to be working remarkably 
well as the one willing to pay a lot often can find good use for the resource, since paying too 
much tends to drain the budget and eventually makes the bidder go broke. (This argument as-
sumes that the other bidders are rational and the market is sufficiently large.) 
That agents will be self-interested is easy to see. A personal software travel agent should pre-
serve the interests of its client.  It should not negotiate to maximize the profit of the airlines, and 
similarly, a personal bargaining CD-agent should not act to maximize the profit of the record 
company.  To preserve the individual goals in a negotiation, each negotiating party will rather 
have its own agent looking after its interests.  In open infrastructures agents will necessarily be 
self-interested, since 
• If people are free to create their own agents, we expect that they will incorporate self-
interested behavior. 
• If people must choose between using self-interested agents or agents optimizing the profit 
for someone else on their expense, we expect they will choose self-interested agents. 
• If people only may use agents that are optimizing the outcome of someone else on their ex-
pense, we expect agents to be used only for tasks where one is even worse off without an 
agent. 
Cooperative agents give away their resources to other agents when explicitly asked (see, e.g., 
[25]) and more implicitly in the constraint-based coordination platforms (see, e.g., [26]). Using 
cooperative agents in a self-interested negotiation context results in absurd behavior of the 
agents.   
Imagine that you have bought a holiday trip, and your hotel is now full so no-one else can go.  
Another person contacts you and says he really wants to have your room.  You would probably 
not just give up the room just because someone you don't know could use your room.  However, 
in cooperative resource allocation, if another agent says it wants the resource more than you, the 
resource is given up. Some consider it "mean" of an agent to refuse to help other agents without 
compensation, but simple "nice" behavior means that your agent subsidizes the other holiday 
goers since they do not have to bid competitively. You also subsidize the travel-agency as it can 
charge more than the end-consumer is willing to pay, which may well decrease the total welfare, 
if such a thing exists. 
If giving up your holiday was to actually increase the global welfare, the seller and other travel-
ers should have been able to compensate you economically for the inconvenience. If they cannot 
do that, either the global welfare decreases or a global welfare metric does not exist, which 
means that one outcome is not necessarily better than the other. This line of reasoning has been 
criticized for not taking into account the agent’s happiness or increased self-esteem from help-
ing others [27].  However, it should be obvious that if happiness cannot be measured on an ab-
solute scale it is meaningless to say that one outcome is better than another simply because one 
agent is more happy than another agent is sad. 
We should not assume cooperative behavior from the agents, partly because it is irrational, and 
partly because agents will in general not agree on which is the best social outcome. Unselfish 
agents will make the system exploitable and vulnerable rather than efficient. 
To seal or not to seal bids 
A large portion of the work in economic mechanism design consists of game theoretic analyses 
of interaction or bidding protocols to find out when agents may benefit from speculative behav-
ior. The agent community is eagerly adopting results from this work. Incentive compatible pro-
tocols promise to make life easy for the agent designer by guaranteeing that the best strategy is 
not to speculate, but to be honest, thereby freeing them from the burden of adding speculation 
intelligence, adaptation and recursive world models to the agent. 
Occasionally, results are adopted without giving proper attention to the preceding assumptions. 
This happens occasionally for the Vickrey auction, where the winner only pays the price of the 
second best bid. One supposes that bids are sealed and that an agent has no knowledge of the 
bid distribution. The analysis shows that bidding too high only risks paying too much without 
increasing chances of winning at an acceptable price. Bidding too low only decreases chances of 
winning without lowering the price the agent must pay. Therefore bidding should be incentive 
compatible and agents should bid honestly. 
The Vickrey auction is only guaranteed to work as designed when the bidders have no possibil-
ity to communicate on the side and have no information at all about each others' bids. In spite of 
that, the Vickrey auction is suggested for scenarios where these assumptions clearly can be vio-
lated, for instance in iterated auctions or auctions over the Internet [5]. In iterated auctions one 
can often infer clearing prices from previous prices. One may benefit from bidding too high if 
that reduces the profit for a competitor. A seller in a Vickrey auction can use the equivalent of 
shills (fake bidders) to increase the profit. With communication on the side, the buyers can col-
lude against the seller by agreeing on bidding very low. 
Vickrey auctions vs English auctions 
Economic coordination for work-flow uses agents that buy and sell their clients' services (see, 
e.g., [28]). If the agents represent the individual workers, they are clearly representing self-
interested individuals. This domain was explored in a paper about English auctions over multi-
dimensional goods [13]. The complex issues of self-interest were avoided by assuming that it is 
illegal to resell the resources and that agents treat prices as exogenous. 
Recent work by Sandholm [29] and by Vulkan and Jennings [13] has made it clear that the 
Vickrey auction has several drawbacks that makes it unsuitable for open agent systems. The fact 
that the Vickrey auction relies on secret private value bids makes it susceptible to collusion and 
unusable for common valued goods. Vulkan and Jennings suggest using the English auction 
since it uses open bids and proves that for private value goods the auction is incentive safe if 
prices are completely exogenous. Nothing is said about how the system behaves if agents are 
allowed to combine and resell goods in which case goods will have common values. 
Ungar [30] also suggests the English auction, but for another reason. The Vickrey auction is 
considered too computationally costly or difficult to use, as it requires you to compute your true 
reserve price in advance. This is a somewhat controversial claim because since the Vickrey auc-
tion is incentive compatible it has been held as strength of the Vickrey auction that no strategic 
reasoning is required. The reason why computing the reserve price is difficult is not very thor-
oughly discussed. Rather this is inferred from the fact that most online auctions are using Eng-
lish auctions, and almost none use Vickrey auctions. One reason given is that bidding for sev-
eral goods in parallel requires nested models of the other agents' preferences and knowledge, as 
one must predict the allocation in the other auctions to bid correctly in one auction. Iterated auc-
tions like the English auctions, will simplify, although not eliminate, the problem, since in early 
phases of bidding, rough estimates may be sufficient, and as bidding proceeds, more informa-
tion will be available. 
Price-taking behavior 
Network pricing is often analyzed in terms of price-taking consumers, whose demand for each 
resource will depend only on prices; increased prices reduces traffic [7, 8, 11, 33, 16]. The as-
sumption that consumers are price-taking is a simplification since it does not take into account 
that competing providers will adjust prices to maintain or reroute traffic. This gives consumers a 
possibility to speculate and the price-taking assumption will not hold. 
In computational economies, sellers are almost always modeled as setting their prices according 
to a predetermined function, increasing prices with demand, rather than maximizing profit [3, 4, 
16, 17]. This results in a nice and smooth dynamic behavior, but the increasing margin-cost 
pricing strategy is not necessarily a rational choice for the resource providers, since the often 
exponential increase in marginal costs results in some of the resources not being sold. Lowering 
prices just enough to empty the stock of resources seems more rational. Kephart et al [18, 19] 
show that self-interested agents in information economies may generate price wars by under-
cutting. 
The price-taking behavior assumption is also incompatible with the ability of consumers to form 
coalitions (consumer cooperatives) to cut prices. Collusion in multi-agent systems has been ana-
lyzed in terms of game theory (see, e.g., [31, 32]). 
General equilibrium markets 
In a general equilibrium auction bids are submitted as resource supply and demand functions to 
an auctioneer, who computes prices by solving the resulting system of equations, such that sup-
ply equals demand. If the market only clears once, there is little room for speculative behavior 
among the agents, as has been demonstrated recently [34]. However, if the market clears several 
times or if the bidding length is randomized, there is again room for time-based speculation, and 
it can be beneficent to bid aggressively initially or near market clearing time. 
Clients might not want their agents to reveal their private valuations to an external auctioneer as 
that information can be exploited. In open equilibrium markets, agents inform the auctioneer 
about their demand and supply only when they receive specific price quotes. This opens up for 
communication on the side and thereby collusion of the auction. The auctioneer may have to 
restrict the bidding deliberation time to ensure that the market will clear eventually [13]. This 
introduces a time-based speculation race even in the price computation of the equilibrium mar-
ket. 
The idea of viewing markets as equilibrium markets is a theoretical simplification. It assumes 
that agents treat prices as exogenous, i.e., the agents' behavior does not affect the price. This is a 
very strong assumption, which is not guaranteed to hold when agents can form coalitions out-
side the market or whenever negotiation is possible. 
Issues that require further attention 
Speculation is necessary 
Our vision of future electronic markets is that they will allow us to create agents that integrate 
simple resources and services into more complex products. This calls for agents that can act as 
enterprises, speculatively producing resources that they wish to sell. Such agents will often face 
the task of combining several resources into one, tailored and packaged for its client. To in-
crease the number of services that are possible to produce, the agents must speculate in order to 
obtain benefits from mass production (of goods and information), etc. 
In general equilibrium markets, the agents must express their bids as absolute utility functions, 
assuming gross substitutability [35]. This assumption is too strong for most real world applica-
tions, and incompatible with our vision, as it assumes that the utility of one resource does not 
depend on whether one holds another resource or not. If we allow reselling, we also allow for 
time-based speculation, and for instance many of the assumptions needed for Walrasian general 
equilibrium auctions fail. 
If demand depends on the availability of other resources, if resources can be resold, or if equiva-
lent resources can be obtained at a later time, the prevalent assumption that simple private value 
bids can be used does not hold. Most of the trading performed with agents will be performed at 
market price with both time based ("Should I buy now or later?") or value based ("Should I in-
crease my bid or will the seller decrease his offer?"). 
Trading concurrently in several markets 
One can not assume that all resources are traded at the same market as this would be an enor-
mous bottle neck (and give too much power to the owner of the market). This complicates the 
process of combining resources. Agents may end up with too much resources (as in [3]). Unless 
these resources can be resold, they are lost. In a dynamic system, this will cause low resource 
utilization. Therefore, in large systems reselling may be necessary even though it causes specu-
lation opportunities. 
In multimarket scenarios, we can expect to find agents that act as speculators with the intention 
to exploit price inefficiencies, just as in the "real" world. This is not a bad thing as it adds li-
quidity to the market. (Increased liquidity generally simplifies the reasoning for the agents as it 
stabilizes prices.) However, frictionless electronic trading also poses a risk for speculation races. 
Both anonymous and identity based trading 
Anonymous trading in stock markets is considered to increase the liquidity, especially since 
large traders can participate incognito. Large traders, if identified, risk altering the prices in a for 
them negative way by trading. 
Privacy, or integrity, is another reason for allowing anonymous trading. Today, sellers log in-
formation about their customers to present more pertinent and personalized information and of-
fers with the intention of increasing and improve sales. Unfortunately, this information can also 
be misused (reduce the outcome of negotiations), and the client has little or no control over what 
information is being logged. 
To get the benefits of directed and personalized deals, personal assistants can help the client to 
be anonymous in negotiations and in the search for information. Instead of having the seller reg-
ister personal information about a user, private information is maintained by the personal assis-
tant who asks the seller for information and filters it according to the clients wishes. 
Identity based trading is necessary for trades where the participants risk that the other party de-
faults, or "defects" from the deal. In such situations, the identity is necessary to establish trust 
[36]. The agents should handle the establishment of trust via third parties, recommendations, 
etc. They also need social protocols for revoking trust if an agent betrays its trust. 
As trust is necessary for some kinds of trades, trusted identities will become a commodity. This 
is particularly easy for software agents as an identity most probably will be proved by digital 
signatures or something that can be copied. 
Conclusions 
Although the appearence of electronic markets has created a need for agents that act in their cli-
ents' best interests, still most agent economies are computational economies rather than econo-
mies of self-interested agents. 
Many agent systems are based on distributed programming protocols that rely on cooperative 
behavior. Their performance and results can not be expected to hold in a real market as self-
interested agents have no a priori reason to give up a good deal without compensation. If we are 
ever to be able to delegate tedious work to software agents in open systems, the focus of future 
work must be on understanding how selfish agents should allocate resources, using speculation 
as needed, and how they should avoid potential problems arising from speculation. 
Some requirements on open markets with truly self-interested agents 
• Agents should not be constrained by predefined bidding strategies 
• Agents should not be assumed to bid their reserve price 
• Agents should be able to resell resources 
Issues that need further investigation 
• Speculation and reducing risk from speculation 
• Strategies for bidding on combinations of goods 
• Decentralization of markets 
• Trust as a commodity 
We expect that research in electronic markets in the coming years will increasingly emphasize 
truly self-interested agents. 
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Abstract
We describe a model of a network of N sub-networks (or routers) where M network users making
concurrent point-to-point connections by selling and buying router capacity to and from each other. The
resources need to be acquired in complete bundles, but there is only one spot market for each router, i.e.
no way to place bids on complete bundles. In order to describe the internal dynamics of the market, we
model the observed prices by N -dimensional Itoˆ-processes. Modeling using stochastic processes is novel
in this context of describing interactions between end-users in a system with shared resources, and allows
a standard set of mathematical tools to be applied. The derived models is intended to price contingent
claims on network capacity and thus to price complex network services such as, trading resource bundles,
pricing quality of service levels, multicast service, etc.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of the state of a communication network. The network is modelled as a graph
where a node represents a cluster of routers, such as a proprietary network, or even an individual router,
and the network state is modelled as a correllated stochastic process. As we have shown [Rasmusson01], the
resulting model can be used to calculate an objective price of complex network services with quaranteed quality
of service level, QoS. The main result of this paper is to provide parameter estimates for two particular mean
reverting processes, with additive noise and with multiplicative noise. As a further justification, we show that
a simulation of a simple bandwidth market will be described quite accurately by one of these processes.
The bandwidth market infrastructure is chosen to minimize the communication overhead for the trading
parties. In this simple simulation, the trading parties are the end-users themselves, a situation which of course
generates a lot of communication overhead. However, in a real implementation of this model, the trading
will be handled by “virtual service providers”. These providers sell services to the end-users in the form of
derivative contracts, and the providers trade the router capacity tokens between themselves in a market place
that is locate outside the communication network itself. The providers require estimates of the network state
process parameters. Such estimates are given in this paper. The details of the network protocols and design
are not given in this paper, as they do not affect the form of the stochastic process, although an efficient choice
of protocol will reduce the communication overhead significantly.
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1.1 Background
A user that requires a network service at a specifice QoS level needs to be able to reserve capacity, or “band-
width” in congested nodes. Since many users will need capacity at the same time, it is important that the
reservation scheme does not unnecessarily block other concurrent reservations, or waste capacity in “pending
reservation state”, and that it does not cause excessively many re-negotiations. This can be accomplished
with a set of “capacity spot markets”. The capacity of one network node is split into shares, which are traded
on a per-node spot market. Anyone can reserve capacity for a connection by buying the capacity along some
path between the source and destination node. It can be the end-users that are trading capacity tokens, but,
more commonly, the actual trade will be handled by service providing middlemen that aggregate the trading
of many end-users. When the capacity is no longer needed by the end-user, it is sold to someone else. The
capacity is sold by someone that gives up its resource usage. The “owning of capacity shares” is similar to a
telephone user that “owns” a telephone line until she hangs up. Compared to “owning” a telephone line, a
capacity share market has the additional benefit that it allows a caller to decide to terminate the call when
the load (and price) increases.
Note that in genereal it is not the “router owners” that sell the capacity on this secondary market. The
network owners may receive their income by fixed per-minute fees, etc. Instead, the secondary market is
intended to provide load balance by mediating the end-user demands in an efficient way.
The motivation for this unusual bandwidth market model is that its goods is tradeable and has a market
price at each instance, hence it can be used for pricing of complex network services. For instance, when the
network becomes congested, it is possible to use the price information and reroute traffic away from congested
nodes to alternative paths with lower load, simply by selling some shares expensively and buy others cheaply.
The necessary negotiation can also be encapsulated in a derivative contract. With such a contract, the end-
users do not have to monitor the network load themselves. They just buy a contract that allows someone else
to reroute their traffic. The details of this contract are outside the scope of this paper, but the fact that such
complex services can be easily provided in this framework is the motivation for this work.
We ultimately want to be able to price many different contingent claims on resources, formalized as options
or futures. The working hypothesis is that adding a suitable set of such claims will improve the efficiency
of the resource allocation, as prices will better reflect all available information of future demand and supply.
Indeed, the purpose of contingent claims is to construct a market for trading expected future value.
One way to price derivative contracts (the one we are advocating) is to use statistical modeling of the
price dynamics. Under suitable assumptions, which we cover in a separate contribution, derivative prices are
functions of current market prices and the properties of the associated model [Black73][Avellaneda99].
This paper addresses the necessary preliminary issue of how to estimate parameters in two stochastic models
from observed market prices, and also presents measures of the efficiency of the market resource allocation
scheme. The meaning of “efficiency”, and related issues, is of interest in its own right, since it is needed for
comparing different bandwidth market systems with each other, and with other allocation schemes.
Since the mid 80’s, artificial markets for resource allocation has been suggested for for a variety of different
allocation tasks in distributed computer systems, ranging over markets for storage capacity [Kurose89], CPU
time [Ferguson88] [Waldspurger92], and network capacity [Kurose85] [Sairamesh95]. The emphasis has been
on evaluating the efficiency of the resource allocation, rather than understanding the resulting price dynamics.
More recent work has stressed the agent aspect, i.e. that the trading parties are locally optimizing entities
[Faratin00]. Combinatorial markets, i.e. trading of bundles of distinct resources is yet a relatively new area.
Somewhat related to combinatorial markets is the area of combinatorial auctions [Rassenti82] [Rothkopf98]
[Sandholm99]. Derivatives have to our knowledge only been used for network admission control by [Lazar98].
Previous bandwidth market models usually only include a primary market, in which end-users can buy
and sell capacity only from the router owner. In the presented model end-users (or their representatives) can
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trade with each other, i.e. the capacity is traded on secondary markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model of the resulting price
process, and the model of the market, of which a central ingredient is a detailed mechanism of price formation
with very low overhead in user-user communication. The main tools used are stochastic differential equations
(Itoˆ-processes), their associated Fokker-Planck equations, and the stationary distribution of those. In section
3 we fit the parameters to the simple simulated market (without derivative contracts). In section 4 we sum
up an discuss our results. Derivations of the process parameter estimates are given in an appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Statistical models of the price process
We approximate the discrete jump price process S(ti) with a continuous process S(t). We try to fit two
different Itoˆ processes to the data (shown in fig. 2) generated by the simulation described below. Notice from
the figure that the price does not appear to drift freely, but rather it returns toward a mean. We therefore try
two mean-reverting processes.
Inhomogeneous drift, additive noise, constant coefficients Assuming the price process is an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, the dynamics for the price of router i would be
dSi(t) = αi
(
µi − Si(t)
)
dt+ σidWi(t) (1)
where Wi(t) is a Wiener process and the correlation between two processes i and j is Corr[dWj(t), dWj(t)] =
ρi,j . Recall that a Wiener process has independent normal distributed increments with mean 0 and variance
t − s, i.e. Wi(t) −W (si) ∼ N [0,
√
t− s] where t > s. For improved readability, we omit the indices in Si(t),
etc., when they are irrelevant for the understanding.
In (eq. 1) the drift term (the dt term) detracts when S is bigger than µ, and adds when S is less than µ.
The amount of the increase is determined by α. The diffusion (the dW term) is independent of S.
When the simulation has run for sufficiently long time, the price Si(t) becomes independent of the starting
state of the system, and reaches a stationary distribution P (t) of S(t). Using the Fokker-Planck equation (see
Appendix A) gives
P (s) = C0e
− 12
(
s−µ
σ/
√
2α
)2
(2)
where C0 = (piσ2/α)−
1
2 , which is the density function for a normal distribution N [µ, σ√
2α
]. We note first
that the normal distribution is non-zero in all of (−∞,∞), meaning that S(t) can take on negative values,
something that is not possible in a market with Farmer’s dynamics (see sec. 2.2). However, the normal
distribution has many good properties, such as that a weighted sum of normal distributed variables is also
normal distributed. If prices are far from zero, this dynamics may therefore be a convenient approximation to
the true distribution. Another note is that the stationary distribution only depends on the ratio σ
2
α and can
therefore not distinguish between separate variations in σ2 and α. Estimating the individual values for these
parameters must be done by other means.
The observations Sˆ(i), i ∈ [1, ..., L] of the process S in its stationary state are regularly spaced with distance
∆t. Since E[S] = µ, we estimate µ with
µˆ = Eˆ[S] =
1
L
L∑
i=1
Sˆ(i)
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We estimate σ after noting that E[(dS)2] = σ2dt+O(dt dW ). Therefore, for small ∆t,
σˆ2 =
1
∆t
Eˆ[(dS)2]
=
1
∆t
1
L− 1
L−1∑
i=1
(
Sˆ(i+ 1)− Sˆ(i)
)2
Since V ar[S] = σ
2
2α , the unbiased estimate is
σˆ2
2αˆ
=
L
L− 1
(
Eˆ[S2]− Eˆ[S]2
)
so the estimate of α is
αˆ =
1
2∆t
∑L−1
i=1
(
Sˆ(i+ 1)− Sˆ(i)
)2
(∑L
i=1 Sˆ(i)2 −
(∑L
i=1 Sˆ(i)
)2)
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the correlation ρi,j between the random sources for
two price processes Si and Sj by solving dWi and dWj in (eq. 1) and using the estimates
dWˆi(k) =
Sˆi(k + 1)− Sˆi(k)− αˆi
(
µˆi − Sˆi(k)
)
∆t
σˆi
so that the estimate becomes
ρˆi,j =
Cˆov[dWi, dWj ]
Vˆar[dWi]Vˆar[dWj ]
=
1
L−1
∑L−1
k=1 dWˆi(k)dWˆj(k)
(∆t)2
where we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt.
Inhomogeneous drift, multiplicative noise, constant coefficients The dynamics in (eq. 1) can gener-
ate negative prices, something which is not possible in a well functioning market. By asserting a mean-reverting
dynamics with multiplicative noise we get a process that is strictly positive. Assume the dynamics for the
price of router i to be
dSi(t) = αi
(
µi − Si(t)
)
dt+ σiSi(t)dWi(t) (3)
where Wi(t) is a Wiener process and the correlation between two processes i and j is Corr[dWj(t), dWj(t)] =
ρi,j . As before, we we omit the indices in Si(t), etc., for readability.
The stationary distribution P (s) of S is
P (s) =
(γµ)γµ
Γ(γ)
e−
γµ
s
(1
s
)γ+2
(4)
where γ ≡ 2ασ2 , and Γ(z) is the gamma function. In (eq. 4) s takes only positive values, which is consistent,
since the dynamics in (eq. 3) does not move an s from positive to negative.
The first moment of this distribution, E[S] is µ (see Appendix A). As for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
above, we estimate µ with
µˆ = Eˆ[S] =
1
L
L∑
i=1
Sˆ(i)
We cannot easily estimate σ from E[(dS)2] since S is in the drift term, but note that the process X(t) =
4
log(S(t)) in (eq. 9) has additive noise. Therefore, we get for small ∆t,
σˆ2 =
1
∆t
Eˆ[(dX)2]
=
1
∆t
1
L− 1
L−1∑
i=1
(
log
Sˆ(i+ 1)
Sˆ(i)
)2
To estimate α, we try two approaches. First we use the conditional expectation E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)] for S in the
stationary state of the system. Taking the partial derivative w.r.t τ gives a first order ODE with the solution
E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)] = e−ατ (S(t)− µ) + µ
showing that the expected value approaches µ exponentially with τ and α determines the speed of the return.
Rearrange to keep e−ατ (which is independent of S(t)) on one side, take the logarithm and take the expected
value of both sides. Let τ = k∆t. We now have an estimate for α,
exp(−αˆ k∆t) = 1
L− k
L−k∑
i=1
Sˆ(i+ k)− µˆ
Sˆ(i)− µˆ (5)
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the correlation ρi,j between the random sources for
two price processes in the same way as above, by solving dWi and dWj in (eq. 3) and using the estimates
∆Wˆi(k) =
Sˆi(k + 1)− Sˆi(k)− αˆi
(
µˆi − Sˆi(k)
)
∆t
σˆiSˆi(k)
so that the estimate becomes
ρˆi,j =
1
L−1
∑L−1
k=1 dWˆi(k)dWˆj(k)
∆t
where again we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt.
2.2 Market model
3
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Figure 1: The network with 10 routers.
We simulate a network consisting of N inter-connected routers or other nodes andM network users making
concurrent capacity reservations for point-to-point connections. There is one spot market per router, where
the capacity shares are traded with a market maker.
Farmer’s non-equilibrium market dynamics [Farmer00] are taken as prescription of how prices change due
to trading (see also sec. 4.1). Farmer’s model is based on the assumption that there exists a market maker
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that guarantees liquidity at all times, and that buying causes prices to increase, while selling causes prices
to decrease. Further, the price dynamics is such that it is impossible to “move” the market by performing a
sequence of trades, where the net traded volume is zero, and that the relative price changes are independent of
the current value of the price. If these conditions are violated, a trader can inflict the market maker unlimited
loss. From the assumptions, Farmer derives a formula that the price per unit in transaction n of ω units is
Sn = Sn−1eωn/λ, where Sn is the unit price in the previous trade, and λ the market depth or liquidity, i.e. the
rate at which the price is changed by trading. For a derivation, see Appendix A. This model is useful since we
do not have to simulate details of the order-book in each market. Instead, we can calculate the price change
caused by trading directly from the last price and the size of the trade.
2.3 Simulation setup
At each time interval, m new demands are generated. A demand is a 7-tuple,
d ≡< id, uid, src, dst, cap, dur,max >
The user identities are chosen independently, so one user may receive zero or one or several new demands. If
the current time is t, demand id specifies that the user uid demands cap units in each node on a path from
src to dst, starting at time t and ending at time t + dur if it costs less than max to obtain the resources. If
there are several paths, a choice will be made, see below. During the simulation a user reserves capacity in a
router by buying that capacity, and sells excess capacity that is no longer in need.
User i owns ri,j units of j. Initially, none of the simulated users are assigned any resources or money, i.e.
ri,j = 0, cashi = 0 for all i and j, nor do they have any resource demand, ωi,j = 0. When a user manages to
satisfy a demand, its capital is increased by the amount max, and when resources are bought and sold, the
capital is decreased and increased, respectively, by the cost of the resource. The simulation is run in L time
steps from time 0 to T with time increments ∆t. At each time step where the current time is t:
• Generate m new demands (hence the total number of requests by a user is approximately exponential
distributed). A demand is specified by a unique demand number id, a user uid randomly drawn from
the set of M users, a source node src and a destination node dst, both randomly drawn from the set of
N nodes, and the required capacity per node cap, which is randomly drawn as the ceiling of eKξ where
ξ is a uniform random variable between 0 and 1. If some demand is more important than others, a user
is willing to pay more for that resource. In this simulation, max is a linear function of the required
capacity, i.e. the maximum total cost max = Cunit cap, where Cunit is a simulation parameter. The
duration (number of time steps) dur is randomly drawn integer between 1 and D.
• Calculate ωi,j , the net change of resource j of user i = uid in the following way:
– For each new demand d, user i looks at the last known transaction prices Sj(t) and decides to buy
cap resources along the least cost path. Since the user will not know the actual cost of a buying and
later selling resources along a path, its decision on whether to buy resources or not, is determined
by a parameter Cmax. The user decides to buy the resources if and only if the estimated total cost
to buy the resources is less than Cmaxmax. The resulting demand cap is then added to the ωi,j for
all the resources j on the least cost path, and the amount max is added to cashi.
– For each satisfied demand d terminating at t, decide to sell the resources that were allocated (if
any) to the demand, i.e. subtract the resulting supply of liberated capacity on the least cost path
if the demand was satisfied and router capacity was bought.
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• All the demands on capacity in single routers (i.e. ωi,j) are effectuated one by one in random order, and
for each trade prices are updated to Sjeωi,j/λj . The cashi is decreased by ωi,jSj and the owned amount
of resource is increased by ωi,j . According to the price formation formula, the trades are made at prices
which depend on the actual order. The prices payed by the users are thus not the same as those used
for determining the least cost path. The next known price is the one that pertains after all the trades,
and is independent of the order.
• When all trading is done for this time-step, log the last transaction prices, Sˆ(t), the number of satisfied
demands, and repeat.
3 Results
3.1 Simulation Parameters
The simulation was run for L = 1000 time-steps (∆t = 0.01) using the network in (fig. 1). There were 10
routers and 10 users, so N = 10 and M = 10. The liquidity in all Farmer markets was chosen to be λi = 10.
The maximal cost per route users were willing to accept was determined by Cunit = 100 and Cmax = 1 for
all users. Initial prices were set to Sˆi(0) = 10 in all markets. Every time step, m = 10 new demands were
generated. The duration dur was uniformly distributed between 1 and 10, i.e. D = 10. The call duration sets
the time scale in the simulation, as we will see below. The required amount of capacity was determined by
K = 2 (see above).
3.2 Parameter estimates
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Figure 2: Plot of the unit price of capacity in router 1 from time 0.01 to 10. ∆t=0.01.
The resulting price process for an individual router in the simulation described in the previous section will
look like the price shown in fig. 2.
To verify that the model and estimate is good, we can plot the histogram of the observed data together
with the estimated density function P (s). See (fig 3) for the resulting fit of the additive noise process. This
estimation coincides with the maximum likelihood estimate of the variables. A least square fit to the values
in the histogram gives a better-looking curve. However, this fit only gives µ and the ratio σ
2
α , as noted above.
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Figure 3: Histogram over the observed prices, the estimated normal distributed density function N [µ, σ/
√
2α]
(the red dashed line) from the additive noise process model, and a least square error fit to the 15 columns in
the histogram (the green dotted line).
As we can see from the left hand side of (eq. 5) for the multiplicative noise process, plotting the right hand
side as a function of k should result in a straight line if α is constant. However, as we can see in (fig. 4), the
line is straight up to some k that depends on the simulation parameters and error. The estimation is very
sensitive to errors in µˆ, especially in the denominator if Sˆ is near µˆ, which results in a flattened out jagged
line, since e−αˆ k∆t is less than the simulation error for larger k. It eventually flattens out which means that α
appears to decrease for larger τ .
Another way to estimate α is to estimate µ and σ as above, and then fit the observed distribution to the
distribution (eq. 4) using the least square method. See (fig. 5) for a plot of the model fit. Plotting the
histograms of ∆Wˆ shows us if the model is good. If that is the case, the ∆Wˆ should behave like samples of a
Wiener process, i.e. be normal distributed. As can be seen in (fig. 6), the model (eq. 3) fits well if the market
liquidity is high. However, if market liquidity is low then the assumed price model does not provide a good fit.
Price Correlations The resource prices in a network of resources depend on the prices of other resources,
since they are traded in groups. Using the parameter estimates of the price dynamics above, we get the
correlation matrix in (tab. 1) for a simulation with high liquidity markets (λi = 100).
We find that prices generally are positively correlated. Comparing with the network graph(fig. 1), one
can see that prices of neighboring nodes often are strongly positively correlated with an average correlation
coefficient of around 0.4, compared to 0.03 for nodes that are not connected. The most significant exception
is nodes 3 and 7. Looking at the network graph it is clear that no least cost path can contain both 3 and 7,
except for the path from 3 to 7.
3.3 Efficiency of the market based resource allocation
The efficiency of a market based resource allocation scheme depends on how well prices reflect the available
information about resource demands. Two sources for bad performance is that price quotes are outdated, or
that they do not reflect knowledge about the price behavior, e.g. periodic price fluctuations, or future prices.
To measure efficiency, we can measure the resource utilization to compare which markets are able to capture
most information.
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Figure 4: Left fig.: the estimate yˆ = e−αk∆t derived from the conditional expectation of S(t + τ) for the
first 100 time-steps in blue, and the plot of y = e−αˆk∆t in green. The estimate may be less than zero due to
the noise from the simulation. Right fig.: the covariance between S(t + k∆t) and S(t). The auto-correlation
deviates some from an exponential, possibly because the price dynamics has higher order than assumed. It
would explain why the estimate in the left plot deviates from an exponential. Simulation time, 100 000 time
steps, λi = 10, and D = 100.
Router 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 0.33 -0.03 0.06 0.48 0.21 -0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.05
2 1 0.02 -0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.60 0.12 0 .36
3 1 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.43 -0.03
4 1 0.38 0.40 0.20 -0.12 0.50 0.09
5 1 0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.11 -0.01
6 1 0.02 -0.11 0.09 0.46
7 1 0.15 0.45 -0.02
8 1 0.41 0.12
9 1 0.01
10 1
Table 1: Correlation coefficients for ∆Wˆ for a simulation with λi = 100, after 5000 time steps. Connected
routers are in bold face.
Communication costs The number of messages sent in the negotiation phase of this kind of system is
negligible, since all users operate on old price quotes and place bids at market, i.e. accept the price whatever it
may be. They do not update their price quotes for every bid. Therefore, less than M messages per trade come
in to a user (the potential quote update from each market). One message per trade (the bid) go out from each
user to the markets that contain resources that the user have chosen. No messages need to be communicated
between the end-users.1
Successful connection ratio In the Farmer market model, the less liquid the markets are, the less valid are
the price quotes. To the left in (fig. 7) the ratio of successful connections is plotted as a function of the market
liquidity λi for simulations with the parameters described in (sec. 3.1). The graphs corresponds to different
values of the decision parameter Cmax. Low liquidity causes large price fluctuations, making the prices higher
than the limit Cmaxmax (see sec. 2.3) which inhibits many connections. Note that a connection is considered
successful even if the net cost (after releasing the resources) is higher than max.
1In a more realistic implementation, the end-users will only communicate one (or a few) message(s) to buy bandwidth options,
they are not even required to know the current router capacity price quotes.
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Figure 5: Histogram over the observed prices and the estimated gamma distribution. µ and σ are estimated
using the moment method, and after that, α is estimated with a least square error fit.
Net profit To the right in (fig. 7) we plot the average profit as a function of the liquidity for a number
of values of Cmax. Large values of Cmax causes the users to buy resources when they are expensive. If the
liquidity is high, the users sell resources at approximately the same price, but with low liquidity, prices will
move significantly downwards when the resources are sold, causing a net loss to the user.
The particular way the max cost for a connection is determined of course very much determines which of
the different kinds of traffic that is promoted in the network. Different schemes could for instance promote
short or long paths, high or low capacity connections, etc.
Average load The average load, or reserved capacity in a router is with the Farmer dynamics a direct
function of the market price, ω(t) = λ log S(t)S(0) . If two simulations that allocate the same connections differ
in load, the higher load depends on inefficient routing that does not choose efficient path. If the simulations
differ in allocated connections, the comparison is less straight forward, and depends on the choice of metric
above. We intend to return to a longer discussion on efficiency, in particular for load balancing, in a future
contribution.
4 Discussion
The traditional statistical models used for telephony have been found to inadequately model data network
traffic. Data communication has been found to show a very bursty or fractal behavior as one communication
event often generates a burst of more communication to other parts of the network. Data communication is
generally short lived and often with strong latency bounds, due to the increasing use of computer networks for
interactive communication. For short lived communication with low transfered amount, traditional switched
best effort networks will probably continue to provide a very efficient solution for a long time. However, with
increasing demand of streaming real-time data such as high quality video-telephony, video-on-demand, etc., it is
necessary to be able to reserve capacity. The alternatives are large buffers, which has bad latency performance,
or migrating data (intelligent replication), which can reduce load for one-to-many communication. Neither is
suited for point-to-point communication service guarantees.
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Figure 6: The left figure shows the histogram (in red) over ∆Wˆ in the simulation described in (sec.3.1) with
λi = 10, and a fitted density function for a normal distribution (in blue). The right figure shows the histogram
of another simulation with the same parameters except for the market liquidity which is λi = 100.
4.1 Market model
First, note that the trading is not intended to take place inside a particular router, but on a secondary market
“outside” the network. Still, it is important that the market is rapid and principally stateless, which is one
reason for choosing the Farmer market model of the market.
In our simulation, Farmer’s market dynamics can be interpreted either as prescriptions of how a rational
market maker should modify the market prices, or as a model of the aggregate behavior of market price changes
during some period of time.
With the former interpretation, the Farmer dynamics can be used to implement a market maker program
that brokers trading between end-users. The dynamics is derived from the assumption that it is impossible to
change prices by ’trade in circles’. This assumption is a necessary condition for any market maker strategy,
since otherwise anyone can exploit the market and gain an unlimited amount of money from the market maker.
The latter interpretation can be used when we want to simulate a part of a market with many concurrent
trades. Since trading causes prices to change means that it is impossible to have updated price information
at the time they place their bid. It is only possible to have completely updated price info if the trading
is synchronous, something that severely reduces the number of bids a market can handle per time unit if
communication delays are taken into account.
The market liquidity (or market depth) parameter λi determines the speed at which prices change. When
the dynamics interpreted as prescriptions for a market maker, it is up to the market maker to adjust λi in order
to reduce the risk of running out of resources. If we model an existing bandwidth market, λi is an observable
parameter which must be determined from the distribution of price jumps in relation to traded volume. The
more resources in relation to the order size, the larger λi. A bandwidth market that is trading the capacity of
a high capacity router can, everything else being equal, be expected to have a higher λi than a similar market
for a congested or inefficient router.
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Figure 7: To the left, average ratio of successful connections as a function of the market liquidity. The graphs
from bottom to top have Cmax equal to 1, 4, 16 and 64. To the right, average net profit as a function of
market liquidity. The graphs from bottom to top have Cmax equal to 64, 16, and 4, showing that a high Cmax
causes losses on average in a low liquid market.
4.2 User model
The user model in the simulation above is very simple, and the user trading is very simplistic. Users do not
accumulate demand, they do not trade speculatively, nor do they reallocate their point-to-point connections
in case of congestion. This may be seen an overly simple model for a “real” computer network, however it
is not an important defect for the purposes of this paper (to produce price generating statistical models of
the system state), as the form of the price process will not be changed radically by more complex end-user
behavior. Another issue is that the system is assumed to be in a fairly steady state, there is no demand
increase or decrease over time. A model that captures that requires that we change the process drift term
(the time derivative). Periodic price processes are used in commodities markets such as (electricity) power
markets, and that analysis follows the same lines as described in this paper.
The end-users do not produce “fat-tail distributed” data, as is commonly observed for data communication
such as file transfer. The reason for this is that we anticipate that video-on-demand-like services (which do
not produce fat tailed traffic) provide a probable early deployment scenario. We think however it would be
interesting to extend this work to include other stochastic processes too.
4.3 Price process model
In the mean reverting processes investigated here, α determines the speed with which the process returns
towards its statistical average µ. The speed of return depends on the characteristic time length of the system,
determined by the simulation parameter D, the call length. With a large D, the prices will be correlated
with previous prices over a longer time period, which results in a small α. With a small D, the price effect of
previous calls will soon be forgotten, resulting in a high α.
In the ’bandwidth market’ presented in this paper, end users buy the required resources themselves. The
demand for updated price quotes results generates additional network traffic. In an extended model, we will
allow risk neutral middle men to sell options on the resources. Since updated quotes will then only be required
by the (few) middle men doing the actual trading, the additional traffic would be greatly reduced. We intend
to return to these topics in future work.
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Appendix A
Stationary Distribution
S(t) is an Itoˆ process with the dynamics dS(t) = a(t, S(t))dt + b(t, S(t))dW (t), and P (s, T ; s0, t) is the con-
tingent probability distribution of S at time T given S(t) = s0. P obeys the Fokker-Planck equation a.k.a the
forward Kolmogorov equation,
−∂TP − ∂s
(
a(T, s)P
)
+ ∂ss
(b(T, s)2
2
P
)
= 0 (6)
An important class of stochastic processes are those that are stationary. For those, if T − t is sufficiently large,
the contingent distribution P no longer depends on s0, and can be substituted with the stationary distribution
P (s), which does not depend on s0, t or T . Two ways in which a stochastic process can fail to be stationary
is if the coefficients, e.g. a and b, are explicitly time-dependent, or if there is no distribution P (s). The latter
happens for instance in ordinary random diffusion, in which the probability gradually spreads out without
reaching a limit.
Assuming that a stationary distribution has been reached, the time derivative drops out of (eq. 6), and
the equation can be integrated once to be
∂sP (s)− 2a(s)− 2b(s)∂sb(s)
b(s)2
P (s) = 0 (7)
which is an ODE. One further integration of (eq. 7) gives
P (s) = C e
∫ s
0
2a(u)
b(u)2
du 1
b(s)2
(8)
where C is a normalization constant determined by
∫
P (s)ds = 1.
The Additive Noise Process
Stationary density function, mean and variance Assume the price dynamics
dS(t) = α(µ− S(t))dt+ σdW (t)
Then the conditional stationary probability distribution of S is, using (eq. 8),
P (s) = C0e−
2α
σ2
∫ s
0 (µ−u)du
= C0e
− 12
(
s−µ
σ/
√
2α
)2
where C0 = (piσ2/α)−
1
2 . P (s) can be identified as the density function for a normal distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2/2α.
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The Multiplicative Noise Process
Stationary density function Assume the price dynamics
dS(t) = α(µ− S(t))dt+ σSdW (t)
Using (eq. 8)
P (s) = C1e
2α
σ2
( ∫ s
s0
µ
u2
du−
=log s−log s0︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ s
s0
1
u
du
)( 1
σ s
)2
=
1
C2
e
2α
σ2
(
−µs
)(1
s
) 2α
σ2
+2
An alternative derivation is to let X(t) = logS(t). Itoˆ’s lemma gives that
dX =
(
αµe−X − (α+ σ
2
2
)
)
dt+ σdW (9)
Then the stationary probability distribution Q(x) of X is , using (eq. 8),
Q(x) = C0e
∫ x
0
(
− 2
(
αµe−X−(α+σ22 )
)
σ2
)
du 1
σ2
= C1e−γµe
−x+(γ+1)x
where C1 is a normalization constant, and γ ≡ 2ασ2 for readability. The stationary density function P (s) for S
is found by recalling X = log(S) and
P (s)ds ≡ Q(log(s))d(log(s))
=
1
C2
e−γµ
1
s
(1
s
)γ+1 1
s
ds
The constant C2 is determined by normalization and identifying the integral as a gamma function, Γ(z+1) =∫∞
0
tze−tdt = zΓ(z). After the substitution t = γµ 1s we get
C2 =
∫ 0
∞
e−t
( 1
γµ
t
)γ+2
(−γµ 1
t2
)dt
=
( 1
γµ
)γ+1 ∫ ∞
0
e−ttγdt
=
( 1
γµ
)γ 1
µ
Γ(γ)
Stationary mean Use the same substitution, t = γµ 1s to obtain
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E[S] =
∫ ∞
0
sP (s)ds
=
∫ 0
∞
(
1
γµ
t)
1
C2
e−t
( 1
γµ
t
)γ+2
(−γµ 1
t2
)dt
=
1
C2
( 1
γµ
)γ ∫ ∞
0
e−ttγ−1dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Γ(γ)
= µ
Conditional expected value Let f(τ |S(t)) be the conditional expectation of S(t+ τ) given S(t).
f(τ |S(t)) ≡ E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)]
= S(t) + E[
∫ t+τ
t
dS(t′)|S(t)]
= S(t) + αµτ − α
∫ t+τ
t
E[S(t′)|S(t)]dt′
Take the partial derivative with respect to τ
∂τf(τ |S(t)) = αµ− αE[S(τ)|S(t)]
= αµ− αf(τ |(S(t))
Multiplying with eατ and collecting the terms gives
∂τ
(
eατf(τ |(S(t))
)
= eαταµ
Integrate both sides over τ from 0 to τ and multiplication with e−ατ gives
f(τ |S(t)) = e−ατ(S(t)− µ)+ µ
where we have used that f(0|S(t)) = S(t). Therefore
e−ατ =
f(τ |S(t))− µ
S(t)− µ
The left side does not depend on S(t). Taking the expected value of both sides
e−ατ = E[e−ατ ]
= E
[E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)]− µ
S(t)− µ
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x]− µ
x− µ P (x)dx
where P is the stationary distribution of S, and we have substituted a time average with an ensemble average,
which is true under suitable assumptions.
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Estimation of parameter α We can estimate the integral from the observed data using the estimates
Pˆ (x) ≡ 1
N
∑
t
δ(x− Sˆ(t))
Eˆ[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x] ≡
∑
t|Sˆ(t)=x Sˆ(t+ τ)
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function and |A| is the cardinality of the set A. The estimation is
e−αˆτ ≡
∫ ∞
0
Pˆ (x)
Eˆ[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x]− µˆ
x− µˆ dx
=
∫ ∞
0
( 1
N
∑
t
δ(x− Sˆ(t))
)
Eˆ[
S(t+ τ)− µˆ
x− µˆ |S(t) = x]dx
=
∑
x|Sˆ(t)=x
1
N
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
∑
t|Sˆ(t)=x
(
S(t+τ)−µˆ
x−µˆ
)
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
=
1
N
∑
t
Sˆ(t+ τ)− µˆ
Sˆ(t)− µˆ
so we can estimate α with
αˆ(τ) ≡ −1
τ
log
( 1
N
∑
t
Sˆ(t+ τ)− µˆ
Sˆ(t)− µˆ
)
which should be a constant function.
Farmer’s market dynamics
Let S be the current price, ω the net demand and S˜ the price at which the demand can be met. We seek a
functional relationship of the type S˜ ≡ S˜(S, ω), where S˜ depends continuously on S and ω. Assume the price
to be positive and bounded, S˜ to be an increasing function of ω, and that prices are only changed through
trading, S˜(S, 0) = S. Assume furthermore that one cannot make money by trading in circles
S˜(S˜(S˜(S, ω1), ω2),−(ω1 + ω2)) = S (10)
and the relative price change is independent of the absolute price,
S˜(S, ω)
S
= φ(ω) (11)
Because of (10) we see that S˜(S˜(S, ω),−ω) = S, so the inverse is S˜−1(S, ω) = S˜(S,−ω), where S˜−1 is the
inverse function of S˜. Applying S˜−1(·,−(ω1 + ω2)) on (10) to see that
S˜(S˜(S, ω1), ω2) = S˜(S, ω1 + ω2) (12)
(11) together with (12) implies that φ(ω1)φ(ω2) = φ(ω1 + ω2) which implies φ(x) = ex/λ for some constant λ.
Therefore
S˜(S, ω) = S eω/λ (13)
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PRICING VIRTUAL PATHS WITH QUALITY-OF-SERVICE
GUARANTEES AS BUNDLE DERIVATIVES
LARS RASMUSSON
Abstract. We describe a model of a communication network that allows us
to price complex network services as financial derivative contracts based on
the spot price of the capacity in individual routers. We prove a theorem of a
Girsanov transform that is useful for pricing linear derivatives on underlying
assets, which can be used to price many complex network services, and it is
used to price an option that gives access to one of several virtual channels
between two network nodes, during a specified future time interval. We give
the continuous time hedging strategy, for which the option price is independent
of the service providers attitude towards risk. The option price contains the
density function of a sum of lognormal variables, which has to be evaluated
numerically.
1. Introduction
1.1. End-to-end quality of service. Today, most traffic in computer networks
is handled by best effort routing; each network router passes on packets as long as
it can, and when the buffers are full, it drops incoming packets. When the network
load is low, all data streams get a high throughput, and when the load is high, all
streams experience equal loss.
This works well for some data streams such as file transfer, but less so for real-
time data streams, i.e. when data packets have hard deadlines. Examples are
audio/video streams [11], grid computing[16], and interactive data streams. Con-
gestion causes packet losses and retransmissions that result in jitter, suspended
computation, and high latency, respectively. These problems arise because the
network cannot provide service quality guarantees and different service levels for
different kinds of traffic. Ability to provide service guarantees requires that an in-
dividual user can reserve some of the capacity in the congestion prone parts of the
network, be that routers, network links, or whatever.
The flexibility of today’s computer network is due to the design choice to keep the
logic inside the network very simple, and to let all application specific knowledge
be handled “at the ends”, by applications on top of the network layer. In this
spirit, we advocate that a reservation policy should be implemented outside of
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Figure 1. An end-user wishes to reserve capacity in a path from
B to C, i.e. buy {B,A,C} or {B,D,C} or neither one, if the price is
too high. The total price depends on the prices of the individual
resources in a complex way.
the network, and that the network should only be a delivery vehicle for packets.
Current attempts to improve throughput rely on more complex internal statistical
routing and network maintenance. This “intelligent network” principle is different
to the “end-to-end principle”, and intelligent networks have not been as good as
end-to-end networks at supporting new applications and uses of the network.
1.2. End-user bandwidth markets. In today’s parlance, discussions of band-
width markets often refer to the trading of spare trunk capacity among large tele-
com companies, Internet service providers, etc. See for instance the bandwidth
markets at Band-X, RateXchange, Min-X, etc. In these markets, the purpose of
trading is to maximize the profit of the service providers, i.e. to let them fulfill
their prior client obligations at a low cost. Since end-users are not affected by the
cost, these prices only affect the traffic load on a coarse scale. Service providers
can only guess what the best buy would be, since they do not know the network
requirements of the applications running on the end-users’ computers.
We propose a somewhat different approach. To make an efficient market, the
bandwidth allocation decisions should be a fine grained negotiation about access to
the scarce resources, that takes place between the end-users, the actual consumers.
This way, someone that really needs a particular resource can bid for it high enough
that someone else releases (sells) the resource, and buys another resource instead.
In most cases, end-users require complex services, services that require capacity in
more than one router, and where these prices interact in a complex way to form
the total price of the service.
The resource prices are correlated in many ways. In fig. 1, the prices of all
resources that are on a potential path affect the decision of whether to buy any of
the other resources. In fig. 2, the demand of user 2 affects the price of resource A,
not on the user 2’s potential paths.
There are some hurdles to overcome to make the resource negotiation fast and
efficient:
PRICING VIRTUAL PATHS WITH QOS GUARANTEES AS BUNDLE DERIVATIVES 3
A
B C
D
FE
Figure 2. User 1 has reserved a path along {B,D,C}, and user 2
wants to reserve {E,D,F} but the price of D makes the path too
expensive. Then, if the prices are appropriate, user 1 should sell
D and buy A, and user 2 buys D.
(1) The negotiation between the end-users must be kept very simple. Bilateral
negotiations [11] is infeasible in real applications.
(2) An end-user does not get a definite price-quote for a complex service such
as a path that involves capacity in several routers.
(3) The end-users will generate an extreme amount of network traffic when
they buy and sell resources, get price quotes, etc.
These problems are addressed by the method presented here.
1.3. Related work. Related work on bandwidth markets to improve performance
in networks are generally based on admission control at the edges, as done by
Gibbens et al. [6]. A user is not admitted to the network if the network does not
provide sufficient service quality. For instance, Kelly [7] models interconnections as
reservations along a specified path, and gives Lyapunov functions that show that the
system state stabilizes asymptotically, as end-users change their demand according
to network load. Courcoubetis [8] models a router as consisting of C channels,
derives the probability that a certain fraction of the traffic is lost, and prices a call
option that bounds the price a user has to pay for capacity in one router. Semret
et al. [14] model admission control to a network over an exponential distributed
number of minutes as a number of n:th-price auctions on 1 minute time-slot access,
and price an access option as the sum of call options on each of the time slots.
Lukose, et al. [9] use a CAPM-like model to construct a mixed portfolio of network
access with different service classes, in order to reduce the latency variance and
mean.
The above models either investigate the asymptotic network behavior, or only
model the price for one network resource. We are interested in handling the tran-
sient behavior of a network with several interacting nodes.
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In neither of the models above do the underlying resources constitute a complete
market, i.e. it is not possible to create a momentarily perfectly balanced (risk-less)
portfolio of options and underlying resources. The price of the option is therefore
dependent on the risk-aversiveness of the network provider. In a complete market,
the price is independent of the risk-aversiveness since perfect hedges can be created,
and the price can be set more tightly, since anyone can trade and compete for the
bids.
We will present a model of a complete continuous time market that allows us to
derive the price of an option that extends the capabilities of the above options in
several ways
• the price depends on more than one underlying resources
• the actual path, or set of resources assigned, does not have to be specified
in advance
• the price is risk-neutral, using the Black-Scholes’ assumptions
Furthermore, we choose a market type in which the resources are traded continu-
ously, rather than in auctions with discrete clearing times since that causes latency.
1.4. Structure of the paper. In section 2 we recapture relevant formulas from
the theory of derivative pricing, in sec. 3 we describe the model price process for
which we price the derivatives, and models of the market and network resources.
In sec. 4 we state the main results, which are the definitions and price formulas for
the network option (proofs are deferred to the appendix), and we conclude with a
discussion in sec. 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Derivative pricing. A standard way to price derivative contracts, a.k.a “deriva-
tives”, such as options, futures, etc. is to use arbitrage-free portfolio theory,
which says that an asset, known to be worth ST at a future time T , is worth
S0 = e−rTST today. Here r is the continuously compounded interest “risk-free
rate”, the loan/interest rate that you get from a bank or a government bond. The
reasoning is that if the asset was worth X 6= S0, which is less (more) than S0,
then anyone could make money by borrowing (lending) X to the rate r, buy (short
sell) the resource, wait to T, sell (buy back) the resource for ST , pay back XerT
(withdraw XrT ) and keep the arbitrage profit ST − XerT > 0 (XerT − ST > 0).
This cannot be possible in an arbitrage-free market. The argument requires that
short selling is allowed, and that transaction fees are negligible.
Derivative pricing often models the asset prices as Itoˆ processes S(t),
dS(t) = a(t, S(t))dt+ b(t, S(t))dW (t)
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whereW (t) is a Wiener process, and a and b are sufficiently bounded functions [15].
The Black-Scholes method [1] prices a derivative of an asset which price follows a
particular kind of Itoˆ-process. It is based on constructing a portfolio that invests
some part of its money in the option, and some part in the asset. At each instant,
the portfolio is balanced in such a way that its value after dt is known exactly. As
time goes and prices change, the portfolio is rebalanced. In short, it is shown that
a derivative f(t, s) that is a function of a stochastic process
dS(t) = a(t, S(t))dt+ σS(t)dW (t)
follows the Black-Scholes equation
∂f
∂t
(t, s) + rs
∂f
∂s
(t, s) +
σ2s2
2
∂2f
∂t2
(t, s)− rf(t, s) = 0
f(T, s) = g(s)
which from the Feynman-Kac formula can be seen to have the solution
f(t, s) = e−r(T−t)EQ[g(S(T ))|S(t) = s]
where Q is the so called equivalent, or risk-free, martingale measure. The boundary
condition, given by the function g(s), specifies the value of the option at the time
the derivative expires. For a traditional call option, g(s) = max(s −K, 0), where
K is the strike price.
Under the Q measure, S(T ) has the drift term a(t, s) = rs, and hence, under Q,
S(T ) = S(t)e(r−
σ2
2 )(T−t)+σ(W (T )−W (t))
Recall from the definition of Itoˆ processes that W (t) is a Wiener process, in other
words, W (T ) is normal distributed with mean 0 and variance T given F0, the
knowledge up until t = 0. This means that we can price derivatives using Monte-
Carlo simulation to solve the differential equations above. Another advantage with
Monte-Carlo is that it converges quite fast also for multidimensional problems,
something that is not the case for binomial-tree pricing methods.
Rebalancing a portfolio, or obtaining/selling assets to decrease its variance is
called ’hedging’ the portfolio. The Black-Scholes hedging method produces a self-
financing hedge, i.e. no additional capital is needed to balance the risk of the
portfolio. Another interesting effect of Black-Scholes hedging is that the formula
for the optimal continuous-time hedge at t given S(t) does not involve the drift
function a(t, s). Hence, the continuous-time hedging is the same for the mean-
reverting and the exponential drift processes.
2.2. Applied pricing. The assumption that a portfolio can be continuously rebal-
anced is violated in real markets. Market frictions, such as transaction fees, often
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make it too costly to rebalance a portfolio very often. For bandwidth markets, we
can eliminate market friction all together, since we are free to design the market to
our own liking. We cannot however guarantee that we can rebalance the portfolio at
every instant, since there are others that want to trade concurrently with ourselves,
and multiple other trade events may occur between the rehedging events.
To understand the effect of interval hedging compared to continuous time hedg-
ing, we show the effect on the portfolio value of hedging and rehedging a call option
on a single asset for three different price processes, hedged continuously and at
intervals.
2.2.1. Continuous time hedging. The lognormal Brownian motion process is often
used to model stock stock price S(t). Its dynamics is
(1) dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW
A derivative contract, on an underlying asset obeying (1) and µ = r under Q,
can be hedged in continuous time by creating a portfolio of γ(t) derivatives and
βi(t) assets. A perfectly hedged, self financing, portfolio with a derivative contract
depending on N assets S¯(t) = {S1(t), ..., Sn(t)} has the value
Π(t) = γ(t) f(t, S(t)) +
N∑
i=1
βi(t)Si(t)
follows (for lack-of-arbitrage reasons) the value of a safe investment, Π(t) = Π(0)ert,
where r is the risk-free continuously compounded interest rate. The hedging strat-
egy is
γ(t+ dt) =
Π(t)
f(t)−∑Ni=1 ∂f∂S (t)S(t)(2)
βi(t+ dt) = −γ(t) ∂f
∂Si
(t)(3)
Consider a share whose price follows a lognormal Brownian motion, see fig. 3.
The price is plotted in the left graph, together with the price of a call option with
strike price 10 that expires at t = 1. The middle graph shows the composition of a
perfectly hedged portfolio. The topmost curve is β(t), the parts of the portfolio part
invested in shares, and under it is γ(t), the part invested in options. A negative
number means that the option should be sold short. To the right is a plot of
the total value of the portfolio that initially consisted of one option. Above and
below are plots of the total value of the portfolio holdings, in shares and options,
respectively. Here r = 0, so the value of the portfolio should be constant even
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Figure 3. To the left, the value of an asset and a call option with
strike price K = 10, in the middle, the fraction invested in each
resource to get a balanced portfolio, and to the right, the total
value of the portfolio (constant), and its parts.
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Figure 4. To the left and in the middle are plots of average value
and standard deviation for a portfolio at the rehedging times. To
the right is the portfolio value distribution when the option ex-
pires, (t = 1). Derived numerically (by Monte-Carlo simulation)
for a lognormal price process (diamonds), and for a mean-reverting
process (stars).
though the share and option prices fluctuate. Since the portfolio value is constant
in the rightmost plot, the hedging works, and the portfolio yields the risk-free rate.
A well known result of the Black-Scholes pricing is the somewhat surprising
result that the derivative prices is not dependent of the drift term. This is because
it is based on a first order approximation, and the drift term is O(dt) while the
diffusion term is O(
√
dt). Since the drift term is the only difference between the
lognormal process and the mean-reverting process with multiplicative noise, the
hedging scheme works as equally well for both processes.
2.2.2. Interval time hedging. For hedging at discrete events with an interval ∆t > 0
rather than in continuous time, the above formula does not give a complete hedge.
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Figure 5. Plots of mean, standard deviation, and final distribu-
tion of portfolio value (see fig. 4) for a mean-reverting asset price
process, rehedged 10 times with the adjusted variance σˆ2.
The effect of hedging a call option with an unmodified strategy is shown, for two
different underlying processes, in fig. 4. Above to the left, is a plot of the average
portfolio value from a Monte-Carlo simulation, of a lognormal process, and a mean-
reverting process with multiplicative noise. The middle plot shows the variance of
the portfolio value at the 10 rebalancing times. The variance increases with time,
and the variance is higher for the mean-reverting process than for the lognormal
process. To the right is the density function for the portfolio value at t = 1. The
rebalancing of the portfolio is only done every 100 steps, i.e. ∆t = 0.1. It is
apparent that the portfolio value for the mean-reverting process is not constant. It
is hence possible to make a statistical arbitrage profit on the derivatives. However,
the deviation in expected value is only a few percent, so a small increase in the
derivative price can protect the issuer from the arbitrage risks.
For some processes a modified hedging strategy can be derived. Cornalba,
Bouchaud et al. [3] have considered time correlated stochastic processes and shown
that for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dS(t) = α(µ− S(t))dt+ σdW (t)
the same hedging strategy can be used, but with a modified variance. A similar
derivation, inspired by Bouchaud, gives that σˆ2 = σ2 (1−e
−2α∆t)
2α∆t . This is based on
a first order approximation, hence the modified volatility σˆ is appropriate only for
small ∆t. For many processes, such as processes with multiplicative noise, we do
not have modified strategies.
Fig. 5 shows plots, similar to fig. 4, of the values for a mean-reverting process
that is hedged with the modified measure of variance σˆ2, and it can be seen that the
adjustment is not perfect, but still only a few percent off. Its dynamics are more
complex, and we do not know of a strategy with modified variance that makes the
portfolio value process replicate that of a risk-free portfolio.
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Since the portfolio cannot be made risk-free over all of ∆t, the future portfolio
value is uncertain. In terms of mathematical finance, the market is incomplete.
In complete markets, options can be priced in a way that does not depend on the
risk-aversiveness of individual participants, something that is not the case in an
incomplete market. However in a technical system, designed to be controlled by
a market, we can require there to always be one or more trading programs that
behave risk-neutrally, or that charge a specified risk premium. That guarantees
that derivatives are traded at prices that make the market efficient, in the sense
that they maximize the expected utility of the end-users by providing low option
prices.
3. Model
3.1. Price processes. In a computer network, end-users share the limited capacity
of the routers and links. To be able to provide QoS-dependent services, these
resources must be managed by the end-users. To each end-user, the system load
appears to fluctuate stochastically, as the end-user does not have access to the
complete system state.
Our approach is to view the state of the system as stochastic processes, and to
control the use of scarce resources by trading the usage right at spot markets. On
these markets, prices will appear to be stochastic processes. The prices present an
an aggregated view of the system. With this view, controlling a technical system
with interacting subunits (not necessarily a network), boils down to developing
suitable derivatives and hedging schemes for the different services that the system
should provide. The implementation requires market-places for the individual re-
sources, and third party middle-men that sell derivatives to end-users and do the
actual trading on the resource level.
An average, sporadic end-user is not willing to take the risk of paying an exces-
sive amount for a network service, but rather get a definite price quote. Trading
derivative contracts is a trade of risk, where one part gets the risk and a premium,
and the other part gets a fixed cash flow. With suitable market models, derivative
contracts can be priced objectively, at least when the price processes can be de-
scribed sufficiently well. So, instead of trading the actual resources, the end-users
buy derivative contracts of a third party. The contract guarantees the delivery of
the required set of resources. The contract may specify both future delivery of some
resources, and deliveries that are contingent on future prices, or functions thereof.
In a previous paper [13], we have simulated a simple bandwidth market without
derivatives, to determine the properties of the resulting stochastic price process. It
was found to be very well described by a correlated mean-reverting process with
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multiplicative noise,
(4) dSi(t) = αi(µi − Si(t))dt+ σiSi(t)dWi(t)
where the price correlation Corr[dWi(t), dWj(t)] = ρij . We gave estimations of the
parameters α, µ, σ, ρ, based on price history data from the simulation. Since this
modeling was possible, it appears feasible to represent complex network services in
terms of derivative contracts on certain complex combinations of resources. Since
in general, introducing new assets in a market modifies the price dynamics, hence
the parameters must be re-estimated when new derivatives are added.
The mean-reverting process drifts back towards µ with a rate determined by α.
As opposed to lognormal processes, mean-reverting processes are auto-correlated
processes, and their variance per time unit, 1τ V ar[S(t + τ) − S(t)] decreases with
increasing τ for the mean-reverting process, while it is constant for the lognormal
process. It is the fact that the price process has “memory” that causes the deviation
in the expected value of the portfolio for interval hedging.
3.2. Farmer markets. The market places where resource trading are of a special
kind designed for very rapid markets that we call Farmer markets, as the original
inspiration was found in [5]. Each market handles one resource, and is run by a
market maker that at each instance guarantees to accept bids both to buy and to
sell.
There is no back-log of pending “limit orders”, only bids “at market” are ac-
cepted. This guarantees that the trading can take place with very little overhead
for the market maker. Since only bids at-market are accepted, the bidder does not
know at what price resources will be traded, but prices can be estimated from the
price-quote history.
The central idea of this market design is that the resources are exchanged on
these markets, and that all more complex contracts are expressed as derivative
contract on these resources. For instance, a limit order, i.e. an order to buy if the
price is less than a specified amount, is a risky contract since the bidder does not
know if the deal will go through or not.
3.3. Resource shares. The capacity of each resource is divided into equal well
defined shares, that gives the owner the right to send a certain amount of traffic
on a short time ∆t if he pays  S(t)∆t. From here on, we assume  = 1. The total
capacity of the shares must not surpass the total capacity of the resource. Without
the payment from the resource holder to the market maker, a holder of the resource
would have no incentive to avoid congested resources, which is shown in the pricing
of the bundle options below.
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For routers, statistical multiplexing has shown to give a large throughput in-
crease, hence it seems reasonable to mix two traffic classes. A router has two traffic
classes, 1) the guaranteed class, and 2) the best-effort class. Packets in the first
class are guaranteed not to be dropped in case of congestion, while packets with-
out valid credentials are handled in traditional best-effort manner. As with the
Metro Pricing Scheme by Odlyzko [10], we only requires two traffic classes, but in
the Metro Pricing scheme, prices are determined outside of the system in such a
way that there is no congestion in the first class, while in our model, prices are
determined by demand, and first class packets get to go first if there is congestion.
4. Results
In a computer network, end-users want to establish virtual paths with certain
guaranteed properties, such as loss, latency, etc. The user wants to have the re-
sources at T1 and to sell them again at T2. This can be implemented as an option
that delivers the resources at T1 together with a bundle of options that lets the user
sell the resources at a guaranteed price. To find the price of this option, we first
establish the following corollary. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Corollary. (1) The price of a future to buy shares of the resources on the cheapest
path between two network nodes at a T1 that are resold at T2 is zero.
However, to balance the load, the price of the derivative must depend on the
resource prices, therefore the so-called bundle future above is not suitable for load-
balancing. Instead, we define a network option, in the following way.
Definition. A network call-option gives the holder the right to send packets with
a specified intensity through nodes on a path between two network routers from
time T1 to time T2, if the fee K is paid at T1.
The call-option price depends on the price of the shares in all routers that are
on any of the possible paths. The following is a very useful theorem for deriving
prices of options based on the correlated price processes.
Theorem. (3) Let S(T ) = {S1(T ), ..., (SN (T )} be an N -dimensional lognormal
price process with correlation ρij = Corr[dWi, dWj ] under probability measure Q.
Then
EQ [Sm(T )g(S(T ))|F0] = Sm,0erTEQ
[
g(ξTm1S1(T ), ..., ξmNSN (T ))|F0
]
where
ξmi = eσiσmρim = exp
(
1
dt
Cov [log dSi(T ), log dSm(T )]
)
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This shows that linear derivatives can be priced as expected values of an adjusted
process ξmiSi(T ).
With the help of this theorem, we can derive the value of the network call-
option, and its partial derivatives, and calculate the optimal rebalance strategy for
a portfolio for the continuous time hedge strategy, using Eq. (2) and (3).
Corollary. (3) The value of a network call-option with strike price K is
f(0, S¯) = TC erT1
N∑
m=1
Sm,0
M∑
i=1
vimQ
[
i = argminjCˆjm ∧ Cˆim < K
]
−TC K Q [minjCj > K]
where
Cˆim =
∑
k
vikξ
T1
miSk(T1)
is the adjusted cost of path i, after the Girsanov transform to eliminate resource
Sm(...),
TC =
e−rT1 − e−rT2
r
with limr→0TC = T2 − T1.
Corollary. (4) The partial derivative of the network option with strike-price K is
∂f
∂Sn,0
(0, S¯) = TC erT1
M∑
i=1
vinQ[Cˆin = minjCˆjn ∧ Cˆin > K]
and
f(0, S¯) =
N∑
m=1
Sm,0
∂f
∂Sn,0
(0, S¯)− TC K Q [minjCj > K]
There is no closed form for the sum of lognormal variables [17], which makes it
difficult to reduce the Q[...]-terms further, but since S(T ) has a closed form under
the risk neutral measure Q, the option price can be approximated with Monte-Carlo
simulation. Note that under the risk neutral measure one, S(T ) can be simulated
without having to simulate the individual price trajectories for the mean-reverting
process, something that is required for pricing techniques using the natural measure,
and which is very time consuming.
5. Discussion
In the proposed network model, access to each node is traded in a different
market. This way, applications at the edge of the network can combine the resources
in which way they choose, i.e. build broadcast trees, or failure safe multi-path
routing. By choosing to trade capacity shares rather than time-slotted access as
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the fundamental commodity, we have only one market per router instead of one per
router and minute.
In the most popular alternative model, network access is handled only at the
edge of the network, hence applications at the edges cannot create new services.
The cost of a more fine grained control scheme is of course more overhead, but with
the proposed scheme, the routers are relieved of much work, since the packets are
source routed.
The central idea is that simple resources are exchanged on very fast markets,
and that all more complex services are expressed as derivative contract on these
resources. Since we use Farmer markets, the trading generates very little overhead
but incurs a price risk for the trader, which must be hedged. Since end-users do
not hedge their risks themselves, but instead buy derivatives, the network will not
be flooded by bids and quotes between all end-users and all markets. When a user
requires a service, or a combination of services, the user simply tells a middle-man
that it is willing to pay a certain amount for a derivative that models the service,
and the user can be informed directly whether or not it got the service, and of the
marginal cost.
The capacity prices are assumed to be correlated Itoˆ processes with multiplicative
drift. We show how use a Martingale technique to price options on one-of-several
linear combinations of assets by proving a theorem on a Girsanov transform that
can be used to price several other options, and give a continuous time hedge strat-
egy that can be used by a trader to balance out all risk. We have not found a
complete adjusted strategy for the mean-reverting price process when the portfolio
is infrequently rebalanced. A potential possibility to find an adjusted strategy is to
look into pricing of Bessel processes [2].
The proposed hedge scheme builds on the assumptions made in the Black-Scholes
model, i.e. that the portfolio is self-financing, without arbitrage possibilities, and
that short selling is allowed. Other hedge schemes use different assumptions, such
as CAPM [18], which aims to minimize the variance of the portfolio value while
maximizing its expected value. The proposed scheme has the advantage that the
price is invariant of risk-attitude, and can be efficiently evaluated using Monte-Carlo
techniques.
Future work will consist of simulations of the complete bandwidth market in
order to determine the effect of the network options on the price processes, to find
better models for the financial risk of trading in Farmer markets, and to model
other network services as derivative services.
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Appendix A.
Here we give the proofs of the theorems and lemmas needed for pricing the
network option.
A.1. Bundle futures.
Definition 1. A bundle future gives the holder a set of resource shares between
T1 and T2, given that an event R occurs at T1. Let Q be the equivalent martingale
measure.
Theorem 1. The price of the bundle future is zero.
Lemma 1. If W(T) is a Wiener process, then E
[
e(−
σ2
2 )T+σW (T )|F0
]
= 1, where
F0 is the natural filtration up to t = 0.
Lemma 2. The price of a future to buy a single resource Sj at T1 that is sold at
T2 is zero.
Proof: At T2, the future is worth Aj = Sj(T2) − er(T2−T1)Sj(T1). Hence the
price at t = 0 is
f(0, s0) = e−rT2EQ[Aj |F0]
= e−rT2 s0EQ
[
e(r−
σ2
2 )T2+σW (T2) − er(T2−T1)e(r−σ
2
2 )T1+σW (T1)|F0
]
= s0EQ
[
e(−
σ2
2 )T2+σW (T2) − e(−σ
2
2 )T1+σW (T1)|F0
]
= s0EQ
[
e(−
σ2
2 )T1+σW (T1)|F0
]
EQ
[
e(−
σ2
2 )(T2−T1)+σ(W (T2)−W (T1)) − 1|F0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0

Lemma 3. The price of a derivative that delivers the future defined in lemma 2,
given that event R occurs at T1, is also zero.
Proof: At T2 the derivative is worth Aj1{R}. Hence the option price at t = 0 is
f(0, s0) = e−rT2EQ[Aj1{R}|F0]
= e−rT2EQ
EQ[Aj |F1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
1R|F0

= 0
where Q[R] is the probability of R under the probability measure Q. 
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Proof of Theorem 1: Let Ri be the event that bundle i is bought. The price
of the bundle future is
f(0, S¯) = e−rT2EQ
 N∑
j=1
vijAj1{Ri}|F0

= 0

Corollary 1. The price of a future to buy shares of the resources on the cheapest
path between two network nodes at a T1 that are resold at T2 is zero.
Proof: Let vij be the amount of router j required on path i, and let Ri be the
event that path i is the cheapest path at T1. The corollary follows from Theorem
1. 
A.2. Network option (step one).
Definition 2. A network option gives the holder the right to send packets with a
specified intensity through nodes on a path between two network routers from time
T1 to time T2, if the fee K is paid at T1.
Lemma 4. The price of an arithmetic average (Asian) call option with strike price
zero and maturity at T is
f(0, s0) = s0
1− e−rT
r
which becomes s0T in the limit of r → 0+.
Proof: At T , the option is worth
∫ T
0
S(t)dt, so
fAsian(0, s0) = e−rTEQ
[∫ T
0
S(t)dt|F0
]
= lim∆t→0e−rTEQ
T/∆t−1∑
i=0
s0e
(r−σ22 )ti+σW (ti)∆t|F0

= lim∆t→0e−rT
T/∆t−1∑
i=0
s0e
r ti∆t EQ
[
e(−
σ2
2 )ti+σW (ti)|F0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= e−rT
∫ T
0
s0e
rtdt
= s0
1− e−rT
r

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Theorem 2. Let Ci =
∑N
m=1 vimSj(T1) be the cost of the resources for alternative
i at T1. The price of a network option is
f(0, S¯) = TC EQ [max(mini(Ci)−K, 0)|F0]
= TC
(
EQ
[
M∑
i=1
Ci1{Ci=minkCk}1{Ci>K}|F0
]
−KEQ [1{miniCi>K}|F0]
)
where TC = e
−rT1−e−rT2
r , for which limr→0TC = T2 − T1.
Proof: The cost to send traffic consists of buying the required router shares at
T1, pay the send fee from T1 to T2 and sell back the shares at T2. This amounts
to a bundle option and an Asian option from T1 to T2 on some path between the
source and the destination. The cheapest option is the option over the least cost
path, i.e. where i = argminkCk at T1. At T1 the network option is worth the sum
of Asian options for the resources on the cheapest path minus K if the option is
in-the-money, else it is worth 0. Hence, on t = 0
f(0, S¯) = e−rT1EQ
[
max
(
M∑
i=1
N∑
m=1
vimfAsian(T1, S(T1))1{Ci=minkCk} −K, 0
)
|F0
]
= e−rT1EQ
[
max
(
M∑
i=1
1− e−r(T2−T1)
r
N∑
m=1
vimS(T1)1{Ci=minkCk} −K, 0
)
|F0
]
=
e−rT1 − e−rT2
r
EQ
[
max(
M∑
i=1
Ci1{Ci=minkCk} −K, 0)|F0
]
= TC
(
EQ
[
M∑
i=1
Ci1{Ci=minkCk}1{Ci>K}|F0
]
−KEQ [1{miniCi>K}|F0]
)

A.3. The 1-dimensional Girsanov transform. We start by showing the useful-
ness of the so-called Girsanov transform for a one-dimensional stochastic process,
in order to simplify the presentation of the proof of the n-dimensional transform.
The one-dimensional pricing of a call option was based on Dufresne et al. [12].
Lemma 5. EQ [S(T )g(S(T ))|F0] = S0erTEQ
[
g(eσ
2TS(T ))|F0
]
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Proof:
EQ[S(T )g(S(T ))|F0] =
∫ ∞
−∞
S0e
(r−σ22 )T+σ
√
Tx 1√
2pi
e−
1
2x
2
g
(
S0e
(r−σ22 )T+σ
√
Tx
)
dx
= S0erT
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2 (x−σ
√
T )2g
(
S0e
(r−σ22 )T+σ
√
Tx
)
dx
= S0erT
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2y
2
g
(
S0e
(r−σ22 )T+σ
√
T (y+σ
√
T )
)
dy
= S0erTEQ
[
g(eσ
2TS(T ))|F0
]
where y = x− σ√T . 
Corollary 2. The value of a call option with strike price K, and maturity at T , is
e−rTEQ [max(S(T )−K, 0)|F0] = S0N(d1 + σ
√
T )−Ke−rTN(d1)
where d1 =
log
S0
K −σ
2
2 T
σ
√
T
, N(x) is the cumulative density function for the standard
normal distribution, the current time t = 0, and S(0) = S0.
Proof: From the definition of the indicator function, EQ[1{A}] = Q[A]. The
corollary follows from seeing that
EQ[max(S(T )−K, 0)|F0] = EQ[S(T ) 1{S(T )>K}|F0]−KEQ[1{S(T )>K}, 0)|F0]
and from the lemma,
EQ[1{S(T )>K}|F0] = Q
[
− W (T )√
T
<
logS0K − σ
2
2 T
σ
√
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d1
]
= N(d1)
and
EQ[S(T ) 1{S(T )>K}|F0] = S0erTEQ
[
1{eσ2TS(T )>K}|F0
]
= S0erTQ
[
−W (T )√
T
<
logS0K − σ
2
2 T
σ
√
T
+ σ
√
T
]
= S0erTN(d1 + σ
√
T )
by doing a Girsanov transform, and using that W (T ) is normal distributed with
variance T . 
A.4. The n-dimensional Girsanov transform of E[S g(S)].
Lemma 6. Let {SQ(T )}i = Si,0e(r−
σ2i
2 )T+σi
√
Txi , i = i, ..., N , where xi are stan-
dard normal distributed variables, correlated with {D}ij = Corr[xi, xj ] under the
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measure Q, and uncorrelated under the measure R. Then
EQ[g(SQ(T ))|F0] = ER[g(SR(T ))|F0]
where {SR(T )}i = Si,0e(r−
σ2i
2 )T+σi
√
T
∑N
j=1 Pijxj , and P is the Cholesky factoriza-
tion of D, i.e. PTP = D.
Proof: Since PTP = D, then D−1PTP = I = PTD−1P . The substitu-
tion Py = x makes xTD−1x = yTy, dx = (det P )dy =
√
det Ddy, and xi =∑N
j=1 Pijyj .
EQ[g(S(T ))|F0] =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx g(SQ(T ))
1
(2pi)N/2
√
det D
e−
1
2x
TD−1x
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dy g(SR(T ))
1
(2pi)N/2
e−
1
2y
Ty
= ER[g(SR(T ))|F0]

Lemma 7. The multidimensional variant of the elimination of Sm for an uncor-
related N-dimensional random variable S is
ER[{SR(T )}mg(SR(T ))|F0] = Sm,0erTER[g(SZ(T ))|F0]
where {SZ(T )}i = eσiσm
∑N
j=1 PijPmj{SR(T )}i.
Proof: ER[{SR(T )}mg(SR(T ))|F0]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dxSm,0e(r−
σ2m
2 )T+σm
√
T
∑N
j=1 Pmjxj
1
(2pi)N/2
e−
1
2
∑n
j=1 x
2
j g(SR(T ))
= Sm,0e(r−
σ2m
2 )T
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
1
(2pi)N/2
e−
1
2
∑n
j=1(x
2
j−2σm
√
TPmjxj)g(SR(T ))
= Sm,0e
(r−σ
2
m
2 )T+
1
2σ
2
mT
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
N∑
j=1
Pmj ∫ ∞
−∞
dx
1
(2pi)N/2
e−
1
2
∑n
j=1(xj−σm
√
TPmj)
2
g(SR(T ))
= Sm,0erT
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
1
q(2pi)N/2
e−
1
2y
Tyg(SZ(T ))
= Sm,0erTER[g(SZ(T ))|F0]
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where xi = yi + σm
√
TPmi, therefore
{SZ(T )}i = Si,0e(r−
σ2i
2 )T+σi
√
T
∑N
j=1 Pij(yj+σm
√
TPmj)
= eσiσmT
∑N
j=1 PijPmjSi,0e
(r−σ
2
i
2 )T+σi
√
T
∑N
j=1 Pijyj)
= eσiσmT
∑N
j=1 PijPmj{SR(T )}i
= eσiσmT{D}im{SR(T )}i

Lemma 8. σiσm{D}im = 1dtCovQ[log dSi(T ), log dSm(T )].
Proof: By Itoˆ’s Formula (see for instance, theorem 3.3.2 in [15]) log dSi =
a dt+ σidWi for some bounded function a.
CovQ[log dSi(T ), log dSm(T )] = CovQ[σidWi, σjdWj ] +O(dt3/2)
= σiσj{D}ijdt+O(dt3/2)

Theorem 3. Let S(T ) = {S1(T ), ..., (SN (T )} be an N -dimensional lognormal price
process with correlation {D}ij = Corr[dWi, dWj ] under probability measure Q.
Then
EQ[Sm(T )g(S(T ))|F0] = Sm,0erTEQ[g(ξTm1S1(T ), ..., ξmNSN (T ))|F0]
where ξmi = eσiσm{D}im = exp( 1dtCov
Q[log dSi(T ), log dSm(T )]).
Proof: Follows from using lemma 6, lemma 7, and lemma 6 again, in the other
direction. 
A.5. Network option (step two).
Corollary 3. The value of a network call-option with strike price K is
f(0, S¯) = TC erT1
N∑
m=1
Sm,0
M∑
i=1
vimQ[i = argminjCˆjm ∧ Cˆim > K]
−TC K Q[minjCj > K]
where Cˆim =
∑
k vikξ
T1
miSk(T1) is the adjusted cost of path i, after the Girsanov-
transform to eliminate resource Sm(...).
Proof:
f(0, S¯) = TC
(
EQ
[
M∑
i=1
Ci1{Ci=minkCk}1{Ci>K}|F0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V1
−KEQ[1{miniCi>K}|F0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V2
)
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where V2 = KQ[miniCi > K] and
V1 = EQ[
M∑
i=1
Ci1{Ci=minkCk}1{Ci>K}|F0]
= EQ[
M∑
i=1
N∑
m=1
vimSm(T1)1{Ci=minkCk∧Ci>K}|F0]
=
M∑
i=1
N∑
m=1
vimS0,me
rT1EQ[1{Cˆim=minkCˆkm∧Cˆim>K}|F0]
= erT1
N∑
m=1
S0,m
M∑
i=1
vimQ[Cˆim = minkCˆkm ∧ Cˆim > K]
by using theorem 3 in step three. 
Corollary 4. The partial derivative of the network option with strike-price K is
∂f
∂Sn,0
(0, S¯) = TC erT1
M∑
i=1
vinQ[Cˆin = minjCˆjn ∧ Cˆin > K]
and
f(0, S¯) =
N∑
m=1
Sm,0
∂f
∂Sn,0
(0, S¯)− TC K Q[minjCj > K]
Proof: The first statement follows from that ∂Q
∗
∂Sin
= 0 nearly everywhere, for
all m and n, for both cases when Q∗ = Q[Cˆin = minjCˆjn ∧ Cˆin > K], and when
Q∗ = Q[minjCj > K]. The second follows trivially from the value of the network
call-option and the first statement. 
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Abstract
We show that one can evaluate the cumulative probability density
function of m weighted sums of n correlated lognormal variables with
Monte Carlo simulation rapidly, by deriving its joint probability density
function. The adaptive Monte Carlo method allows us to estimate the
number of rounds required to achieve a given tolerance. The need for
evaluating this function rapidly occurs in many applications, for instance
for pricing combinatorial options for bandwidth markets.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Systems which state depend on very many independent factors can, due to
the Central Limit Theorem, often be modeled as changing state with normal
distributed random steps. If this modeling works for sufficiently small time
scales, the system can be modeled as being driven by the continuous time analog,
the Wiener process. If the state change is proportional to the current state, such
a system generates lognormal trajectories, i.e. the future state of the system
follows a lognormal distribution.
In our prior work on load balancing of computer network, sums of correlated
lognormals arise as modeling the cost of a routed path in the computer network.
In a prior bandwidth market simulation, the short time capacity cost of each
router was found to be approximately lognormal [10], and therefore complex
∗Corrected: 16 Jan
1
network services such as virtual channels, etc., can be described as derivative
contracts on router capacity. To evaluate an efficient price for a virtual channel
in a routed network, one needs to evaluate the CDF for sums of lognormal
variables in an efficient way [9]. In the standard applications of mathematical
finance one has usually priced assets which are to a large extent uncorrelated
(stocks or interest rate derivatives), but in bandwidth markets, the underlying
network structure makes capacity prices correlated, and hence the need to also
handle correlated lognormal variables.
The high dimensionality (due to the number of network routers) makes stan-
dard methods from mathematical finance fail. For instance, the standard bi-
nomial tree method [3] requires exponentially more memory as the number of
assets grow. Therefore we will have to rely on the Monte Carlo method to
evaluate the CDF within a probabilistically bounded error.
Other applications which involve the evaluation the expected value of a dis-
continuous function of the future state are interference in cellular phone net-
works [6], or so called quality options [2]. In these, as well in our application
one needs to compute the cumulative density function (CDF) for a weighted
sum of lognormal variables within a specified tolerance.
1.2 Weighted sums of lognormal variables
We give a formula for the PDF ofm weighted sums of correlated lognormals that
arise from n correlated processes driven by n independent Wiener processes, in
terms of an n dimensional integral over Rn.
No closed form solution of the CDF for weighted sums of lognormals has
been found in the literature. Beaulieu et al. [1], dismiss the idea of determining
the PDF of a sum by computing the inverse Fourier transform of the product
of the Fourier transforms of the PDFs of the summands, on the grounds that
the Fourier transform for lognormal variables is not known, and that numerical
Fourier transform is difficult due to highly oscillating integrands with slowly
decaying tails. Instead, they suggest approximating the sum of independent
lognormals with another lognormal density function. This is a crude approx-
imation, since, as they are aware, the sum of lognormals is not a lognormal
distribution itself, nor does the method provide much insight into the size of the
approximation error.
Although a promising paper by Leipnik [5] giving the characteristic function
of the lognormal PDF (albeit in a form shown to be difficult to evaluate numer-
2
ically) appeared to be a first step toward the solution, its promised follow-up
paper has not yet been published.
Milevsky et al. [7] approximate an unweighted finite sum of correlated log-
normal variables with an infinite unweighted sum of lognormals, and find that
the inverse of the infinite sum is gamma distributed. They approximate the
inverse finite sum with a gamma distribution by moment matching.
Boyle et al. approximate the minimum of several single lognormal assets Si
as
E[min(S1, ..., Sn)] = E[exp(max(− logS1, ...,− logSn))]
≈ E[exp(−Vn)]
≈ exp(−µ)
[
1 +
µ2
2!
− µ3
3!
+
µ4
4!
]
where Vi = max(Vi−1, logSi) is approximated with a normal distribution with
suitable moments µk. This is an approximation to exact formulas provided by
Johnson [4] which prove to be very complex to evaluate for more than two assets.
The difficulty to find closed form solutions to these problems suggests that
the general problem of weighted sums of lognormals also has to be tackled by
numerical means.
We derive the PDF for the weighted sum of lognormals, and use the Monte
Carlo method to evaluate the CDF to within an estimated error tolerance.
2 The density functions
2.1 The PDF for a correlated multi-dimensional lognor-
mal process X
Let Wi(t), i = 1, . . . , n be an n dimensional Wiener process, i.e. for 0 ≤ s1 <
s2 ≤ t the steps Wi(s2) − Wi(s1) ∈ N(0,
√
s2 − s1) are i.i.d. Let Xi(t), i =
1, . . . , n be a correlated lognormal stochastic process
dXi(t) =
n∑
j=1
Xi(t)σijdWj(t)
3
with linearly independent components, which implies that σ−1 exists. The n-
dimensional normal process Yi(t) is defined by
Yi(t) = logXi(t), i = 1, . . . , n
A Taylor series expansion of dYi(t) to order dt gives
dYi(t) =
∂ logXi(t)
∂Xi(t)
dXi(t) +
1
2
∂2 logXi(t)
(∂Xi(t))2
(dXi(t))2 +O((dXi(t))3)
=
n∑
j=1
σijdWj(t)− 12(
n∑
j=1
σijdWj(t))2 +O(
∑
j,k,l
dWj(t)dWk(t)dWl(t))
=
n∑
j=1
σijdWj(t)− 12(
n∑
j=1
σ2ij)dt+O(
∑
j
dWj(t)dt)
since Wiener processes have the property (dWi)2 = dt. Therefore
Yi(t)− Yi(0) =
∫ t
0
dYi(s)
=
n∑
j=1
σij
∫ t
0
dWj(s)− 12(
n∑
j=1
σij)2
∫ t
0
ds
=
n∑
j=1
σijWj(t)− 12(
n∑
j=1
σ2ij)t
4
and we see that Yi(t) ∈ N(µi, s2i ) where mean µi = − 12 (
∑n
j=1 σ
2
ij)t, and variance
s2i = t
∑n
j=1 σ
2
ij . The covariance is
Cov[Yi(t), Yj(t)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
−∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
(
n∑
k=1
σikwk − µi)(
n∑
k=1
σjkwk − µj)
× 1
(2pit)n/2
exp(− 1
2t
n∑
k=1
w2k)dw1 · · · dwn︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡f(w¯)dw¯
−µiµj
= µiµj
∫
f(w¯)dw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−µi
n∑
k=1
σjk
∫
wkf(w¯)dw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[Wk]=0
−µj
n∑
k=1
σik
∫
wkf(w¯)dw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∫
(
n∑
k=1
σikwk)(
n∑
k=1
σjkwk)f(w¯)dw¯ − µiµj
=
n∑
k=1
σikσjk
∫
w2kf(w¯)dw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V ar[Wk(t)]=t
+
∑
k 6=l
σikσjl
∫
wkwlf(w¯)dw¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Cov[Wk(t),Wl(t)]=0
= t
n∑
k=1
σikσjk
where we let w¯ denote the vector (w1, ..., wn)T and let dw¯ denote the volume
element dw1 · · · dwn. Hence, if we denote C = σσT , the covariance matrix is
tC, and the mean is µi = − 12 t Cii. The joint density function for correlated
normal variables is
pY¯ (y¯)dy1 · · · dyn =
1
(2pit)n/2
√
det(C)
exp
(
− 1
2t
(y¯ − µ¯)TC−1(y¯ − µ¯)
)
dy1 · · · dyn
so by using Yi = logXi and performing the coordinate change
yi = log xi
dyi =
1
xi
dxi
5
we obtain
pX¯(x¯) =
1
(2pit)n/2
√
det(C)
exp
(
− 1
2t
(log x¯− µ¯)TC−1(log x¯− µ¯)
)
1
x1 · · ·xn
= pY¯ (σ
−1(log x¯− µ¯))
pY¯ (y¯) =
n∏
i=1
φ(yi)
with the substitution Y¯ = σ−1(log X¯ − µ¯), and log x¯ ≡ (log x1, ..., log xn)T , and
where φ(x) is the PDF for the standard normal distribution.
2.2 The PDF for S¯ =WX¯
Considerm linearly independent sums of n correlated variables Si =
∑n
j=1 wijXj ,
or S¯ =WX¯. Note that rank(W) = m, and m ≤ n. The joint density function
for the sums S1, ..., Sm is
qS¯(s1, . . . , sm) =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
−∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
dx1 · · · dxnδ(m)(Wx¯− s¯)pX¯(x1, . . . .xn)
where pX¯(·) is the joint density function for the correlated variables, and
δ(m)(Ws¯− k¯) ≡
m∏
i=1
δ(
n∑
j=1
wijxj − si)
where δ(x) is the Kronecker delta function, defined by
∫ b
a
f(x)δ(x)dx =
{
f(0) if a ≤ 0 ≤ b
0 otherwise
The m constraints imposed by the delta functions reduce the dimension of the
integral bym. To see this, partitionRn into two orthogonal subspaces, Ker(W)
and Im(WT ). Ker(L) ≡ {x¯|Lx¯ = 0} is the kernel, or null space, of the linear
operator L, and Im(L) = {y¯|∃x¯ : Lx¯ = y¯} is the image, or range, of L. They
are orthogonal, since
∀x¯ ∈ Ker(W), y¯ ∈ Im(WT ) : (x¯, y¯) = (x¯,WT z¯) = (Wx¯, z¯) = (0, z¯) = 0
where (x¯, y¯) denotes the scalar product.
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Construct n orthonormal base vectors v¯i, i = 1, . . . , n such that v¯1, . . . , v¯m ∈
Im(WT ) and v¯m+1,...,n ∈ Ker(W), for instance by first finding the nullspace
basis, and then use Gram-Schmidt’s method. Let V denote the n × n matrix
with column i equal to v¯i. Performing the coordinate change
x¯ = Vy¯
dx¯ = det(V)dy¯ = dy¯
gives us
qS¯(s¯) =
∫
dx¯δ(m)(Wx¯− s¯)pX¯(x¯)
=
∫
dy¯δ(m)(WVy¯ − s¯)pX¯(Vy¯)
=
∫
· · ·
∫
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m
dym+1 · · · dyn
∫
· · ·
∫
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
dy1 · · · dym
m∏
i=1
δ(
m∑
j=1
{WV}ijyj − si)pX¯(Vy¯)
Let M be the linear operator
My¯ =
m∑
j=1
{WV}ijyj
which is the “leftmost” m×m sub-matrix ofWV. M is invertible since it maps
Rm → Rm. Performing the coordinate change
z¯ = My¯
dz¯ = det(M)dy1 · · · dym
gives us
qS¯(s¯) =
∫
· · ·
∫
dym+1 · · · dyn
∫
dz¯det(M)−1
m∏
i=1
δ(zi − si)pX¯(V{M−1z¯, ym+1, . . . , yn})
= det(M)−1
∫
· · ·
∫
dγ¯ pX¯(V{M−1s¯, γ¯})
where γ¯ = (ym+1, ..., yn)T , and {M−1s¯, γ¯} denotes an n× 1 vector.
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2.3 The CDF
The cumulative density function for a weighted sum of correlated lognormal
variables is
QS¯(k¯) ≡ Prob[Si ≤ ki, i ∈ 1, . . . ,m]
=
∫ k1
−∞
· · ·
∫ km
−∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
ds1 · · · dsmqS¯(s1, . . . , sm)
= det(M)−1
∫
ds¯ dγ¯ H(m)(k¯ − s¯) pX¯(V{M−1s¯, γ¯})
=
∫
ds¯′ dγ¯ H(m)(k¯ −Ms¯′) pX¯(V{s¯′, γ¯})
where H(m)(x¯) =
∏m
i=1H(xi), and H(x) is the Heaviside unit step function,
and we substituted s¯′ =M−1s¯ in the fourth step.
QS¯(k¯) =
∫
ds¯′ dγ¯ H(m)(k¯ −Ms¯) pX¯(V{s¯′, γ¯})
=
∫
ds¯′ dγ¯ H(m)(k¯ −Ms¯) pX¯(V{s¯′, γ¯})
3 Numerical evaluation of the CDF QS¯(k)
3.1 The Monte Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo method for evaluating an integral
I =
∫ b
a
f(x)dx
is based on the observation that
I =
N∑
i=1
f(Xi)
N
+ ε
where Xi ∈ U [a, b] is i.i.d uniform random variables in the range [a, b], and the
error ε is normal distributed (due to the Central Limit Theorem) with mean 0,
and standard deviation proportional to 1√
N
.
In the case we must integrate over the entire Rn, and our integrand is the
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product of a function f(x¯) and the density function pX¯(x¯), we can write
I =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x¯)pX¯(x¯)dx¯
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x¯)
n∏
i=1
φ({σ−1(log x¯− µ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=y¯
}i)dx¯
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(exp(σy¯ + µ¯)) det(σ)
n∏
i=1
φ(yi)dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=dzi
=
∫
[0,1]n
f(exp(σΦ−1(z¯) + µ¯)) det(σ)dz¯
≈
N∑
j=1
1
N
f(exp(σΦ−1(Z¯j) + µ¯)
with substitution y¯ = σ−1(log x¯ − µ¯) in step three and substitution dzi =
φ(yi)dyi in step four. Note that zi =
∫ yi
−∞ φ(t)dt = Φ(yi) is the CDF of the
normal distribution, and that Φ(x)−1 exists since Φ(x) is monotone since φ(x)
is strictly positive, and that Φ−1(x¯) ≡ (Φ−1(x1), ...,Φ−1(xn))T .
Combining the two above results, we get
QS¯(k¯) =
∫
ds¯′ dγ¯ H(m)(k¯ −Ms¯′) pX¯(V {s¯′, γ¯})
=
∫
dw¯ H(m)(k¯ −M{V−1w¯}1...m) pX¯(w¯)
≈
N∑
j=1
1
N
m∏
i=1
H
(
ki −
{
M{V−1 exp(σΦ−1(Z¯j) + µ¯)}1...m
}
i
)
=
N∑
j=1
1
N
m∏
i=1
H
(
ki −
{
W exp(σΦ−1(Z¯j) + µ¯)
}
i
)
where, as above, µi = − 12 (
∑n
j=1 σ
2
ij)t, and where we substituted w¯ = V{s¯′, γ¯′}
in step 2, recalled that detV = 1, and denote {V−1w¯}1...m = ({V−1w¯}1, ..., {V−1w¯}m)T .
In the final step we recall the definition of the operatorM to simplifyMV−1 =
W.
Since if Zij are i.i.d. U [0, 1], then all Φ−1(Zij) are i.i.d. N(0, 1). One way
to speed up the simulation is to tabulate Φ−1(x) and interpolate. Another way
is to generate independent standard normal distributed numbers Y = (y1, y2)T
from Z = (z1, z2), i.i.d. zi ∈ U [0, 1] numbers by using the Box-Muller method,
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see for instance Numerical Recipes [8].
3.2 Absolute error bound
Suppose the true value of QS¯(k¯) is p and that xj =
∏
H(...) is the value of our
integrand in MC round j. Note that xj are i.i.d.
xj =
{
1 with prob. p
0 with prob. 1− p
E[xj ] = p, E[x2j ] = p and E[xixj ] = p
2 for i 6= j. The error is ε = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj−p,
and E[ε] = 0. The error variance is
σˆ2 = E[ε2] = E[
1
N2
∑
i,j
xixj ]− 2pE[xj ]
N
+ p2
=
1
N2
∑
j
E[x2j ] +
1
N2
∑
i 6=j
E[xixj ]− p2
=
p
N
+
N(N − 1)p2
N2
− p2
=
p− p2
N
=
V ar[xj ]
N
The probability that the absolute error is less than TOL is
Pr[−TOL
σˆ
<
ε
σˆ
<
TOL
σˆ
] = 2Φ(
TOL
σˆ
)− 1
because ε ∈ N(0, σˆ) by the CLT. To achieve an absolute error |ε| < TOL with
confidence c, we see that
Φ(
TOL
σˆ
) >
c− 1
2
N >
V ar{xj ]
TOL2
(
Φ−1(
c− 1
2
)
)2
Therefore, one must perform N ≈ 4V ar[xj ]TOL2 Monte Carlo rounds for c = 95%. To
make the algorithm adaptive, V ar[xj ] = p − p2 (and thereby N) is estimated
during the Monte Carlo simulation.
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3.3 Relative error bound
The relative error is e = ε/p, and therefore Nrel = Np2 Monte Carlo rounds must
be made to achieve the relative error, which gives the answer with − log10 e
significant decimal digits. Note that the number of rounds increases as the
square of (1/p), therefore the algorithm converges very slowly for small values
of p.
4 Discussion
We have derived the PDF for a weighted sum of correlated lognormal variables
X¯, and given an adaptive Monte Carlo method for evaluating the CDF QS¯(k¯) =
Pr[WX¯ ≤ k¯] = p. The Monte Carlo method is used since we are interested in
evaluating the function when the number of variables is greater than 20.
The Monte Carlo Method can compute in constant memory, and it scales
well in time as long as one only requires a bound on the absolute error. To
compute the CDF for 30 lognormal variables and 10 bounding constraints to
an absolute error of 0.01 takes around one second on a normal PC workstation
(Intel Pentium, 800MHz). The relative error of the Monte Carlo method given
here is O(1/
√
Np2) which means that it converges slowly for small p. In our
motivating application for this work, we are only interested in a weighted sum of
many CDFs of the form described in this paper. Therefore we do not require a
low relative error, but only a low absolute error, which the Monte Carlo method
handles sufficiently well.
In contrast, most quadrature methods use at least two points in each di-
mension, and therefore require O(nd) evaluations. They are difficult to use on
functions which are almost zero everywhere except for in a small region, unless
one is able to find this region. A high dimensional probability function has this
behavior. Stroud [11] provides some quadrature schemes that uses less than two
internal points per dimension, but the numerical quadrature still suffers from
the problem of finding the sufficient region over which to integrate.
Since we are interested in the CDF of a sum, which is a convolution of the
PDFs, a Fourier transform based method would seem appropriate. However,
Fourier transform in many dimensions is achieved by applying the transform to
one dimension at a time, which means that the time and memory complexity is
greater than O(nd) where d is the number of dimensions, and n is the number of
function evaluations in each dimension. This means that the method is infeasible
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for d > 30 on a standard computer. The method is however still interesting for
lower dimension problems.
Quadrature methods use too much memory, and their execution time scales
exponentially in the number of variables. Fourier transform methods also ap-
pear to suffer from the curse of high dimensionality, although these alternative
methods may be useful for lower dimension problems, especially when one needs
to evaluate the CDF in many points.
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Abstract
We describe the architecture of a network, in which the traffic flow
is controlled by a market. The network access is controlled by a trusted
access node, that separates traffic into best effort and first class traffic,
adds a source route header, and shapes the traffic. The network core
consists of rapid forwarding devices, such as label switches, and source
routing gateways. Network services, including dynamic routing, load
balancing, and fault tolerance, are built by bundling the transmission
capacity in several independent network domains into a service, a
bundle of resources with the right properties. The service is priced as
financial derivative contract, and traded on a market, independent of
the network access control. Besides describing the network model, we
show how to implement parts of the network access node functionality
on a standard Linux machine. The implementation has been tested
on a system of virtual Linux machines.
Keywords: Quality-of-Service, Communication Networks, Bandwidth Mar-
kets, Admission Control
1 Introduction
This paper describes a communications network architecture that supports
capacity reservation, and the network components that are necessary to im-
1
plement it. It also shows how parts of the required functionality can be
implemented on a standard Linux machine.
The building block of the Internet is the autonomous system, AS, a collec-
tion of subnetworks managed by a single entity. An AS is a network domain
connected to other ASes by gateways. Inside an AS, the packets’ path to-
wards the appropriate gateway is determined by an internal routing protocol,
e.g. OSPF [1]. The AS path, the lists of ASes to traverse on the remaining
path, is determined by inter-domain routing protocols, e.g. BGP4 [2].
In the Internet, the ASes forward incoming traffic from the entry gateways
to the exit gateways with best effort service. This means that some traffic
will be lost when the network becomes congested, and the end-users cannot
do anything about the situation but to wait. Current inter-domain routing
protocols cannot guarantee that the incoming traffic to an AS will not exceed
the AS’ capacity. In practice the current protocols do not distribute the load
over many paths. Nor do they allow the users to send traffic to the same
destination on parallel paths to avoid congested areas, or to reduce the loss
probability. These issues must be addressed to achieve a better performance
of the Internet.
To avoid network congestion for sensitive traffic, and to reduce the packet
loss, one must do a combination of sending less traffic into the network,
prioritize traffic, reserve capacity, and send traffic over many paths.
In the proposed architecture, the network user acquires “first class capac-
ity” between an entry and exit gateway in the ASes on one or more AS paths
between the source and destination. A source route in the packet header lists
the entry routers of the path, so that the AS path is controlled by the sender.
The traffic is shaped by the sender’s access node at the network edge, so that
the sender will not send more than the acquired capacity. Assuming that the
access nodes can be trusted by the ASes, this guarantees that the incoming
traffic will not exceed the capacity in any AS.
Since all incoming first class traffic is shaped when it comes to the AS,
the routers do need to maintain per-flow state information to guard against
over-use. Thus the number of flows that each router can handle is infinite, as
long as the total traffic does not exceed the router’s capacity. To guarantee
that the first class traffic is delivered, an AS must strictly prioritize the
first class traffic over the best effort traffic. It must also estimate the first
class capacity between its gateway nodes, in order to not sell more than the
available capacity.
To be able to buy capacity on an entire path, the capacity must be ac-
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quired in a bundle on the network capacity market. In previous contributions
[3, 4], we have shown how this market could be run, and how the trading of
bundles could be executed. The idea is that the network owners sell first class
transit capacity in their ASes. The capacity sold in divisible units, shares, so
that different service levels can be built as different mixes of first class and
best effort traffic. To free the end-user from the risk involved with trading
bundles, a financial broker, or middleman, computes a deterministic spot
price for the demanded service as the price of a financial derivative contract.
Its value can be computed from the prices of underlying network capacity re-
sources. The middleman performs the actual trading, and eventually delivers
the capacity to the end-user.
While the AS managers are free to use traditional routing methods inside
the AS, routing guided by market prices moves the inter-domain routing from
the network to the trading middlemen outside the network core. Moving out
the routing opens up for a host of new services. They are implemented as
derivative contracts, and the trading to construct the service is determined
by the optimal hedging strategy for a portfolio short in the derivative. New
services can easily be introduced without modifying the network core.
Current protocols use reservation in the routers to allocate resources, or
they only give statistical guarantees. The IntServ protocol [5] reserves per-
flow capacity in each router on the default path. The main critique towards
IntServ is that it will not scale up to the number of flows that go through
the core Internet routers [6].
To avoid IntServ’s scaling problems, the DiffServ protocol [7] classifies
the packets of many flows into a small number of classes. All packets in
one class get the same treatment inside one AS, thus getting a statistical
service guarantee. DiffServ cannot give Quality-of-Service guarantees for the
entire path. When the traffic crosses an AS boundary, the local service level
agreement (SLA) defines how the traffic classes should be translated across
the border. For instance, a receiving AS may down-rank part of the incoming
high class packets if the sender has sent too many.
Source routing comes with the cost of requiring larger packet headers, but
it has the benefit of moving routing decisions to the edges of the network. It is
supported in the popular Internet protocols today. While destination based
routing is the default behavior in IPv4, IPv6, and MPLS, source routing
can be achieved with the loose source route (LSR) IP Option [8] in IPv4,
the Routing Header [9] in IPv6, and by Next Hop Label Forwarding [10] in
MPLS.
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The focus of this paper is not network capacity markets, as they have
been treated elsewhere, but the network architecture, and the components
that are necessary to realize a network in which capacity can be traded
in the above sense. In the next section we will go through the roles and
components of the proposed network architecture, and their relation to the
current Internet standards. Section 3 will discuss the results from a proof-
of-concept implementation of some of the functionality of the network access
node, and section 4 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Network architecture
The participants in today’s Internet are network providers that sell capacity
between each other on different levels, similar to whole-sale and distributor
levels. The end-users can typically only buy access to a provider’s network. In
this section we describe another network architecture that is intended to allow
the network participants to automatically trade capacity for entire paths,
not just for access. The functionality can be achieved with standard network
components, and without changes to the network core, but the bandwidth
market for end-users changes the customer/provider relationship between
network providers and end-users. The rest of this section goes through the
participants and the components of the proposed network architecture.
2.1 Subnetworks
The network is a super-network composed of many many inter-connected
subnetworks. Each subnetwork is owned by an autonomous organization,
such as an Internet provider, a company, or a university. The network has
border gateways, which are connected to other networks at exchange loca-
tions (see fig. 1). The border gateways have two different roles, they act as
entry or exit gateways. Although one gateway typically performs both tasks,
it is clarifying to distinguish between the two.
The subnetworks are roughly the same networks that today are BGP4
ASes, although they do not need to run the BGP4 protocol or use the AS
numbering. They are centrally managed networks that are connected to one
or more exchange location.
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path: r1, r2, r3
Autonomous network
Border router
r3
r2
r1
    DATA
first class
Exchange location
Figure 1: A first class data packet contains the coarse route (r1, r2, r3) in
the packet header. It lists the exit gateways in the different subnetworks the
packet traverses. Subnetworks are interconnected at exchange locations.
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Preconfigured path
Internal router
Link
Border router
Figure 2: Inside a domain the packet is forwarded along a preconfigured path.
It is up to the network owner to use traffic engineering methods to setup and
balance the load in the internal network.
2.2 Intra- and inter-domain routing
Inside a subnetwork, internal nodes are only concerned with routing the
traffic to the appropriate exit gateway. The subnetwork has preconfigured
routing paths with bounded capacity between its gateways. (see fig. 2) The
paths are set up by existing standard internal routing protocols, or by more
advanced traffic engineering methods that balance the local load (e.g. [11]).
The network handles traffic in two classes, traditional best effort destina-
tion routed traffic, and a new first class source routed traffic. The first class
packet header contains a source route, the list of addresses to the gateway
it should traverse. When a first class packet arrives from an external exit
gateway to an entry gateway, the entry gateway checks the packet header for
the address of the next exit gateway to determine which preconfigured path
to use. The packet is then fast forwarded through the internal network along
the path.
A border gateway that only handles first class traffic can have a very
short, i.e. very fast, routing table. The table only needs to contain entries
for the gateways in the other networks connected to the same exchange loca-
tion, because the first class packet header contains the next border gateway
address. When the packet arrives to an exit gateway, it advances the next-
destination pointer in the packet header, and sends the packet to the next
subnetwork on the path (see fig. 3).
In the network, best effort traffic runs side by side with first class traffic.
Since the network owner is obliged to deliver the first class traffic between
the border gateways, the internal forwarding protocol must support traffic
prioritization. Otherwise, bursts of best effort traffic may cause congestion
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r1
r2
  DATA
r1, r2, r3
first class
Figure 3: When a packet leaves one subnetwork, the source route in the
packet header is examined by the exit gateway, and the packet is forwarded
to the correct entry gateway of the next subnetwork.
and losses in the first class traffic. The entry gateway tunnels incoming
packets in a QoS capable protocol, or sets the appropriate QoS bits in the
packet header.
Prioritization in an IPv4 network domain can be achieved by using the
precedence bits in the Type-of-service field to give incoming first class traffic
priority over other traffic. If IPv6 is used inside the network domain, the
routers can be configured to use the DiffServ Expedited Forwarding for the
first class traffic [7]. Expedited forwarding is a service class that forwards
the packets with minimal delay. Even if one does not have an IPv6 network,
class-based queuing is built into most popular routers, including Cisco routers
[12], Intel routers (previously Xircom) [13], and Linux computers [14]. If IP
is tunneled over MPLS [10], Cisco routers can use the EXP field to carry the
packet priority, in order to guarantee QoS within the network domain.
A more sophisticated approach is the virtual time scheduling by Zhang et
al. [15]. In it, the packets are stamped with a virtual time stamp that is used
in the queuing inside the network. The packets are forwarded in manner that
allows bounds buffer sizes and network delays to be computed, and therefore
guaranteed.
Source routing and traffic prioritization is implemented in today’s routers,
but it is usually turned off for transit traffic, since, if uncontrolled, it can
be exploited in various computer security attacks, in particular denial of
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Figure 4: Traffic from one part of the network may interfere with other
traffic and cause congestion. Therefore, the network owner must configure
its network to guarantee the capacity for the first class traffic.
service attacks. It is not sufficient to simply turn on the functionality without
improved network access control. In this architecture, network access nodes
control the individual users’ access, in order to prevent packet flooding and
malicious use of source routing.
2.3 Capacity on preconfigured paths
The preconfigured paths between the border routers have bounded capacity.
To determine how much traffic that can be allowed at the border, the path
capacity must be estimated. It can be done by active or passive measurements
[16, 17]. Traffic engineering can be used to rebalance the load of a network
so that the available capacity increases (see [18] for a survey and references
to current methods).
The amount of traffic that can be sent on one path depends on how much
traffic that is sent on other paths. Therefore, the network owner can provide
delivery guarantees on one path only if the traffic on the other paths is limited
so that it cannot interfere and cause congestion in the internal routers on the
path (see fig. 4).
Getting guaranteed service quality from the network implies that the re-
ceived quality should not be disturbed by other flows, such as other senders
that transmit above their allowed rate. Only over-transmitters should expe-
rience congestion loss and loss due to policing. Therefore, the network traffic
limiter must be able to distinguish between individual flows, in order to be
able to give delivery guarantees. However, the large number of flows through
the core border routers makes it infeasible for border gateways to limit traffic
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by other than statistical means, i.e. throwing away random packets (from
some packet class) when congestion occurs.
A shaping strategy that does not live up to these demands is the DiffServ
shaping. It shapes flow aggregates, and is thus unable to provide delivery
guarantees. It shapes traffic on several locations on the path, potentially on
every network provider border crossing. Shaping flow aggregates suffers from
a ”tragedy of the commons” problem [19, 20], which means that average con-
sumers will pay indirectly for the heavy consumers. To address the problems
of DiffServ, the proposed network uses shaping at the network edge. The
shaping is done only once, and for the entire path. The device responsible
for this is the Access Node.
2.4 Access nodes
Today, no shaping of individual flows is done for the entire network path.
Aggregated shaping takes place at many of the AS borders along the path,
but only for the aggregated traffic volume. Traffic shaping late in the path
is disadvantageous, as late drops consume capacity in early routers, without
delivering any packets.
To avoid the problems with statistical shaping in the network, shaping
must be handled at the access nodes where the network users connect to the
Internet. The traffic from one user goes through an access node, and the
access node shapes the traffic from the user to prevent him to send more
than the allowed amount of first class traffic. The access node shapes each
individual flow to a certain configured rate. Excess traffic is reclassified as
ordinary best effort traffic. The traffic is only sent as first-class if there is
enough available capacity on the entire path. Since one access node only
is responsible for a limited number of users, it can shape individual flows
without becoming a bottleneck. Since the traffic is shaped at the network
edge, no shaping of individual flows needs to be performed in the network
core.
The access nodes enforce a distributed access control policy that shape
individual flows, and they control the entire access to the first class capacity
(see fig. 5). An access node on one network may admit traffic that goes
to another network far away. The network owners must therefore trust the
access nodes to not admit more traffic than fits in the capacity owned by the
user.
As was pointed out above, unless the traffic is shaped at the edge, no
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Autonomous network
The Internet
Access node
End user
Figure 5: The network access is controlled by network access nodes. They
admit access to the core network, the Internet. Each access node is responsi-
ble for a limited number of users. The access node uses only local information
(i.e. o talking to the network routers) to check that the sender owns sufficient
capacity in all the subnetworks that the packet will traverse.
service guarantee can be given, in a scalable way, on the entire path through
the network. As far as the authors are aware, this requires the use of trusted
node. The reason for this is that it is infeasible to do any book-keeping of the
traffic in the network core nodes to detect malicious access nodes. However,
the need for trusted access nodes is a weakness in the architecture. If an
access nodes are compromised, or run by dishonest network managers, they
can admit more than the allowed traffic. The sum of the incoming traffic
in some other AS would then exceed the available capacity, and packet loss
would result. With dishonest network managers, the core network will only
be able to provide statistical guarantees for the traffic. It is not proven
here that it is impossible to provide an access control that can detect access
nodes that admit too much traffic. It may be that such a system can be
constructed, and it would then be an important improvement to the access
control presented here.
2.5 Capacity tokens
Before admitting first-class traffic to the network, the access nodes must be
certain that a user has the right to send through the remote subnetwork. A
user proves its right to send by showing a capacity token to the access node.
Sending on a path spanning many ASes requires tokens for each AS on the
path.
10
The tokens are contracts that specify the details regarding the capacity.
A token is a binary strings that is cryptographically signed [21] by a trusted
authority, and therefore it cannot be forged by the user. The tokens must
be such that they cannot be double-spent by the user. The token exchange
protocol must also guarantee that no tokens can be lost or created during
the exchange.
The capacity tokens are traded on the network capacity markets. Users
can exchange the tokens between each other, or though market middlemen.
Since the trading needs to be fast, exchange of tokens between users may
not involve communication with any server in the subnetwork, or the token
exchanges will flood the network with excessive traffic.
To these ends, the token string contains the user’s identity, the entry and
exit gateways of the subnetwork through which the traffic may be sent, the
amount of capacity, a time stamp, and the identity of the access node that
may admit the traffic. The signature can be verified by everybody, but a
signature cannot be forged more easily that an exhaustive search through a
space with size on the order of two to the number of bits in the key.
2.6 Access node configuration
The access node performs three tasks:
• it keeps a list of which capacity tokens that belongs to each user,
• it shapes traffic coming from the users, and
• it adds a source route header to the first class packets.
The access node maintains lists of the owned tokens, routing paths, etc., re-
configures shaping devices, and encapsulates packets in source routing head-
ers.
2.6.1 Token access list
The user’s computer tells the access node that it has acquired network capac-
ity in some subnetworks by showing the capacity tokens. Before the token
is added to the capacity table (see fig. 6), the access node verifies the sig-
nature, and that the token is not already in the table. The user cannot give
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x.y.z.10        exch 0                 exch  1             300
x.y.z.10        exch 1                 exch  2             200
x.y.z.10        exch 2                 exch  3             200
Capacity table Path cache
Owner IP   From exch loc.   To exch. loc   Amount (kb/s) nr    src, dst                         Hops                      amount
45     x.y.z.10,  a.b.c.3        r1, r2, r3                      200
Figure 6: Each access node has a capacity (or token) table in which it lists
the capacity owned and used by each user. The path table lists the explicit
coarse route for a given path, and is the basis for the source route header
that is prepended to the first class packets.
the token to more than one access node, since the name of the access node
is in the token.
When revoking a token from an access node, the user gets a signed receipt
from the access node. This revocation receipt is needed to be able to sell the
capacity on a network capacity market [3].
2.6.2 Headers
When the users sends data, the packets can be of three types:
• best-effort,
• access node routed, or
• explicitly routed.
The user signals the type to the access node by using a signaling field in the
IP packet header.
When receiving a best-effort packet, the access node does nothing with
the packet, and treats it as traditional IP traffic. When receiving an access
node routed packet, the access node constructs a path to the destination, out
of the user’s capacity listed in the capacity table. Finding a path can be done
with a minimal spanning tree algorithm [22]. The path is cached and reused
the next time. The access node routed type is to facilitate the transition
between the normal IP communication, and reserved capacity communication
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DATA
LABEL=45
src, port, dest, port
first−class
src routed, lbl, 3 hops
r1, r2, r3
DATA
LABEL=45
src, port, dest, port
first−class
Figure 7: Inside the network, the packet is forwarded encapsulated with a
source routing header. The header is prepended to the packet by the access
node after access has been granted. The encapsulation is removed by the last
exit router.
by removing the need for the user to explicitly reserve a path, and it is
optional to implement in the access node.
When receiving an explicitly routed packet, it is the user that determines
the path. The path access right is verified by the access node, and then
placed in the cache. Each path has an index in the path cache. To send on
a specific path, the index is written into the signaling field of the packet.
For the source routed traffic, i.e. the access node routed and the explicitly
routed traffic, the data packets are encapsulated in a transport protocol
that supports source routing, such as IPv6, MPLS, etc. (see fig. 7) The
encapsulating header contains the coarse path that the packet will take.
2.6.3 Shaping
The traffic that leaves the access node is shaped with a class based token
bucket filter. Class based filters sort the incoming traffic into different classes
and then subjects them to various delays, reclassifications, and routing, de-
pending on the class.
The shaper has one class per path. The class based filter are reconfigured
when the class path table is updated. A filter is configured to admit the
lowest rate on the path. If two paths share a token, the sum of the flows in
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the streams is regulated by an explicit filter for that token.
The shaper does not buffer the packets. Instead, packets that arrive too
fast (“out of profile”) are reclassified as best-effort traffic, and the source
route header is removed.
3 Implementation of the access node
Parts of the shaping functionality described in the previous section was imple-
mented as a proof-of-concept, using the iptables firewall [23], and the iproute2
[14] traffic shaping software available for Linux kernels 2.4 and later.
Iptables is originally a firewall tool that has advanced packet filtering
capabilities, and it is used to set up packet matching rules and actions.
Incoming packets are matched against the rules, and if a rule matches, the
associated action is executed. This can be to drop the packet, or to change
the contents of the packet header, etc.
The class based filter in the access node was implemented with an iproute2
Hierarchical Token Bucket, HTB [14]. The choice of signaling field depend
on the IP version used. For IPv4 we chose to use the TOS field [8] to signal
to the access node. For IPv6, both the DS field and the flowlabel [9] were
considered. Initially we intended to use IPv6 to do the filtering, but it was
abandoned when it was discovered that multiple routing tables are work in
progress, and not yet supported in the Linux IPv6 stack (as of vers. 2.4).
The functionality was implemented, and a network of four virtual Linux
machines was set up (see fig. 8), using the UML software [24]. User Mode
Linux, UML, lets the user run a Linux kernel as a normal process. The
kernel acts as an own host machine, and it can be configured to use a virtual
network, or even to use the real network. The virtual network was used to
verify that the shaping did indeed take place as expected.
The access node functionality is divided into four pieces; an access dae-
mon, a filter, a header writer, and a shaper. Below we show how these were
implemented in the test implementation
3.1 Access daemon
The access daemon (see fig. 9) that manages the capacity list is implemented
as a user space program. This is sufficiently fast, since the daemon only
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Figure 8: The client A wants to send to node D. By signaling in the packet
TOS field, the user can control which path the traffic is sent by the access
node.
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Figure 9: The user communicates with the access daemon to set up paths
and show network tokens, and the access daemon sets up the access filtering,
the header writer that encapsulates packets, and the shaper. The traffic can
then pass rapidly through the access node.
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configures the shaping devices (which run in the OS kernel), and does not
handle the actual traffic.
The access daemon listens for messages from the network users. The
messages are
• addToken(token, revocation key)
• retractToken(token, signature)
• reservePath(path, capacity)
• constructPathTo(dest, capacity)
• unreservePath(path id)
Since the goal of the testbed is to test the shaping functionality, the testbed
does not implement any public key infrastructure, and therefore no crypto-
graphic keys are used. The sender is identified by his IP source address. In
a real-world scenario, the user and the access daemon communicate over an
authenticated, secure channel.
3.1.1 addToken
The token is verified by checking the signature, that the date stamp is greater
than the latest date stamp, and that it is addressed to the access node. The
token and the revocation key is then added to the access node’s list of tokens
for the user. The same token cannot be added twice, because it contains a
date stamp, and the latest date stamp is stored by the access node.
3.1.2 retractToken
It is verified that the sender has the right to retract the token, i.e. that the
signature is made by the private key of the revocation key pair, and that
no reserved paths use the capacity that the token represents. If the token is
used in a path, a command parameter tells if the path should be unreserved,
or if the command should return with an error message. If the token can be
retracted, it is removed from the token list, eventual paths are unreserved,
and a signed receipt that the access node has removed the token is returned.
The token date stamp is stored to prevent the same token being added again.
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3.1.3 reservePath
An explicit list of tokens (or token hash numbers) is given as parameter. The
access node verifies that they form a gap free path, that the tokens belong
to the owner, and that sufficient capacity exists along the path. An unused
path id is chosen and returned to the user. The reserved path is entered into
the path table.
The access filter is configured to send packets on this path to the header
writer.
A packet header is constructed, and the header writer is configured to
write the header to packets on the path.
The shaper is configured to only admit the allowed amount traffic on the
path.
3.2 Access filter
In the testbed, the TOS field was used as the signaling field. The field
determines if the user wants the packet to receive first class or best effort
service, and whether the traffic is explicitly routed or access node routed.
3.2.1 Best effort
If the packet is marked for best effort service, it is sent to the low priority
best effort queue, and is only sent when there is no first class traffic that can
be sent.
3.2.2 Access node routed
If a path matching the source and destination in the packet header exist in
the path table, then the packet is explicitly routed according to that path.
If there is no matching path, the access node constructs such a path, using
a minimal spanning tree algorithm, and enters the path into the path table.
Then the packet is explicitly routed according to that path.
3.2.3 Explicitly routed
In the testbed, the path id was written into the higher bits of the TOS field.
Although the TOS-field is small, it is sufficient with only a small number of
path ids, since they are unique for every source-destination pair. Initially,
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we intended to use the flowlabel field of the packet for IPv6. Under IPv4,
the 20 bit path id was to be appended 20 bits to the end of the packet, and
stripped off by the access node.
The access node extracts the path id from the packet header. If there is
no matching path id in the path table, the packet is sent to the best effort
queue, otherwise it is sent to the header writer.
3.2.4 Implementation
The access filter was implemented by routing rules for the iptables tool and
the iproute2 tool. Iptables is a firewall utility that can select and classify
packets, and iproute2 can shape packets based on various attributes, such as
the iptables class. The user uses iptables to write the desired signaling value
into the TOS-filed, by the rule
The following command configures the user to set the TOS field of its
outgoing packets to a certain value:
> iptables -A PREROUTING -t mangle \
-s <src ip> -d <dst ip> -p tcp --dport <dst port> \
-j TOS --set-tos <value>
The first line tells iptables to match the packet before the kernel routing
is performed. The second line is the matching criteria, specifying that the
packet must have the specified source IP, destination IP, and destination
port. The third line (the -j switch) specifies the action to take if the matching
criteria is fulfilled. We use the action module TOS, which has the ability to
change the value of the TOS field.
3.3 Header writer
In the tests, the testbed uses a stripped version of the header writer in which
the TOS field is interpreted as the id of the source routed path. In the full
testbed, the header writer encapsulates the packet in a packet with a source
routing header. The source routing header for the packet has been prepared
by the access daemon. After the source routing header has been prepended
to the packet, it is sent to the shaper. The header writer is also implemented
with the iptables tool.
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The access daemon can configure the header writer to add the encapsu-
lating header with the help of a new matching module called label, and a
new action module, PREPEND. Label matches on the IP packet flowlabel.
PREPEND takes a hexadecimal byte string which it prepends packet. The
byte string is the precomputed path from the path table.
In an alternative implementation, the iptables line could use the label
filter and the PREPEND action to achieve the header writer functionality.
> iptables -A PREROUTING -t mangle \
-p ipv6 -s <src ip> -m tos --tos 8 -m label <path id> \
-j PREPEND 0x3f0af4400f3ad...
Above, TOS=8 denotes that it is a first class packet, and the hex string in
the end (0x3f0...) is to illustrate the header that should be written to the
packet.
A similar rule for access node routed traffic is added, and a third rule
that sets and resets the relevant fields, including the flowlabel, of best effort
traffic.
3.4 Shaper
The shaper is configured to only allow a certain rate of first class traffic to
leave the access node. Traffic that arrives faster than the configured rate
is called out-of-profile. The shaper can work in two modes, where it either
buffers out-of-profile packets, or reclassifies out-of-profile packets.
3.4.1 Buffer out-of-profile packets
In this mode, the shaper is configured as a hierarchical token bucket (see
fig. 10). The path id determines to which class the packet belongs. The
hierarchical token bucket can be configured to allow the different classes
to borrow capacity from each other, however, this feature must be turned
off here, as it will otherwise admit too much traffic, and cause congestion
downstream. This is done by setting the class configured rate equal to its
ceiling rate.
All packets for which there is no explicitly configured class, i.e. best effort
traffic, are sent to a low priority class with a configured rate of zero but with
an infinite ceiling rate. That means that it will not be guaranteed any service
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Figure 10: The queuing discipline for the ’buffer out-of-profile packets’
shaper. The root class has filters that sort the packets into different classes
depending on the path id, which is stored in the flowlabel field of IPv6 pack-
ets. Each class is configured to only admit the lowest rate on the entire
path.
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by the node, but it is able to send as long as no other class may transmit.
All traffic which is out-of-profile is buffered, with one buffer for each class.
This way the sender does not have to adjust its rate, but buffer overflows
may cause buffer drops.
The root qdisc (queuing discipline), and the best effort class are created
with
> tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1:0 htb default 2
> tc class add dev eth0 parent 1:0 classid 1:1 htb \
rate1000 Mbit ceil 1000Mbit
> tc class add dev eth0 parent 1:1 classid 1:2 htb \
rate0 Mbit ceil 1000Mbit
The first line stays that default traffic (all that is not reserved) should go to
class 1:2, the best effort class. The third class creates an intermediary class.
We need to create the intermediary class because children to the root class
cannot borrow capacity from each other. The third line says that the best
effort traffic should not be guaranteed any capacity, but only be sent out
from the access node when there is no first class traffic to send.
To create a traffic class for a path, we add a class and a filter
> tc class add dev eth0 parent 1:1 classid 1:3 htb \
rate 1Mbit ceil 1Mbit
> tc filter add dev eth0 protocol ip parent 1:0 prio 1 \
u32 1 0x000FFFFF at 0 flowid 1:3
which directs packets with flowlabel = 1 to class 1:3.
3.4.2 Unmark out-of-profile packets
In this mode, the shaper has no send buffers. Instead, packets that are out-
of-profile are stripped of their source route header, reclassified as best effort
packets, and sent to the best effort queue. This requires that it is possible
to route packets differently depending on them being in- or out-of-profile.
It is not possible to configure the iproute2 hierarchical token bucket to to
this, although it is possible to write another queuing discipline based on the
HTB that has this ability. However, this was not tested in the experiment
described here.
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Figure 11: Measurement of capacity sharing between flows through an access
node. The total link capacity is bounded to 300 kbit/s. Three flows start at
time 0, 10, and 20 respectively. The first flow ends at time 30. Each flow
is guaranteed 100kbit/s, but may borrow unused capacity from the other
flows. As more flows enter the access node, the throughput approaches the
guaranteed rate. When flows leave, the throughput goes up.
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3.4.3 Comments
The shaper’s ability to shape traffic was measured with tcpdump. In the test
three flows were guaranteed a minimal capacity, but they were able to use
unused capacity of other nodes.
The unmark mode has the advantage that it will not place high demands
of buffer space on the access node. Reclassified packets may be lost during
the transmission through the network, and a sender that uses an ordinary IP
stack will adapt to the loss by reducing the traffic so that only the reserved
rate is sent. Another advantage with the unmark mode is that it can use
more than the reserved capacity when the network is not congested, without
any specific intelligence at the sender side. However, it is possible to achieve
better performance with an application that is aware that some traffic is sent
with best effort service, and some with first class service. By intelligently
choosing which packets that are sent with which service, the application
can minimize the effect of packet loss. This is useful for instance for video
streaming where key frames can be sent with first class service, and frame
modifications can be sent with best effort service.
Alternatives to the HTB shaping setup were also considered. A very
costly but flexible setup is to have the access node configure a virtual network
interface for each network token that a user has provided, where the shaping
device is a stand-in for a real shaping device at the subnetwork edge. The
access daemon then configures the internal routing tables so that a specific
flow is routed (inside the access node) through all the virtual devices before
it exist the node. This has the advantage that flows can share capacity
between each other more flexibly. Consider for instance two flows that both
flow through A and then through B1 or B2 respectively. The flows alternate
between 50 and 150 kbps. If they can share the capacity in A, it is sufficient
to allocate 200 kbps in A, otherwise 300 kbps is necessary. Experimentation
with this setup showed however that the routing in Linux IPv6 cannot handle
this yet. The iptables6 packet support for multiple routing tables is not
implemented yet.
4 Summary and discussion
This paper has described the architectural components for controlling the
access to a network which provides and discriminates between first-class ser-
24
vice and best-effort service. The access control is made by an access node
at the network edge. The access node verifies that access has been granted
through all subnetworks that are requested before it admits traffic.
The internal nodes use fast local routing protocols, such as label switch-
ing, for delivering the traffic between network exchange locations. Each
subnetwork is responsible for configuring its internal network so that it guar-
antees the delivery between its border nodes. The path inside the subnetwork
can vary as the network owner uses traffic engineering methods to balance
the local network load.
Since the end user can control the coarse network route by “source rout-
ing”, an external bandwidth market can be used to construct various services
such as failure safe paths, virtual leased lines, etc. The coarse route is en-
tered into the packet header by the access node, but only if the end user has
purchased the necessary capacity on the bandwidth market.
The access node is responsible for three tasks. Granting access, encapsu-
lating the data in a source routing protocol, and shape the traffic so that it
does not exceed the allowed rate.
The modules that execute the tasks are configured by an access daemon.
It is a user level process at the access node that is responsible for the book-
keeping and signaling with the end user, or the service providing middleman
that trades capacity on behalf of the end user. We describe the necessary
protocol for communicating with the access node, and the tables for network
tokens, the path cache, and the backlog. The communication with the ac-
cess daemon uses a public key infrastructure to establish the identities of the
communicating users.
The shaping can handle out-of-profile first class traffic either by buffering
it at the access node, or by reclassify it for best effort service and transmit
it immediately. The setup uses the buffer method.
The access node functionality in this architecture has been implemented
in a testbed with virtual Linux hosts, and a virtual network, running con-
currently on one host. Thus, the real network tools have been used, not
simulated tools. The cryptographic infrastructure is not implemented in this
testbed yet. Experience from the testbed showed that extensions to the kernel
level filters have had to be made to provide all the necessary packet classi-
fication functionality. It also showed that the current Linux IPv6 stack is
not mature enough to handle some configurations. In particular, the current
iptables6 implementation does not correctly handle multiple routing tables.
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Abstract
In a simulation of a computer network, the capacity between pairs
of border routers in a network domain is sold on a spot market. End-
users establish point-to-point connections across several domains by
buying capacity in the domains along a path in the network. This
paper compares three different trading strategies: spot requests, null
broker requests, and derivative broker requests. Their performance is
measured in terms of the ratio of successful connections, and the cost
to establish a connection. Simulations of a network results show that
the derivative broker requests typically performs better than the other
two, especially in networks where prices fluctuate rapidly.
Keywords: computer networks, bandwidth markets, QoS, combinatorial
trading, option pricing
1 Introduction
Computer networks are now being used to transfer live video and other data
that need reliable service from the network, in terms of latency, jitter, and loss
[1, 2, 3]. Bandwidth or capacity markets can help to provide the necessary
end-user quality of service guarantees [4, 5, 6, 7]. Capacity trading enables
users to reserve capacity in congested networks, and thereby get a guaranteed
throughput, even when the network is congested.
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The networking QoS routing deals with routing under path constrains.
Since it is NP-hard to find one optimal multi-constrained path that satisfies
a set of (more than one) constraints, approximative solutions such as hierar-
chical routing [3, 8], or relaxing multi-constraint to single constraints [9] are
necessary.
Most approaches to combinatorial allocation use a centralized distributor
that solves a global constraint problem c.f. [5, 10, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 7], which
has the obvious disadvantage in a network scenario that, besides solving the
allocation problem, the distributor must first collect all demands, and then
distribute all allocation information before the system’s state is updated.
Another relaxation of the QoS problem is to only give statistical service
guarantees [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. This is in the spirit of service models such
as DiffServ [19] that only aims to provide QoS within a centrally managed
network domain, while it fails to provide guarantees along an entire path.
In this paper, techniques and concepts borrowed from the financial mar-
kets play an important part. The most closely related previous literature on
derivative pricing in relation to computer networks deal with trading in just
one single asset, network access, [20, 21], without addressing the combinato-
rial pricing problem. Combinatorial problems are addressed in [22, 23, 24],
where forward contracts on time-slotted network capacity are priced. This
has the disadvantage of producing a large number of fundamental assets,
with interrelations due to both network topology and time.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: section 2 contains
a short background to network services implemented in terms of traded ca-
pacity, and section 3 presents the model of the network and user demand.
In section 4 we give the results of the simulations in the form of hypothesis
testing. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results.
2 Background
In the bandwidth market model used for the simulation results reported
in this paper, the trading relies on a network admission mechanism that
controls the end-users’ access to the network recently discussed in [25]. End-
users buy capacity tokens on the capacity markets. The tokens are used by
the admission mechanism to verify that a user has all the necessary capacity,
from source to destination, before his traffic is let out on the network. To
provide shaping of each flow, the admission mechanism uses trusted access
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nodes that shape the traffic only at the network edges. The edge admission
mechanism seems to be necessary in a real network, since it would be too
costly to shape individual flows in the network core. We do however leave the
door open for the possibility of future developments in distributed shaping
mechanisms. The simulation described in this paper only models the capacity
trading, and it is assumed that some admission mechanism is in place.
The motivation for this particular kind of market-based network QoS
provision and network architecture is put forward in [26], where also the
market dynamics is described. The idea to price network services in terms of
financial derivative contracts of the spot market assets was introduced in [27].
2.1 Network services
A network service can be interpreted as the right to own capacity in certain
subnetworks at certain time points. For instance, a backup service can consist
of a fixed capacity on a path between the server location and the backup
storage location for one hour every night. A video service can consist of
access to one of several movie repositories for three hours daily. In this
paper, we consider the point-to-point service, which consists of the capacity
on one of the several paths between two places, with specified start and end
times.
The fundamental problem in producing a point-to-point service is as fol-
lows. A network is represented by graph with nodes and edges, where the
nodes correspond to the congested resources. To send traffic between two
nodes, a user must have acquired capacity in every node along some path
between the two nodes. It is not sufficient to only have capacity in some
nodes on a path. Nor is it useful to have capacity in nodes that are not
on the chosen path. The user has a limited budget which sets the maximal
cost that he is willing to pay for the connection. Furthermore, an end-user
may know its capacity demand some time in advance, which gives him the
opportunity to buy different pieces of the capacity at different times before
the expiration time of the demand. Thus the end-user faces a complicated
problem of deciding which resources to buy, and when.
2.2 Trading strategies
In this paper we simulate three different trading strategies, and compare them
with each other in the following way. In the simulation, end-users generate
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a flow of requests for point-to-point connections in the network. There are
two different types of requests,
• spot requests; the user waits until the expiration time, and then buys
the path that is cheapest for the moment, and
• broker requests; the user immediately asks a broker to supply the ca-
pacity on some path at the expiration time.
By using brokers, end-users do not have to do any trading of their own. All
the risk involved in trading is moved from the user to the broker. The spot
requests are the null hypothesis to the broker requests. Brokers are useful if
they result in more successful requests than spot requests do, and/or if the
admission cost is lower for broker requests.
There are two types of broker strategies, depending on the type of broker
request,
• null broker requests; the broker only aggregates a number of request,
and only trade when the requests expire, and
• derivative broker requests; the broker computes the value of the con-
tingent claim on the resources requested by the end-user, and sells a
derivative contract to the user. Between the request time and the ex-
piration time, the broker buys and sells capacity to reduce the risk of
loss due to price fluctuations, and at the expiration time, the broker
buys the remaining required resources.
The null brokers are the null hypothesis to the derivative brokers. If all the
profit from the derivative brokers is due to the fact that they aggregate a
number of risky demands, then the null broker and the derivative broker will
perform equally well. If the derivative broker performs better than the null
broker, the increased performance is due to the hedging strategy.
The requests have a maximal budget constraint that determines whether
the request will be accepted or rejected. The admission performance of the
request types is measured as the fraction of rejected requests. The net cost
per request for the user and for the broker determines how well the pricing
mechanism captures the capacity price movement. These metrics are studied
in section 4.
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The main topic of interest in this paper is the derivative broker request.
Derivative brokers accept early requests, and hedges the request until the
starting time by rebalancing a portfolio so that the expected value of the
total portfolio is kept at zero. Spot requests and null broker requests are null
hypothesis request types. Spot requests model network users in a network
that does not have derivatives to price services. With spot requests, the users
must do all the trading, take all the risk, and cannot trade in future demand.
Null broker requests model a network where requests simply are aggregated,
and no hedging is performed by the broker. The risk is transfered to the null
broker, who remains passive until the starting time, at which the null broker
decides to buy whatever looks cheapest at the moment.
3 Model
3.1 The network
The network is a fixed connected finite undirected graph G. The nodes
V (G) denote the network resources, i.e. a congested subnetwork, and the
edges E(G) denote the links. Individual nodes are denoted by an index
Vi = Vi(G) ∈ V (G), i = 1, ..., n. G′ is a subgraph of G if E(G′) ⊆ E(G) and
V (G′) ⊆ V (G).
A network path is a connected subgraph of G such that
max
u∈V (G′)
degE(G′)(u) ≤ 2.
The nodes with degree 1 are called end-points. The network path node set
pathnodes(s, r) = {V (x) : x is a network path with endpoints s, r}
is the set of node sets on paths between s and r. The alternative network
path node sets or alternative paths A(s, r) is
A(s, r) ⊆ pathnodes(s,r), such that ∀a, b ∈ A(s, r) : a 6= b⇔ a * b
A(s, r) is the largest set of sets of network path nodes with end-points s and
r, such that no path has a node set that is a superset of the nodes in another
path in the same alternative paths set. The paths in a set are enumerable,
and path i is denoted Ai ∈ A(s, r).
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For a given pair of end-points s and r, the resource matrix
vij = 1 if Vj ∈ Ai(s, r), and zero otherwise. (1)
The average number of vertices in the alternative paths is denoted
η =
1
|A(s, r)|
|A(s,r)|∑
i=1
|Ai|
and thus the a priori probability of a node belonging on a path between a
uniformly chosen pair of nodes is η|V (G)| .
3.2 Capacity prices
A network user that owns capacity in a node is entitled to send through the
node at a rate less than or equal to the owned amount. Shares of the total
capacity in a node is traded on a market.
In the abstract, one can consider any kind of market mechanism, and any
type of resulting price processes. In practice, it is important that the market
is set up to be as fast as possible, and to have minimal communication and
negotiation overhead. In the mechanism used here, the market is run by a
market maker that adjusts the prices in response to the changing capacity
demand. The market maker only accepts market bids, i.e. bids to trade a
certain quantity at the market price, whatever it may be. The bid is a buy
bid if the quantity is positive, and a sell bid if the quantity is negative. The
market does not accept limit bids, i.e. bids that only are valid if the price
is within a certain range, or other conditional bids. Since there is no order
book of unfilled limit bids, the market overhead is kept minimal.
The market is cleared at regular times, t = 1, 2, ... The spot price for one
unit of capacity in node j ∈ V is adjusted according to
Sj(t)=Sj(0) exp
ωj(t)
λj
(2)
where ωj(t) is the total demand for capacity in node j at time t. All unfilled
bids get to trade at price Sj(t). The model parameter λj, also called the
liquidity parameter, sets the amount of capacity in the node. A small amount
of capacity is modeled with a small λ, which results in large price fluctuations,
and vice versa.
Besides paying for buying capacity, a capacity owner pays a holding fee
Sj(t) for holding the capacity in the interval [t, t+ 1).
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3.3 Requests
Network users generate requests to the system. The requests arrive as a
Poisson process, with intensity 1
µ
, where µ is the average number of arrivals
per unit of time.
Request i asks to buy capacity in all the vertices in any of the network
paths in the alternative path set A(si, ri). The source and destination nodes
si and ri are drawn uniformly from V (G). Request i asks to hold the capacity
in the nodes di ∈ Ge+[1d ] time intervals, where d is the average duration, and
Ge+(p) denotes the first time distribution.
Request i has a maximal budget ci ∈ Exp[1c ], where c is the average
budget. When the request arrives, an admittance cost is computed. The
admittance cost is the user’s or broker’s estimate of the cost to produce the
service. If the admittance cost is less than the budget, the request is accepted,
otherwise it is rejected.
The request type determines how the admittance cost is computed. There
are three types of requests, spot requests, null broker requests, and deriva-
tive broker requests. In a simulation, q ∈ [0, 1] of the requests are broker
requests, and (1 − q) of the requests are spot requests. Derivative brokers
and null brokers are not mixed, thus a simulation contains either only spot
and derivative broker requests, or only spot and null broker requests.
Spot requests are traded immediately, while broker requests arrive ai ∈
Ge+(
1
a
) time intervals before the capacity is actually needed (the expiration
time), where a is the mean alert time.
For spot requests, the admittance cost is
cspot={v
(
S(t)− S¯(t) + diS¯(t)
)
}k (3)
where
k = argminj{vS(t)}j (4)
is the index of the cheapest path, based on the price at t, S¯(t) is the average
cost taken over an interval (t − τ, t], and v is the demand’s resource matrix
(see eq. 1). The spot cost is the user’s estimate of the total cost of realizing
the service. In the end, the user may have to pay more or less than cspot.
For null broker requests, the admittance cost is
cnull = dimin
j
{vS(t)}j (5)
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For derivative broker requests, the admittance cost is computed as a call
option to buy the cheapest path at the starting time t+ai and give back the
resources at the ending time t+ ai+ di. The send fee is payed by the broker,
and is therefore covered by the option price that the network user pays once.
cderiv = f(t, v, t+ ai, di, K) +K (6)
where the strike price is put to
K = min(
ci
2
,min
j
{vS(t)}j).
Users that use broker requests are guaranteed to only pay the admittance
cost, while the broker may have to pay more or less, due to price fluctuation.
In the simulation, Monte-Carlo simulation was used to compute the deriva-
tive price
f(t, S(t), v, T, d,K) = EQ[max (min
k
∑
j
vkjCj −K, 0)|S(t)]. (7)
Here T > t is the starting time of the request, Q is the risk-neutral measure,
and
Cj = S(T ) + 
∫ T+di
T
S(t)dt− S(T + di)
is the cost of buying capacity j at T , holding it from T to T + di, and selling
it at T + di. The option price is evaluated with 100000 runs of Monte Carlo
in a procedure as described in [28]. In the simulation, we put the risk free
rate r = 0, which gives S the dynamics dSj = Sj{σdW}j under Q. dS
and dW are |V |-dimensional processes, W (t) being a Wiener process with
i.i.d. components. The price diffusion covariance σ2 is computed using the
estimator for a mean-reverting process with multiplicative diffusion derived
in [26]. The hedge
hij = − ∂f
∂Sj
is computed at the same time, using the same simulation trajectory. The
elements of the hedge h were constrained to be within [−2, 2], to prevent
instability in the hedge composition due to numerical errors from the Monte
Carlo simulation.
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3.4 Parameters
Simply varying the parameters µ, d, a, and c, does not allow us to compare
the system performance directly, as one will compare systems with different
units for currency, time, and capacity with each other. Instead, we will vary
the intrinsic dimensionless parameters that govern the system behavior, and
scale the other parameters accordingly.
The arrival rate µ sets the intrinsic time scale of the simulation, as it
determines the number of requests that arrive per time unit.
The system is a M/M/∞ queuing system with arrival rate µ and depar-
ture rate 1
d
. If all requests are accepted, the offered load
Lt ∈ Po[µd(1− e−t/d)]
if L0 = 0. Let the parameter
L = lim
t→∞
E[Lt] = µd
denote the characteristic load which is the asymptotic offered load, i.e. the
average number accepted and active requests at one time.
The expected number of offered requests per link is
ω¯ = L
η
|V (G)| ∝ L,
since η|V (G)| is a constant for a given network. The prices are scaled so that
the price at load ω¯ is S∗L. S
∗
L is called the scaled characteristic price. The
scaling is achieved by setting the price S(0), i.e. the price at time zero, when
the load is zero. Since
S∗L = S(0)e
L
λ
the baseline price S(0) is set to
Sj(0) = S
∗
Le
− L
λj .
Thus, the simulation runs with scaled prices that vary approximately around
S∗L, while the natural prices are proportional to e
L/λS(t).
The scale of the price processes determines the scale of the budget size.
The average budget
c = ρS∗L
9
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Figure 1: The topology of the randomly generated network used in the sim-
ulation. For example, there is only one alternative path from node 2 to 10,
but three alternative paths from node 2 to 6.
is controlled by the dimensionless budget parameter ρ.
In the simulation, all network links have the same capacity, thus we set
λj = λ for all j ∈ V .
The network, with the topology shown in fig. 1 has n = 10 nodes. It is
the same network topology used in the bandwidth market in [26]. The 212
alternative paths in the network have average path length η = 854
212
≈ 4.
3.5 Simulation
One simulation is run for 1000 time steps, t ∈ [0, 999]. In each time step, the
net change in demand is computed, and the prices are updated. There are
five sources for change in demand:
1. new spot requests that arrive
2. new broker requests that arrive
3. changes in the broker’s portfolio due to hedging
4. broker requests that are at their starting time
5. requests that are on their ending time
As we are interested in the performance of the demand types, only the the
aggregated behavior of many brokers and users is modeled. The simulation
keeps track of the aggregated demand caused by broker requests, the broker
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demand, ω(B)(t), and the aggregated demand caused by spot requests, the
spot demand, ω(S)(t).
To compute the changes in demand, the simulation proceeds as follows
at time t
1. New spot requests arrive with intensity 1
µ
(1 − q). For each new spot
request i that arrives at time t
(a) Compute cspot and the path number k by eq. (3) and (4).
(b) If cspot < ci, accept the request, increase the spot demand of
resource j with vkj, where vkj is the resource matrix in eq. (1)
(c) If accepted, add the request to the list of running requests.
2. New broker requests arrive with intensity 1
µ
q. For each new broker
request i that arrives at time t
(a) If the brokers in the simulation are derivative brokers, compute
cbroker = cderiv by eq. (6), otherwise, compute cbroker = cnull by eq.
(5).
(b) If cbroker < ci, accept the request, and append it in the list of
waiting requests.
3. If the brokers in the simulation are derivative brokers, for each request
i in the list of waiting requests with start time>t
(a) Compute the new hedge h for request i, where hij is the amount
of resource j that is used in the hedge.
(b) Increase the broker demand for resource j with hij − h′ij, where
h′ij is the previous hedge for request i. Decrease the demand if the
quantity is negative.
4. For each request i in the list of waiting requests with start time=t
(a) Compute the path number k by eq. (4). This is the path assigned
to the request.
(b) Increase the broker demand for resource j with vij − hij. (If the
brokers in the simulation are null brokers, hij will be zero).
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(c) Remove the request from the list of waiting requests, and add it
to the list of running requests.
5. For each request i in the list of running requests with end time=t
(a) If i is a spot request, decrease the spot demand for resource j by
vkj where k is the path number chosen for request i at an earlier
time in step 1.
(b) If i is a broker request, decrease the broker demand for resource
j by vkj where k is the path number chosen for request i at an
earlier time in step 4.
When the change in demand has been computed, the book-keeping starts.
Spot request costs are logged per request, while broker request costs are
aggregated.
1. The new net demand
ωj(t) = ω
(B)
j (t) + ω
(S)
j (t)
is computed, and the new prices S(t) are updated by eq. (2).
2. The users’ cost associated with each new accepted spot request i is set
to ∑
j
vkjSj(t)
3. The cost associated with each running spot request i is increased by

∑
j
vkjSj(t)
4. The cost associated with each ending spot request i is decreased by∑
j
vkjSj(t)
5. The brokers’ cost for trading resources is increased by∑
j
(ω
(B)
j (t)− ω(B)j (t− 1))Sj(t)
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6. The brokers’ cost for holding resources is increased by

∑
j
ω
(B)
j (t)Sj(t)
7. Finally, new estimates of the price process parameters σ and α are
computed, from a price history 100 time steps long.
8. The time is increased by one, and the simulation loop is reiterated.
4 Results
4.1 Hypotheses
Experiments were made to test the following hypotheses:
1. H1: Using derivative broker requests gives a lower fraction of rejected
requests, compared to spot requests and null broker requests.
2. H2: The performance of the derivative brokers is due to their hedging
strategy. It is not simply a result of aggregating the gains and losses
over many requests.
3. H3: Increased alert time decreases the fraction of rejected requests for
derivative broker requests, but not for null broker requests.
4. H4: Using derivative broker requests has a dampening effect on the
price fluctuations. The effect is not simply a result of aggregating
many requests.
The hypotheses were tested for significance by performing a rank test of
the expected value in the data sets. Confidence tests were made using the
paired t − test, which assumes that the data is iid and Gaussian. The as-
sumption is reasonable here, since a large part of the errors are due to Monte
Carlo method imprecisions, thus caused by many small independent error
sources, and which justifies use of the Central Limit Theorem.
The t − test tests if hypotheses of the type E[X] > 0 are supported by
data points x1, ..., xm by checking if the null hypothesis E[X] = 0 is less
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likely than the confidence, here taken to be C=0.05. It assumes that the
data points are drawn from a R.V. X, and tests if
Prob[X > x] < C.
The quantity to the left is called the p− value of the data. If the confidence
criteria cannot be met, then it may or may not be true that E[X] = 0, and
the data is said to be inconclusive.
A similar test, the mean difference test, is made to investigate if two sets
of samples are drawn from random variables with the same expected value.
The mean difference test is used to compare the relative performance of
the different trading strategies. The tests were made with the Mathematica
program [29].
Other tests such as Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank test [30] or the Kruskal-Wallis
Rank test [31] may also be used. Nonparametric tests such as these may be
preferable due to their robustness, i.e. their insensitivity to small departures
of the idealized assumptions, on e.g. underlying distributions, but are on the
other hand less sensitive.
4.2 Data sets
Four test sets with simulation results were generated. The parameters were
fixed in each individual simulation, but varied over the test set:
• In the first set, the parameter L was varied over L ∈ {10, 20, ..., 100}.
The L parameter controls the number of concurrently running requests
that the network will support in its stationary state.
• In the second set, the parameter λ was varied over exp 1
λ
∈ {1.02, 1.05, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3}.
Instead of varying λ directly, we vary x=exp 1
λ
, since exp 1
λ
has a more
intuitive meaning. It is the relative price movement caused by trading
one unit of capacity in a node, e.g. x = 1.1 means that the price is
moved 10% when the net demand is changed one unit. In networks
with small capacity, the price fluctuation is large since the demanded
volume is large in comparison to the available amount, and thus λ is
small and x is large. The inverse holds for large networks.
• In the third set, the parameter a was varied over a ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}.
With larger values of a, the brokers have more time to trade to obtain
the necessary resources.
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• In the fourth set, the parameter ρ was varied over ρ ∈ {1, 2, .., 10}.
The budget parameter controls the budget size in relation to the char-
acteristic cost. If ρ is small, the average cost of a request is large
compared to the average budget, and vice versa.
Besides the above parameters, the parameters q and broker request type was
varied over q ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}, and type ∈ {null, derivative} in all test sets,
in order to compare the different request types along the test set parameter
axis. The baseline values of the model parameters were set to L = 50, a = 5,
ρ = 4 ≈ η, λ = 1/ log 1.1, µ = 1, d = L/µ.
Each simulation ran 1000 time steps. In order to let prices settle before
derivative request costs were computed, for t < 200, q was set to 0, making
all requests spot requests. For t ≥ 200, q was reset to its simulation value,
making a fraction q of the requests broker requests of the type type, as
specified for the simulation.
The fraction of rejected requests, and the costs to accept the requests,
were averaged over the time interval t ∈ [500, 1000). The price variance σ
was measured at t = 1000.
Figures 2 to 6 compare the derivative broker requests’ performance with
• the null broker requests’ performance in a similar situation, and
• the spot requests’ performance in the same simulation.
In these figures, the averages of the data points are connected with cubic
splines to facilitate reading. The color of the line denotes the request type:
red is for derivative broker requests; green is for spot requests, and blue is for
null broker requests. The line dashing denotes the q value, i.e. the fraction of
broker requests to spot requests. Sparse dashed lines show q = 0.1, medium
dense dashed lines show q = 0.5, and dotted lines show q = 0.9. Solid lines
show unmixed populations. Thus, as an example, q = 0.1 means that there
are ten percent broker requests and 90 percent spot requests. Curves with
similar dashing can therefore be compared with each other.
Since derivative brokers and null brokers are not mixed, a simulation
contains either only spot and derivative broker requests, or only spot and
null broker requests. Thus, when derivative brokers are compared to null
brokers, they have run in separate simulations, independent of each other.
When the derivative brokers are compared to spot requests, they have run
in the same simulation, competing against each other.
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4.3 Rejected requests
In fig. 2 the fraction of rejected requests y is plotted against the parameters
L, λ, a, and ρ. In agreement with H1 and H2, the derivative broker requests
result a lower rejection rate than null broker requests, and spot requests.
A mean difference test of the derivative broker rejection rate and the null
broker rejection rate shows that the mean difference is significant, except for
the cases q = 0.1, with varying λ or ρ (see the sparse dashed lines, left column,
rows two and four). A similar mean difference test with spot rejection rate
shows that the mean difference is significant for q = 0.9, or for parameter
values to the left on the x-axis. In the other regions, the data is inconclusive.
In agreement with H3, increasing the alert time a decreases the rejection
rate for the derivative broker, but not for the null broker. It appears that
changing a has an effect on the spot requests. This effect is a result of
the implicit interaction with the derivative brokers that run in the same
simulation. When spot requests from a simulation with null brokers are
plotted, no effect due to a is found (not shown in the figures). Thus, the spot
requests profit from the derivative brokers ability to trade future demand.
The result of modifying λ is at first counter-intuitive, since the rejection
rate decreases with increasing x = exp 1
λ
. This can be explained by noting
that large λ (and small x) keep prices very near S∗, where the rejection rate
will be on the order of 0.5 (for ρ = η), while for small λ, prices will mostly
deviate significantly from S∗, most of the time remaining below S∗, with
occasional large price peaks.
The graphs show that derivative broker reject rate decreases with increas-
ing q, since red curves with denser dashing are below more sparsely dashed
curves. In other works, the more derivative brokers the better for the request
acceptance rate.
4.4 End-user costs
In fig. 3 the end-users’ cost per request is plotted against the parameters L,
λ, a, and on the characteristic price scale in fig. 3, and on the natural scale
(i.e. rescaled by exp L
λ
) in fig. 4. The plot of prices on the natural scale shows
that the prices increase exponentially with the load.
The prices displayed are the average costs for the accepted requests. For
low values of L and λ, the derivative broker requests’ average costs are higher
than for spot and null broker requests. This is an effect of the high rejection
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Figure 2: The fraction of rejected requests, or loss, plotted for the four data
sets. Color denotes request type, and dashing fraction of broker requests,
as explained in sec. 4.2. The horizontal axis on row one shows the load
parameter L, on row two, the market liquidity x = exp 1
λ
, on row three, the
alert time parameter a, and on row four, the budget size parameter ρ.
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Figure 3: The users’ cost per request is plotted on the characteristic cost S∗
scale, for the four data sets, varying L, λ, a, and ρ on respective rows. Color
and dashing has same meaning as in fig. 2.
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Derivative broker (red) vs. Derivative broker (red) vs.
Null broker (green) Spot request (blue)
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natural currency units, i.e. the prices in fig. 3 are scaled by exp L
λ
. Color and
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ratio of the latter schemes, as discussed in section 4.3. Since calls are rejected
when the price is high, the average cost of an accepted call becomes low. This
indicates that cspot and cnull compute too high acceptance costs for low values
of L, which causes the excessive rejection rate that is shown in row one of
fig. 2. Since the relatively high end-user cost at low L results in higher
admission rate, this does not contradict H1 and H2.
The end-users’ spot request costs are even lower than the null broker
request costs for small values of L. However, a user trading directly at the
spot-market is exposed to the additional risk of having to pay more than
cspot for the service, due to fluctuations in the capacity prices. For small
values of L, and other parameters at baseline values, about 7 percent of the
spot-trading end-users exceed their budget, by on average about 30 percent.
As shown in fig. 4, for large values of L, the users’ cost for derivative
broker requests goes below the cost of both spot requests and null broker
requests, while derivative broker requests maintain the lowest rejection rate.
The performance of the derivative broker increases with q, the fraction of
derivative broker requests.
In agreement with H3, increasing the alert time a decreases the users’
cost for the derivative broker requests. It also decreases for the null broker
requests, although with smaller slope. Similar to the spot requests loss be-
havior, changing a appears to change the users’ cost for the spot requests,
but again this is an effect of the spot requests free-riding on the derivative
requests. In a simulation without derivative brokers, the spot requests do
not benefit from increased alert time a.
Increasing the end-users’ budget, by increasing ρ does, as expected, in-
crease the average price paid per request, which is consistent with the de-
creased rejection rate observed on row four in fig. 2.
4.5 Broker costs
Fig. 5 shows the brokers’ cost per request plotted against the data set pa-
rameters L, λ, a, and ρ, in the characteristic cost S∗ scale. Fig. 6 shows the
cost plotted in natural price units, i.e. rescaled by exp L
λ
. In these plots,
a positive cost means that the broker is losing money on average, while a
negative value means that money is earned on average.
The broker cost as a function of the load L shows that the null broker
under-prices the point-to-point service, while the derivative broker over-prices
it. Therefore, the null broker effectively “subsidizes” the requests, which
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Figure 5: The brokers’ cost per request is plotted on the characteristic cost
S∗ scale, for the four data sets. On the horizontal axis in row one are L and
λ respectively, and and on row two, a and ρ. A positive broker cost means
that the broker is losing money. Color and dashing has same meaning as in
fig. 2. The wiggly lines are an artifact of fitting a cubic spline to noisy data .
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Derivative broker (red) vs. Null broker (green)
(running in separate simulations)
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Figure 6: Here the upper row of fig. 5, the brokers’ cost per request as
a function of L (left) and λ (right), is plotted on a semi-log plot in natural
currency units, i.e. the prices in fig. 5 are scaled by exp L
λ
. Color and dashing
has the same meaning as in fig. 2.
results in a lower reject rate. The derivative broker overcharges, which to
some extent explains the large increase in end-user cost for low values of L
(see row one in fig. 3).
For large values of L and exp 1
λ
, both types of broker requests under-price
the point-to-point service. Extrapolating the curves outside the data set
suggests that for very large values of the parameters, the derivative broker
will surpass the null broker in underpricing the service. This is an artifact
of the Monte Carlo method, which produces a larger relative errors when it
samples wildly fluctuating prices.
The parameters a and ρ have in the investigated range no statistically
significant impact on the brokers’ cost per request.
4.6 Price variance
To study the effect on the price variance caused by different types of broker
requests, the average price diffusion variance
〈
σ2jj
〉
was computed, based at
the estimate at t = 999, for distinct values of L, q, and type. Fig. 7 shows
the ratio of the price volatility caused by derivative broker requests and null
broker requests. For low values of L, the derivative broker request prices are
more volatile than null broker prices, while for large L, the price volatility
for derivative broker requests decreases below that of the null broker. The
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Figure 7: The average price variation for derivative broker requests, and for
null broker requests is estimated at t = 999. The ratio is plotted against the
load parameter L. Dashing has same meaning as in fig. 2.
volatility ratio decreases quite rapidly around L = 50, and thus appears to
behave qualitatively similar to the user cost per request (fig. 4). This result
is in agreement with H4 for L > 50 and in disagreement for L < 50.
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Figure 8: A linear fit of the average price variation is plotted against the alert
time parameter a. Color denotes request type, and dashing denotes fraction
of broker requests, as explained in sec. 4.2. The slope is significant only for
derivative brokers when q > 0.5.
Fig. 8 shows a linear fit of the price diffusion variance
〈
σ2jj
〉
plotted as a
function of the alert time parameter a. The red densely dotted line shows
that the derivative broker requests reduce the price variance, while the slope
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is insignificant for the null broker. This is interpreted as evidence that the
hedging strategy is able to use the information about future demand to reduce
the price fluctuation, while the null broker trading strategy does not have
this effect. It is consistent that the sparse dense lines have a smaller slope,
since in those simulations, many of the requests were spot requests, which
are not affected by the alert time. Thus, the graph in fig. 8 is consistent with
H4.
This figure also provides an explanation to the spot requests’ performance
increase due to a, as shown in the right column on row three in fig. 2 and
3. The derivative brokers’ damping effect on volatility is useful to the spot
requests.
5 Conclusion
This paper reports on measurements of the effect of a broker trading mech-
anism for network capacity. The mechanism was tested in a computer net-
work scenario where end-users face the task of composing virtual circuits,
or paths, through a network, by buying capacity on several spot markets.
The mechanism uses financial derivatives contracts and hedging techniques
to allow a broker to trade and combine bundles of resources, when the single
resources are traded on separate and independent markets. The derivatives
based approach was compared to two other trading strategies that act as
null hypotheses; a spot trading strategy that does not trade future demand,
and a “null broker” strategy which trades future demand without perform-
ing any advance trading to reduce the risk. The performance was measured
over a range of parameter values controlling the network’s size in terms of
router capacity, and user models. All simulation were run on one randomly
generated network with 10 nodes.
The simulations showed that the derivative trading strategy admits more
point-to-point request to the network than the null hypothesis trading strate-
gies, even though the null broker “subsidized” admission by under-charging
for the service it produced. This shows that it is the derivative broker’s abil-
ity to trade future demand, and to balance the risk through hedging, that is
responsible for its performance gain.
Brokers are useful in taking on the risk from the end-users. An end-user
is more sensitive to over-spending than a broker, for whom profits and losses
more quickly average out. The simulations showed that derivative brokers,
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for an added cost, take on the end-users’ trading risk, and reduce their risk
of overspending from seven percent to zero. The results presented here show
that the approach to trade network path components with the help of a
derivative trading mechanism is feasible and has good effects on the net-
work, compared to other simpler trading mechanisms. The main weakness
of the derivatives based approach is the computational cost of Monte Carlo
evaluation of the derivative price f and its partial derivatives. One poten-
tially fruitful approach to improve on this is to approximate the derivative
price function with a smooth interpolating function which can be evaluated
rapidly. This is likely to be possible because the absolute values of partial
derivatives of f are small, bounded by the number of nodes in the longest
alternative path.
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